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Abstract
"Second-order logic" is the name given to a formal system. Some 
claim that the formal system is a logical system. Others claim that it is a 
mathematical system. In the thesis, I examine these claims in the light of 
some philosophical criteria which first motivated Frege in his logicist 
project. The criteria are that a logic should be universal, it should reflect 
our intuitive notion of logical validity, and it should be analytic.
The analysis is interesting in two respects. One is conceptual: it gives us a 
purchase on where and how to draw a distinction between logic and other 
sciences. The other interest is historical: showing that second-order logic is 
a logical system according to the philosophical criteria mentioned above 
goes some way towards vindicating Frege's logicist project in a 
contemporary context.
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Introduction
"Ne pas déplorer, ne pas rire, ne pas détester, 
mais comprendre."
-Spinoza
Traditionally, philosophers have accorded to logic a privileged 
status. Logic is what underlies all our reasoning. It underpins all 
rational argument. It acts as the ultimate, and therefore preferred, 
justification for any claim insofar as it is appropriate. That is, what we 
can justify by appeal to logic, we should justify by appeal to logic, since 
this makes for the strongest possible justification. Logic is very close to 
mathematics in these respects. However, prima facie, there seem to be 
differences between mathematics and logic. Mathematical theories 
seem to be about particular sorts of abstract objects or structures. Logic 
seems to be universal, and not about any objects at all.
The logicist is interested in the contrast between justifying claims 
by appealing to logic, and justifying claims by appealing to the "special 
sciences". If a claim is justified by logic, then it does not rely on 
particular facts about the world, or how it is we see the world. In 
contrast, claims which are justified by mathematics or physical 
assumptions, are ones which depend on assumptions about physical 
structures, or our sense of spatial intuition. The logicist is also 
interested in where the boundary lies between the two. Historically, the 
first guess has been that arithmetic is really part of logic, but geometry 
is not.
The problématicjue of the Thesis can be described in at least two 
ways: one historical and one conceptual. The more historically 
motivated question is to what extent Frege's logicism can be vindicated 
in the light of the tragic history of the project, and in the context of a 
plethora of logical and mathematical formal systems which have 
mushroomed since Frege. The difference that the plethora of formal 
systems makes to Frege's logicist project is that because the differences
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between these formal systems are so small, their development (or 
discovery) throws into doubt the very idea that a distinction can be 
drawn between logic and mathematics.
The more conceptual or metaphysically motivated group of 
questions is where and how to draw a distinction between logic and 
mathematics. Chapters one and three concentrate more on the historical 
questions. Chapters two and four are more conceptually oriented. 
Nevertheless, it will become clear that the two groups of questions 
overlap considerably, and inform each other throughout the thesis.
We begin with a little history. In the second half of the 
nineteenth century there was a view expressed, by Dedekind,^ amongst 
others, that arithmetic is just a more sophisticated form of logic. Frege 
set out to make that view more precise, and indeed, to prove it true. 
"Herr Dedekind, like myself [Frege], is of the opinion that the theory of 
numbers is part of logic; but his work hardly contributes to its 
confirmation. "2 Frege finds fault with Dedekind's methodology. It is not 
rigorous enough.
According to Frege, to prove that number theory is really just 
logic, one has to prove that the axioms of arithmetic are derivable, 
as a set of theorems, from logical axioms. That is, using only logical 
assumptions and logical methods of deduction, we should generate 
the truths of arithmetic we would generate from the traditional 
Peano-Dedekind axioms of arithmetic (henceforth: the Peano 
axioms). Theorems of arithmetic should just fail out of the logic. For 
the purpose of showing that this was indeed possible, Frege had to 
set up a logical system because the existing logical systems were 
woefully inadequate for the task. The prepositional calculus had 
been introduced, and a very restricted use of quantifiers was
^Richard Dedekind, "The Nature and Meaning of Numbers," Richard Dedekind, 
Essays on the Theory of Numbers, trans. Wooster Woodruff Beman, (New York: 
Doyer Publications, Inc., 1963), pp. 31 -115.
“Gottlob Frege, The Basic Laws of Arithmetic. Exposition of the System, ed. & 
trans. Montgomery Furth, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Uniyersity of California 
Press, 1964), p. 4.
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making an appearance through the work of Boole,^ and Pierce, 
amongst others. Dedekind did not have an explicitly articulated 
formal system which he considered to be logic. For this reason, he 
could not formally prove that arithmetic is part of logic. He could 
only offer sketches of proofs, and give conceptual arguments.
Frege thoroughly articulated a conceptual leap forward in 
logic through his three great works: Bem ffsschrift. a Formula 
Language, Modelled upon that of Arithmetic, for pure Thought,  ^
(henceforth: Begriffsschrift). The Foundations of Arithmetic, A 
Logico-Mathematical Enquiry into the Concept of Number,  ^
(henceforth: Gnindlagen) . and The Basic Laws of Arithmetic, 
Exposition of the System.  ^ (henceforth: Cnindf^esetze). In his formal 
system, Frege lays down some axioms which he believes to be 
obviously logical. He also sets up a notation which traces truth 
preservation through rules of inference. That is, from a logical truth, 
only logical truths will follow.
To realise the project of proving that arithmetic follows from 
logic, not only did a sophisticated logical system need to be 
developed, but also, the philosophical notion of what a logic 
consists in, had to be made more precise. For, one cannot claim that 
arithmetic is just logic, unless one can characterise logic. Otherwise, 
one does not know if what one has derived arithmetic from, is really 
logic and not just mathematics. The reduction of arithmetic to a 
more "basic" formal system is a technical result. It is only exciting in
^George Boole, An Investigation of The Laws of Thought on which are Founded 
the Mathematical Theories of Logic nnd Probabilities, (New York: Dover 
Publications, Inc., 1958).
•^Gottlob Frege, B e m ffss c h r if t. a Formula Language. Modelled upon that of 
Arithmetic. For Pure Thought, in From Frege to God el. a Source Book in 
Mathematical Logic, 1879 -1931. ed. Jean van Heijenoort, (third printing; 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 1 - 82,
'■’Gottlob Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic, a L ogico-M athematical Enquiry 
into the Concept of Number, trans. J. L. Austin, (Second edition; Evanston, 
Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1980).
(’Gottlob Frege, The Basic Laws of Arithmetic. Exposition of the System, ed. & 
trans. Montgomery Furth, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 1964).
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the light of the philosophical privilege accorded the reducing 
system over the reduced system.
Frege's Gnindlagm  explores the philosophical aspect of 
logicism. Be<^riffsschrift and Grundgesetze, respectively, set up and 
develop the formal aspects of logicism. Frege's project was abruptly 
halted with the discovery of inconsistency derivable from his fifth, 
purportedly logical, axiom, introduced in the first volume of his last 
great work: Grundgesetze.
The failure of Frege's project was followed by one other 
serious attempt at creating a logical foundation strong enough to 
derive the theorems of arithmetic. In fact, it was a more ambitious 
project: to show that, not only arithmetic, but all of mathematics is 
reducible to logic. The attempt was carried out by Whitehead and 
Russell, who developed a powerful type theory. They failed. The 
type theory they developed, was deemed, on philosophical 
grounds, to be mathematics; since it included an axiom of infinity, 
for example. The failure of Russell and Whitehead was followed by 
a search for alternative foundations for mathematics. Questions 
were raised as to the nature or essence of mathematics, and as to 
what distinguishes sound from unsound mathematical practice. 
Logic no longer looked like a likely candidate for providing an 
answer, so mathematicians turned their attention to global 
mathematical systems, such as set theory and type theory. The idea 
of founding mathematics, or even part of it, in logic had been 
abandoned.
Set theory was the favoured discipline of Zermelo, Fraenkel, 
Von Neumann, Godel, Bernays and others. Some mathematicians 
advocated a tempering of mathematics through epistemological 
considerations. Their worry was that, in pursuing mathematics into 
the realm of the infinite, we were overreaching ourselves, and that 
some of the notions we employed were in fact incoherent. To ensure 
against finding a contradiction in set theory or any other theory, the 
constructivists, most famously represented by Brower and Heyting, 
advocated greater discipline in the use of the law of excluded
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middle, and stressed that mathematics is a building process. In 
mathematics, we must give methods for constructing finite or only 
countably large entities or structures. Hilbert suggested a less 
restrictive approach. He placed two constraints on mathematics: 
that it should be consistent and that proofs, as opposed to 
structures, should be finite.
Partly as a result of this search for foundations in 
mathematics which followed the collapse of Frege’s project, and 
partly as a result of a concern to tailor logical and mathematical 
systems to applications; a number of formal systems were 
developed. Many of these claim, in name at least, the status of a 
logic. In name then, it looks as though there are many competing 
logical systems, and one could quickly draw the inference that 
"logic" is an ambiguous or relative term.
This is not to say that there was only one logical system  
before Frege. Frege's formal system of the Begriffsschrift was 
accompanied by philosophical arguments to show that his system  
was logic, and, to my knowledge, this claim was not directly 
challenged by Frege's contemporaries. At the time, it was quite 
natural not to challenge Frege over his claim that the formal system  
of the Begriffsschrift is a logical system since there was perceived to 
be an obvious gap between his formal system and mathematics. We 
now recognise Frege's logic to be equivalent to second-order logic,^ 
and second-order logic is stronger than first-order logic. Since Frege, 
first-order logic has come to be regarded as logic, and broadly 
speaking, anything stronger has come to be thought of as being 
mathematics. Not everyone is adamant that first-order logic is the 
strongest logic. This is because there are formal systems which are 
just a little stronger than first-order logic, and therefore, in the spirit 
of a slippery slope argument: if we let first-order logic be considered 
logic, then we might as well consider a slightly stronger system to
^George Boolos, "The Consistency of Frege's F ou ndations o f  A r ith m e tic ,"  On Being 
nnd Saving: Essays in Honor of Richard Cartwright, ed. Judith Jarvis Thompson, 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts; MIT Press, 1987), p. 3.
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be logic as well, and so on. For example, first-order logic, with the 
quantifier "there are infinitely many" is considered to lie between 
first and second-order logic in strength. In fact, there are many 
formal systems which lie between first and second-order logic. 
There are also stronger systems than second-order logic. For 
example, trans-finite type theory, second-order set theory, and 
category theory. Interestingly, it turns out that since there is a sense 
in which simple type theory reduces to second-order logic;^ third- 
order logic, fourth-order logic and simple type theory are often^ not 
considered to be stronger formal systems than second-order logic. 
Some of these are powerful enough that we can do a substantial 
amount of mathematics in them. Thus, the very idea that there is a 
border between logic and mathematics becomes harder to defend. 
The philosophical criteria for logic have to be sharper today than 
they did at the turn of the century, in order to make more fine­
grained distinctions between existing formal systems.
To add to the confusion, internal to a formal system there are 
various places where we might draw a distinction between the 
logical and the non-logical. For example, we can distinguish logical 
from non-logical terms, logical from non-logical vocabulary, 
sentences, rules of inference and so on.
The smallest unit is the vocabulary, sometimes referred to as 
an alphabet. In setting up a formal system, in the list of vocabulary, 
we distinguish between logical constants, non-logical constants, 
descriptive vocabulary, and variables. The logical constants are 
usually connectives like " v" and operators such as "V", and 
sometimes relations such as What distinguishes a logical 
constant from other vocabulary is that the interpretation of these 
symbols stays fixed across domains. That is, no matter what domain 
of objects, and possibly relations and functions, we may be
^This is discussed in chapter IV, § 3.
^Strictly speaking, this will depend on how one measures the strength of formal 
systems.
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considering, the logical connectives work in exactly the same way. 
We are debarred from interpreting "v" as for example.
Non-logical constant symbols have an intended fixed 
interpretation across domains. The purpose of saying that they have 
an intended interpretation is that we can give unintended 
interpretations to these symbols. Sometimes this proves very 
fruitful. They are introduced to the language for the express 
purpose of studying a particular set of mathematical objects, 
relations or functions. We adopt the convention here of calling these 
"mathematical theories". For example, the mathematical constant 
symbol "s " might be introduced in order to facilitate the study of 
first-order set theory. Non-logical constant symbols may stand for 
individuals, such as that usually designated by the symbol: "0" in 
arithmetic. They may stand for a relation, such as that usually 
designated by "e ", or they may stand for a function such as that 
which is designated by It is standard practice, and we shall treat 
this as our default position, to regard - i ,  v ,  a , — 3, V and = as 
symbolising logical constants. The non-logical constants, by 
convention, are symbolised by other symbols. We shall also come to 
question the extension, if not the intension, of the distinction 
between logical and non-logical constants. Intensionally, the non- 
logical constants have no place in a logical language because 
understanding the use of the symbol which designates them 
requires some specialised knowledge based on intuition or sense 
perception. We shall elaborate this point in the course of the thesis.
The descriptive vocabulary is a set of predicate, relation and 
function symbols. A predicate is a one-place relation. The relations 
and functions may have any number, n, of places for variables, such 
that n e 0). For example, a two-place relation relates pairs of objects 
from the (Cartesian product of the) domain. The interpretation of 
the descriptive vocabulary is not independent of the domain, as it is 
with constants (logical or non-logical), but is fixed relative to a 
domain. That is, in each domain, the descriptive vocabulary receive 
a fixed interpretation.
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Variables are not fixed at all. They range over individuals of 
the domain, in the case of individual variables, and over subsets of 
the powerset of the domain, in the case of predicate, relation and 
function variables. In first-order logic, we have only individual 
variables. To distinguish between different sorts of variables we say 
first-order variable for the individual variables, and second-order 
variables for the others.
To fix terminology, we shall say that the only non-logical 
vocabulary is composed of the non-logical constants. Any other 
combination of vocabulary can act as part of what we shall call a 
language of logic. This is contrasted to the language of a theory, 
which will include non-logical constants. "Formal languages" and 
"formal systems" are deliberately ambiguous between these in order 
not to beg any questions.
A term denotes an object. A logical term is one which has no 
non-logical constants. For example, "Px" is a logical term. This 
ensures that it can be interpreted in any domain of discourse. A 
non-logical term can only be interpreted in some domains, because 
there may not be a sensibly corresponding element in the domain. 
For example, the non-logical constant "0" cannot receive a sensible 
interpretation in the domain of objects composed of the contents of 
my desk drawer.
A logical sentence will also have no non-logical constants. A 
logical sentence is not the same as a logical truth. It is only a logical 
truth if it is true under any interpretation. A logical falsehood is a 
sentence which is false under any interpretation. A logical sentence 
may be neither a logical truth nor a logical falsehood. In this case, it 
will be true under some interpretations and not others. A logical 
truth is also called a valid sentence.
A logical axiom or rule of inference is one which governs the 
use of one or more of the logical connectives. For example, an axiom 
about the combination of "-i" and "v" is: -i(p v q) —> ( —ip a -iq). A 
non-logical axiom or rule of inference governs the use of non-logical 
constants. For example, an axiom for "+" and "0" is: 0 + x = x.
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Axioms, whether logical or not, are true, in the sense that in a given 
theory we are obliged to choose only interpretations which make 
them true. A logical axiom is the limit case: it is true under all 
interpretations. In part, this is an artefact of the logical vocabulary 
receiving an interpretation which is fixed independent of any 
domain. In part, we think that the logical axioms reflect 
fundamental (pre-theoretic) truths.
At various points in the thesis it will be appropriate to 
discuss one or other of these different units viz: logical or non- 
logical vocabulary, logical or non-logical sentences, logical or non- 
logical axioms, and so on. In general, the chief aim is to distinguish 
a logical from a non-logical system (at times this might be done in 
terms of vocabulary and so on).
"Formal system" is ambiguous between a theory and a logic.
In general, a formal system consists in (intended) interpretations 
and a formal language (vocabulary, terms, well-formed formulas), 
an assignment function, a satisfaction function, a set of axioms and 
rules of inference. A logic is such a formal system which has no 
intended interpretations: any interpretation may be considered. A 
theory has an intended interpretation. We may try to make this 
explicit by adding non-logical constants or special axioms to a 
language, which come with, or force, a particular interpretation.
While in the business of drawing distinctions; rather glibly, we 
have been referring to the notion of expressive strength of a formal 
system, as though the notion were not ambiguous. Unfortunately, this 
is not the case. We use different measures for the strength of a formal 
system: in terms of limitative results, in terms of the sorts of theorems 
which can be generated, and in terms of the definitional resources of 
the underlying formal language. The three forms of measurement are 
closely related but not identical. For example, consider many-sorted 
logic. This is a formal system made up of a second-order language, that 
is, there is quantification over predicate, relation and function variables, 
but this differs from full second-order logic in that the predicate 
variables only range over a fixed subset of the domain and the relation
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and function variables only range over a fixed subset of the powerset of 
the domaindO In contrast, in second-order logic, the second-order 
variables range over all subsets of the domain. Many-sorted logic and 
first-order logic share several limitative results. They are both compact, 
complete, have the upward and downward Lowenheim-Skolem 
properties and are semi-decidable. ^  ^  Thus, in terms of the limitative 
results mentioned above, the two systems have equal expressive power. 
However, many-sorted logic has greater expressive power in terms of 
definitional resources, owing to its allowing quantification over second- 
order variables. Thus, in terms of definitional resources, many-sorted 
logic is stronger than first-order logic. Nevertheless, while there are a 
few examples of formal systems which show a divergence according to 
different measures of strength, it remains that there is more concord 
than disagreement over the ratings of strength of formal systems.
To return to our history; with the mushrooming of formal 
systems, of varying strengths, the question was raised as to whether 
or not second-order logic was to be considered a logic. For instance, 
Quine has argued that second-order logic, and a fortiori Frege's 
logical system, is part of set theory. In particular, the semantics of 
second-order logic is that of set theory.^^ That is, we have to 
interpret the syntactic part of second-order logic in terms of sets, as 
they are arranged in the set-theoretic hierarchy. Since the set- 
theoretic hierarchy is a particular interpretation, which excludes
^Stewart Shapiro, Foundations Without Foundationalism: A Case for Second- 
Order Logic. (Oxford Logic Guides: 17; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), pp. 7 3 -4 .
A theory is deddable iff it has an effective proof procedure which can detect of 
any sentence that it is or is not a theorem. See George Boolos and Richard Jeffrey, 
Computabilitv and Logic. (Second edition; Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 174. A theory is semi-decidable if there is 
an effective positive test for unsatisfiability. Such a test is "an effective procedure 
which, when applied to an arbitrary sentence S... terminates with a 'yes' iff S is 
unsatisfiable." George Boolos and Richard Jeffrey, Computability and Logic. 
(Second edition; Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 
p. 142. Such a test is not the same as a decision procedure. For, there is no 
effective test for the satisfiability of an arbitrary sentence S because some of the 
proofs which try to determine this will be infinite; they will not terminate. 
‘^Willard Orman Van Quine, Philosophv of Logic, (Englewood Cliffs, New  
Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1970) pp. 66-7 .
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others, second-order logic is not general, and therefore, is not 
considered to be a logic.
Another question which arises in tandem with this argument 
is: what is the philosophical basis for characterising a logic, in 
contra-distinction to mathematics? This question did not have to be 
answered in enormous detail by Frege, mainly because there were 
fewer formal systems to distinguish between. As the number of 
formal systems increases, and the differences between them become 
increasingly subtle, a first question which arises is how to 
characterise a system at all: whether in terms of limitative (or 
characterising) results, or in terms of the semantic and syntactic 
presentation or in terms of philosophical considerations. The first 
approach can appear contrived or artificial. This is because it really 
belongs to the realm of abstract model theory, and it is not obvious, 
at first, why it is that some limitative results are more important 
than others, or whether we have anything like an exhaustive 
catalogue of these. The second approach holds the difficulty that not 
all systems are presented in readily identifiable divisions of 
semantic versus syntactic aspects. The third aspect: of the 
philosophical characterisation of logic, has received too little 
attention. The characterisation given by Frege is not sufficiently 
sharp to pick out one formal system over others. Thus, the 
philosophical characterisation bears sharpening. In this thesis I shall 
be using the first two approaches to sharpen the philosophical 
notions.
Discussion of the philosophical characterisation of logic 
belongs to the more conceptual aspect of the thesis. Logic excites 
philosophers for many reasons. In some sense, logic is supposed to 
be universal. Logical inference and logical axioms are both the 
starting point and the final appeal in any reasoned debate. Logical 
inference cuts through rhetoric. Logical systems ignore any 
peculiarities of a subject. A logical axiom is amongst the most basic, 
and may always be appealed to. A valid logical inference is always 
truth preserving.
11
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This is all very well, until we start to consider rival formal 
systems, each with their own claims to the honorific "logic". For, one 
formal system will label an argument valid, where another will not. 
A standard definition of a valid argument is that an argument is 
valid if and only if (henceforth: iff) whenever the vocabulary used in 
the premises is interpreted in such a way as to make the premises 
true, so is the conclusion. As we mentioned before, we have no 
leeway in interpreting the logical constants. A sentence, as opposed 
to an argument, is logically valid, if it is true under any 
interpretation. Formal systems will disclose more or less 
information about the structure of the premises and the conclusion 
of an argument. How much information they disclose will depend 
on their expressive power. Thus, some formal systems might just 
miss out on what makes a given argument valid. This indicates an 
insufficiency in expressive power. For example, the argument:
Mary has a sister.
Betty has a sister.
Therefore, Mary and Betty have some property in 
common;
is not valid in first-order logic. It is valid in second-order logic.^^
To decide if an argument really is logically valid, 
independent of whether or not a particular formal system 
pronounces it to be so, we are left with appealing to informal 
notions, that is, philosophical intuitions and arguments not formally 
laid out. There is an informal notion of validity: to which the formal 
notions are ultimately responsible! Thus, it is possible to informally 
recognise an argument to be valid when it is not so approved by a
first-order logic we would formalise the argument as follows. Let "S" be the 
predicate "has a sister", let "m” stand for Mary, let "b" stand for Betty, then the 
premises are represented: Sm and Sb. For the conclusion, we have to invent a new 
two-place predicate: "H" for "have some property in common", so the conclusion 
is represented: "Hmb". The argument, thus represented, turns out to be invalid in 
first-order logic. In second-order logic, we could represent the promises in the 
same way: Sm and Sb. The conclusion could be written: (3S)(Sm a  Sb), and is 
thereby shown to be valid. The conclusion follows from " a  introduction", and 
second-order " 3  introduction", respectively.
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given formal system. This judgement will usually arise from the 
inadequacy of the formal language to capture the relevant logical 
structure of the argument. The ability of a logical system to do so, is 
a measure of its expressive strength. A weak logic will misrepresent 
more arguments than a strong logic will.
It is tempting at this stage to think that, to reflect our informal 
notion of logical validity, all we want is a very powerful logic one that 
will find a lot of arguments valid. (Obviously, we do not want all 
arguments to be valid, because that defeats the purpose of 
argumentation, and makes disagreement trivial.) However, there must 
be some maximal way of expressing all valid arguments: distinguishing 
the valid from the invalid, and reflecting our informal notion of validity 
as accurately as possible.
Unfortunately, the situation is not so straightforward. 
Distinguish three different sorts of validity: an informal notion of 
logical validity, formal logical validity and validity in a theory. An 
argument is informally and logically valid just in case its form can be 
imported to any discourse, and the conclusion is deemed, on an 
intuitive level to follow logically from the premises. We shall say no 
more at this stage, since the notion is meant to be intuitive, in the sense 
of pre-theoretic. We shall be sharpening the notion progressively at 
different points in the thesis as we try to match it to validity in 
particular formal systems.
An argument or sentence is formally and logically valid just in 
case a chosen formal (purportedly) logical system pronounces it valid. 
The order in which we consider factors which contribute to the 
judgement that an argument is valid is different from the intuitive case. 
In the intuitive case, we are presented with an argument and asked 
what our intuitions say about it: whether we feel it to be logically valid 
or not. In the formal case, we decide first whether or not a given formal 
system is logic. We then express the argument in the language of the 
logic, and accept the verdict given by the formal system as to its logical 
validity.
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The last sort of validity is distinct from both of these, not in the 
order of the factors we invoke in pronouncing an argument valid, but 
in what the nature of the premises is, which make that argument valid. 
An argument or sentence is valid in a theory just in case it appeals to 
some feature of the theory which that theory does not share with other 
theories. In other words, it is sound in that theory. What makes the 
premises in the argument true are assumptions peculiar to the theory. 
For example, a law of a theory belongs to that theory and it is 
inappropriate to import it to some other theories. For example, we 
cannot automatically take laws of physics and re-interpret them in an 
economic context and apply them. To do so requires argument to the 
effect that the analogy holds. An argument is invalid if there is an 
interpretation which makes the premises true, but the conclusion is 
false. An argument is logically invalid, but valid in a theory, or a 
context, just in case all falsifying interpretations are inappropriate to the 
theory, or context. For example, the statement that it is impossible to 
get Mr. Seasick on to a boat is false under the interpretation which 
allows us to kill Mr. Seasick, and then bring him on to a boat. In most 
contexts this is illegitimate. Thus, the assertion is true, and valid in a 
context which precludes beforehand certain types of counter-example, 
or certain types of interpretation. The assertion would be falsified in the 
context, if we consider, for example, asking Mr. Seasick to board a boat 
which is on land.
The logic of an argument refers to its form. The form is 
independent of the content. Form and content are informal notions, no 
pun intended. The form/ content distinction applied to arguments is 
meant to be drawn out by the logical vocabulary which is supposed to 
reflect the form of the argument, where the variables range over the 
content, i.e. the domain. In the case of logic, domains are perfectly 
general, because they are arbitrarily chosen, insofar as they are chosen 
at all. The non-logical constants restrict the domains we may consider, 
and for that reason possess content. Similarly, an axiom expressed in 
only logical vocabulary (logical constants, variables or descriptive 
vocabulary) is an axiom which governs logical form and not special
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content. This is the idea behind the distinction between logical 
vocabulary and non-logical constants or between a logic and a theory. 
Of course, people have different ideas as to what constitutes the form of 
an argument as opposed to its content. To register this, w e have 
different formal systems. The ability of logical systems and formal 
languages to capture form varies accordingly. A language which is 
more sensitive, and so, can capture more features, is said to have 
greater expressive power than one which overlooks aspects of form.
But for the language to be considered to be a logical language, it must 
not have the capacity to exploit particular features of a domain, 
whatever the extension of "particular" turns out to be! This is not to say 
that sentences written in a logical language are meaningless or that they 
cannot be interpreted or applied to domains of objects. Rather, the 
symbols of a logical language together, do not have the capacity to 
identify particular features had by individuals in a domain of 
interpretation. This is one sense in which a logic is topic neutral.
Determining which aspects of a sentence concern its form, and 
which its content, is not straightforward. For instance, a problem might 
arise if the formal validity of an argument depends on features which 
we can formally represent, which we can build into the formal 
language, and of which we have no strong intuition as to whether they 
(informally/ philosophically) belong to logic or not. Consider modal 
notions concerning time. For example, the argument:
Everything that comes into being has a first moment.
Therefore, in particular, the universe had a first moment.
Therefore, there was a first moment of time.
Displaying the validity of the argument depends on using modal 
temporal notions coupled with a metaphysical theory about time (that 
time is dependent on the existence of the universe, for instance). To 
some extent, we can build the metaphysics into a formal system which 
will formalise the argument and have it come out valid. We simply 
need to make a judicious choice about the rules of inference and axioms 
we introduce to govern the new modal operators. It would be quite 
natural for some people to feel uncomfortable about calling the
15
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conclusion a logical one, because one might feel that the structure or 
metaphysics of time is not a matter for logic to decide. In this sense, the 
metaphysics underlying the system has come before the formal system. 
We simply designed the system to fit a preconceived idea. Thus, 
something’s being expressed in a formal language, is not enough to 
guarantee logicality.
Why expressing something in a formal language is useful, is that 
it suppresses information contained in sentences. In particular, a 
formalisation will suppress (at least part of) the content of a subject 
matter. A logical formal language will suppress all content. It can be 
applied to any subject matter, it can be interpreted in any domain. In 
this sense, logic is universal. This is a feature the logicist looks for in a 
logic, as well as its ability to reflect an informal notion of validity.
Frege thought of universality as manifested by the 
omnipresence of logic. Frege did not employ model-theoretic 
notions explicitly, but he did have a conception of logic applying to 
an universal domain: all that there is. We know now that, on pain of 
contradiction, we cannot consider the universe to be an object,^like 
a set, which has already been gathered together. Thus, I propose 
that, in the first instance, we interpret universality as "being 
applicable to any domain" understood as any proper subset of "all 
that there is". A logic, then, is universal by virtue of its language 
being interpreted in any domain.
We might think that set theory complies with this criterion. The 
semantics of set theory includes a series of domains organised in a 
hierarchy called the universe (of domains). There is a sense in which we 
can find a domain to match any in mathematics. That is the basis upon
course, this is an over simplification. The theory of classes would treat this as 
a proper class. Thus, in this theory, we do not incur contradiction by considering 
the whole universe. However, our discussion is restricted, because proper classes 
are treated differently than sets, and this seems nd hoc. Furthermore, there is a 
type theory developed by Church which allows "all that there is" to be a set. 
However, here again there is a prim a  facie accusation of being flrf hoc because the 
unrestricted sense of "all", used in sentences which begins with this quantifier do 
not have one of the two truth values true and false. See Alonzo Church, 
Introduction to Mathematical Logic. (I; Princeton, New jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1956), p. 347 n. 577.
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which it is argued that set theory is foundational to mathematics. Most 
of mathematics can be translated into set theory. In this sense, it is 
universal. What indicates that the set theoretic universe is ad hoc is that 
it contains, for instance, an axiom of regularity. This guarantees that a 
set, a, which is a member of a set, b, which is a member of a set, c, and 
so on for arbitrary number of sets n, cannot then be a member of the 
sets a, b, or c up to n. The purpose of the axiom is to block Russell-type 
paradoxes involving sets which are members of themselves, or cycle 
through a number of sets to become a member of an original set.^^
Prima facie, this seems to be an assumption made from outside logic. 
For, we can hold a consistent position arguing that there are such sets. 
That is, it is logically possible for there to exist sets which are members 
of themselves. For example, the set of all sets of infinite cardinality is 
itself an infinite set, and is therefore a member of itself. Therefore, set 
theory, as it is presented, cannot be a logic on pain of non-generality: 
the theory precludes the possibility that the universe contains 
"irregular" sets. To some extent, this is an artefact of presentation. In set 
theory we stipulate, by means of an axiom, that there are no such sets.
According the logicist, then, logic is independent of particular 
subject matters to which it is applied. Logic does not rely on special 
features of theories. Furthermore, it does not rely on special knowledge. 
Roughly, this aspect of logic falls under the rubric "analytic". The 
analytic/ synthetic distinction has been drawn in various ways. Frege 
drew it in such a way as to reflect his interest in disengaging logic from 
psychological or empirical considerations. That is, he believed that 
what is distinctive of logic is that it makes no appeal to empirical data, 
and is independent of the sense organs or the structure of the human 
brain. For example, it would be irrelevant to suggest that someone who 
is colour-blind, should not be as good a logician as someone with full 
colour vision; even if this were discovered to be an empirical fact. The 
reason it is irrelevant, is that logical inference in no way depends upon 
our abilities to distinguish colours. Nor should logic depend on our
I'^For a discussion of this see Patrick Suppes, Axiomatic Set Theory. (Dover 
Edition, New York: Dover Publications Inc., 1972), p. 53 ff.
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abilities to discern various smells, textures, sounds and so on. 
Furthermore, logic should not depend on the brain’s talent to perceive 
certain mathematical structures, despite the fact that our brains might 
affect our abilities to follow a logical argument. The inability to follow a 
logical argument is not one of lack of talent; it is a fault of inattention or 
lack of concentration. The logic itself is inviolate. It is independent of 
our talent or what I usually refer to as Kantian intuition.
Frege insists that logic should not depend on intuition in Kant's 
sense. Kant postulated that in order to do arithmetic we need temporal 
intuition; and in order to do geometry, we need spatial intuition. Frege 
disagreed with the former but agreed with the latter. Thus, he was not 
opposed to the doctrine of intuition as a whole. Frege also believed, 
along with Kant, that logic does not require intuition. Where Frege 
disagrees with Kant, is over the scope of logic. Frege believes that 
arithmetic is just a part of logic. Kant thought that the two disciplines 
were very much distinct, since one, and not the other, relies on 
intuition. Frege's desire to show that arithmetic is analytic is in part a 
reflection of his reaction against the Kantian doctrine. We shall refer to 
this as Frege's negative characterisation of analyticity.
There is a more modern conception as to what makes a 
judgement analytic, and this has to do with meaning. A sentence is 
analytically true if it is true in virtue of the meaning of the words in the 
sentence. For example, "a sea-worthy boat will not sink in calm waters," 
is analytically true, since it is in virtue of the meaning of "sea­
worthiness", "sink" and "calm waters" that the sentence is true, not in 
virtue of some empirical fact. There are many more analytic (in the 
modern sense) truths than logical truths, such as the example given 
above. This modern conception of analyticity I shall leave aside in the 
thesis, since I do not think that it engages what is important in 
distinguishing logic from mathematics.
Frege's positive characterisation of an analytic judgement is 
that analytical judgements should follow from logical axioms plus 
definitions. This sounds like the modern conception. However, he 
only considers definitions which are short-hand for concepts which
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have already been introduced. So, what counts as analytic is what 
follows from logic plus logical definitions, that is, definitions for 
logical notions or definitions whose definiens is expressed using 
only logical vocabulary.
If "follows from" is taken too narrowly (and arguably how  
Frege meant it to be taken) then we confront another notion, again 
traditionally associated with logic: that of effectiveness. A formal 
system is effective iff it has a finitary deductive sy s te m :o n e  
capable, in principle, of generating all the truths of the theory in a 
finite number of steps. In this sense, all truths are either axioms or 
theorems. Effectiveness is an idealisation on methods of proof. We 
realise that as humans, even with the help of computers, we can 
only carry out short finite proofs. If we think of proofs as a series of 
manipulations of symbols in a given expression, then the conclusion 
of a proof is the result of a series of manipulations. For a proof 
method to be effective, we make stipulations in two directions. One 
is a limitation, the other is an idealisation. The limitation is that 
proofs must be rigorous, in the sense that each step in an effective 
proof must be short. That is, we only deal with one "word" at a 
tim e.7 Also, the instruction, for manipulation, must be unique, in 
that there is only one rule for the manipulation of a given word, 
there is no choice. For example, we might have a general rule which 
says to manipulate the word on the extreme left of an expression 
first. Thus, the expression: -i( Vx)(3y)(Rxy v Ryx) is manipulated 
to: (3x)~i(3y)(Rxy v Ryx). This is then manipulated to: -i(3y)(Rxy 
V Ryx), and so on. The limitation requirement for an effective 
method of proof is that it be short and unique.
formal system may be dccidablc while having the capacity to generate 
infinite proofs. For example, some formal systems which have the CD-rule will 
have infinite proofs since the co-rule is infinite.
T^For example, ( Vx) is considered to be one "word", as are —i, and Px. One 
way of individuating "words" is by the introduction and elimination rules, or by 
the satisfaction function, depending on orientation. Another way is by looking at 
how they are individuated in the rules for constructing well-formed formulas.
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The idealisation is that we suppose that we can carry out 
manipulations indefinitely. Nevertheless, they have to be finite. 
Sometimes effectiveness is expressed in terms of Turing machines.
A Turing machine can only carry out short and simple 
manipulations, but it can do so indefinitely.
I shall not accept effectiveness as a criterion of logicality. For,
I believe that this criterion answers to an epistemological concern 
about logic: that logical systems ought to provide us with the means 
of deducing all truths of logic. This is to treat logic as a tool of 
demonstration as opposed to its just acting as an ultimate 
justification in the following sense.
There is a lot more to logic than a set of effective or 
mechanical proofs. There are also certain dangers in thinking of 
logic as being exhausted by such proofs. When we do this, we forget 
about certain metaphysical notions, such as universality, and 
analyticity, which are attributed to logic. A second danger is that we 
blindly identify logicality with formalisation, within the constraints 
of effectiveness (i.e. a formal system must have an effective proof 
procedure and be complete). We might then allow in any 
formalisable notion provided it meets the constraints of 
effectiveness, and at the same time we lose track as to the 
background metaphysical importance of logic in its distinction from 
the rest of science. Symptomatic of this is the attitude which says 
that there is no clear distinction to be drawn between logic and 
other sciences.
In keeping with a more metaphysical orientation, showing that a 
sentence is justified by logic can take the form of an effective proof, but 
it can also take other forms as well. For example, we may examine the 
vocabulary in which it is written, we might be asked to justify the claim 
that some vocabulary is logical and some is not, we may be asked to 
accept infinite proofs, again, provided that they are justified by logical 
considerations. In other words, the stance taken in this thesis is that 
logic is distinguishable from other disciplines in a philosophically
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significant sense. The epistemological concern will be expressed in
terms of the negative characterisation of analyticity.
Epistemologically, logical truths are not true or false a posteriori,
and they do not depend on a special faculty of intuition. This does not
entail that all logical truths must be the result of a mechanical
procedure. There is a middle ground to be occupied by logic. In this
middle ground, the types of justification allowed reach beyond an
effective proof, but they fall short of resorting to appeals to intuition
and to sense experience. It is in this sense that I am interested in logic in
its justificatory role; not in its role as a mechanical tool. Thus, we find
that the negative characterisation of analyticity Frege gives is more
revealing as to what is distinctive of logic: that the justification for
judgements in logic be free from intuition and sense perception.
This declaration of interest conflicts with some remarks Frege
makes concerning proof. It would be consistent with some of what
Frege writes, that he should think that the Begriffsschrift notation
made for both an effective method of proof, and that it was
sufficient to generate all the truths of logic and, with the addition of
axiom V or Hume's principle, to generate those of arithmetic. For
example, Frege writes:
...the fundamental truths of arithmetic should be 
proved... with the utmost rigor; for only if every gap in 
the chain of deductions is eliminated with the greatest 
care can we say with certainty upon what primitive 
truths the proof depends.
The notion of gapless proof is naturally compared to that of
effective proof, and Frege identified gapless proof with the
manifestation of rigor. Of course, there is no effective procedure for
generating all the truths of arithmetic because arithmetic is
incomplete. Frege was ignorant of this because the incompleteness
of arithmetic was only discovered, by Godel, in 1936. For these
reasons, we could hardly expect Frege to have been aware of the
incompleteness of arithmetic. Other remarks Frege makes
'^Gottlob Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic, trans. J. L. Austin, {Second 
revised edition; Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1980), § 4.
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concerning reducing mathematics to a series of mechanical
procedures are more ambiguous. For example, when Frege criticises
the formalists in Grundgesetze. he writes:
This attempt at formal arithmetic must be considered a 
failure, since it cannot be pursued consistently. In the 
end numerical figures are used as signs after all.
Thomae's own inventory of rules is incomplete, and 
we were forced to suppose that such a list could never 
be completed.^^
I am not certain that we want to attribute to Frege a modem use of 
the words "inconsistent" and "incomplete". The point he is trying to 
make is that the notation of Begriffsschrift, and other formal 
deductive systems (proof theories) which are, anachronistically 
speaking, effective, are inadequate as a substitute for arithmetic or 
mathematics. Rather, we have always to bear in mind the semantics 
of the sentences we use. The proper practice of mathematics cannot 
be replaced by blindly implementing syntactical manipulation rules. 
In this sense, for Frege, a Turing machine does not "do" arithmetic, 
because it does not understand what it is proving.
In general then, while there is evidence in F r eg e ,th a t he 
would have endorsed the effectiveness criterion; in the light of the 
Godel incompleteness results, he may well have chosen to reject it. 
Regardless, I shall grant that an effective proof method makes for a 
good tool of demonstration. Furthermore, an effective proof is 
sufficient to show, on what it is that the truth of a theorem depends, 
namely: an initial list of axioms. However, by itself, an effective 
proof method is not enough to act as an ultimate justification 
because citing a proof as sole justification ignores the significance of
^^Gottlob Frege, "Frege Against the Formalists" G ru n dgese tze , Vol.II §§86 - 137, 
Trans. Max Black Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege 
eds. Peter Geach & Max Black, (Third edition, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980), § 
137.
^^For example, Fregé rejects the possibility that there should be infinitely many 
axioms in logic. This poses an immediate problem. Second-order logic is 
unaxiomatisable in the sense that we do not and provably could not have a 
complete list of the axioms. This makes the set of axioms of second-order logic in 
some sense potentially infinite. This I take as yet another reason to give up 
effectiveness as a criterion for logic.
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the symbols which are being manipulated, and therefore, is 
insufficient as an account of what the axioms themselves mean, or 
what status they have: whether they are logical, geometrical, and so 
on.
Unsurprisingly, often logical necessity is associated with 
logic, and a formal system which is said to be logic gives or reflects 
some sense of what the extension of the concept of logical necessity 
is. But in the context of trying to characterise logic, we must ask the 
question of how the notion of logical necessity is to feature in a 
criterion for the logicality of a formal system. Is it that whatever 
formal system best captures logic has, thereby, to reflect some pre- 
theoretic or pre-formal use of logical necessity? If so, we can readily 
identify a conviction, best described as logical that we ought not to 
contradict ourselves. This can be elaborated on both a syntactic and 
a semantic level. Syntactically, a statement is logically possible if it is 
not contradictory. Whatever it is that a set of sentences refers to, 
such as an event, a fact, a state of affairs, etc. is possible if the 
sentences do not engender contradiction. On a semantic level, 
possibility and necessity and are defined in terms of consistency. A 
contradiction takes the form of "a a -la", where "a" stands for any 
proposition. However, it may take a few inference moves to show  
that a given statement contradicts another, and to show this, one has 
to appeal to logical laws together with rules of inference, and 
perhaps even some semantics. A set of sentences is mutually 
consistent if there is an interpretation which makes them 
simultaneously true. Put another way, the axioms or laws of logic 
are true. The rules of inference, such as modus ponens, are truth 
preserving. Logical truths are logically necessary. A valid sentence 
is logically necessary.
Thus, if we now want to know what the laws or axioms of 
logic are, we cannot turn to the notion of logical necessity, for it 
presupposes them, in the sense that it presupposes that they have 
already been chosen. Nevertheless, I shall take for granted as a 
criterion for a formal system to call itself a logic: that it not contain a
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contradiction.^^ All the formal systems we examine are consistent or 
equiconsistent with others.
However, there is often more associated with concepts of 
logical necessity and its dual; logical possibility. On a 
phenomenological level, for example, we might say that w e are/ 
feel compelled to accept logically necessary truths, that it is logical 
necessity which compels us to accept the conclusion of a logically 
valid argument. We might, on a more metaphysical level, say that 
logical necessity is normative, in the sense that logic is normative of 
reasoning. Thus, anyone who fails to see or confirm a logical 
necessity, and is (otherwise (however that may be)) compos mentis, is 
not obeying our norms of reasoning.
Both these notions which are associated with logical necessity 
presuppose that we already know what logic is, or what 
distinguishes logic from other sciences. From the point of view  
adopted here, this is an illegitimate assumption. There is an 
intuitive sense of what logic is, but this is insufficiently precise to 
distinguish between formal presentations of (purported) logic(s).
For this reason, the attitude adopted here is that the formal system 
which optimally meets our three criteria for logicality forms a sort 
of implicit definition for logical necessity, and therefore, appeal to 
logical necessity for characterising logic begs the question against 
the logicist.
Taking stock, we have discussed five philosophical notions 
involved in characterising logic: universality, logical validity, 
effectiveness, logical necessity and analyticity, and some of the 
history of these notions. We endorse validity, universality and 
Frege's negative characterisation of analyticity. We reject 
effectiveness as a necessary criterion for logicality. Logical necessity 
is taken to be the product of the endorsed criteria.
21 Even Graham Priest includes a notion of consistency in his logic, even if he does 
allow outright contradiction. Consistency is manifested in terms of following, or 
failing to follow, a rule. See for example, Graham Priest, "Can Contradictions be 
True?" The Aristotelian Society. Supplementary volume. (LXVIl, 1993), pp. 35-54.
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We turn now to more recent history, and how this merges 
with the more conceptual aspect of the thesis: the matching of the 
criteria of universality, analyticity and informal validity to existing 
formal systems. In 1983, Wright taught us in his book: Frege's 
Conception of Numbers as Objects,— that the formal system  
outlined in Frege's Begriffsschrift (second-order logic) together with 
Hume's principle (which introduces the notion of cardinal number 
in terms of one-to-one correspondence) form a consistent formal 
system strong enough to derive the Peano axioms! Hume's principle 
was introduced by Frege in the Grundlagen which followed 
Begriffsschrift. For philosophical reasons, Frege resisted just 
including Hume's principle as an axiom in his formal system. He 
added Basic Law V in Grundgesetze. to the formal system developed 
in Begriffsschrift. Basic Law V, was thought to be more obviously 
logical than Hume's principle since it introduces identity conditions 
for extensions of concepts, and Frege thought that the notion of 
extension of a concept was more obviously logical than that of 
number belonging to a concept. The purpose of adding Basic Law V, 
was to prove Hume's principle as a theorem, and thus to prove its 
logicality, and a fortiori, the logicality of arithmetic. Basic Law V is 
inconsistent. However, its removal, and the promotion of Hume's 
principle to the status of axiom does form a consistent system. This 
discovery has revived interest in the logicist project, albeit in 
modified form. This is because Hume's principle contains logical 
elements, but it does not seem to be sufficiently general to count as a 
logical axiom. Hume's principle is only true of infinite domains. The 
modifications we have to make to Frege's logicist project correspond 
exactly to the degree to which we can argue that second-order logic 
is a logic and that Hume's principle is a logical principle.
In this Thesis I propose to present a way, inspired by Frege, 
of characterising logic in contradistinction to some of mathematics. 
The project is largely programmatic in that it is impossible to survey
22crispin Wright, On Frege's Conception of Numbers as Objects, (Aberdeen; 
Aberdeen University Press, 1983).
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all formal systems. Furthermore, the philosophical criteria I use for 
assessing what formal systems I do examine, may not be exhaustive. 
The type of project it is, is one of matching some philosophical 
notions to some technical data in the form of particular formal 
systems which are all plausible candidates for the honorific "logic". 
Which parts of mathematics are then captured by the formal system 
is a largely technical result, not pursued here. The philosophical 
notions are universality, logical validity, and analyticity. Generality 
(or universality) turns out to be one of the most important, 
although, we shall see towards the end that all the criteria are inter­
related.
The first chapter of the Thesis is introductory and historical.
It gives the historical motivation for the present project and presents 
its conceptual roots. As has been mentioned, the prevailing thought 
through much of this century has been that, insofar as it makes 
sense to draw a line between logic and mathematics at all, it ought 
to be drawn at first-order logic. That is, first-order logic and any 
weaker system is generally accepted as being logic. Any system 
which is stronger, is deemed to be mathematics. The historical 
account begins with Leibniz who had a vision of an universal 
language which would serve as an uniting basis for all science, and 
by means of a picture script, would make all scientific truths plain. 
These are dim, and imperfectly related beginnings to Frege's more 
modest, but better argued vision: that we can show that arithmetic 
is just a more sophisticated logic. Frege's project is placed in the 
context of nineteenth century mathematical analysis. The 
mathematicians, who marked this tradition, aspired to bring greater 
rigor to the discipline of analysis. Frege applied the notion of rigor 
to logic. The rest of the chapter examines the chequered history of 
the logicist project: its demise, a related attempt by Russell and 
Whitehead, and the abandonment of the project along with the 
emergence of first-order logic as the canonical logic.
In chapter two I discuss the proposed criteria for a formal 
system to be called a logic. These are validity, universality and
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analyticity. The criterion of validity is expressed as follows: a formal 
system conforms to the criterion of validity if its formal notion of 
validity matches our informal notion. The criterion of universality 
has two aspects. A formal system must be applicable to any domain, 
and it must be topic neutral. The first aspect is fairly weak. For, any 
language can display this aspect provided we are allowed to 
consider any domain of interpretation, including ones where 
elements of the language have no referent. To fend from this, we 
insist that said language not include any non-logical constants. 
There is a convention governing what counts as a logical constant. 
Unfortunately, for the purposes of this project, we cannot simply 
avail ourselves of the convention without begging the question. 
Thus, we have to invoke the other aspect of generality: that a logic 
should be topic neutral. Intuitively, what this means in the context 
of a logic is that the language of the logic does not allow us to 
distinguish particular objects in a domain of interpretation. Of 
course, this ties in with our other two criteria: validity and 
analyticity. It ties in with validity in that the logical vocabulary of a 
sentence is supposed to reflect the logical form of the sentence. The 
lack of non-logical constants, should suppress the content of a 
sentence. Topic neutrality ties in with analyticity in that, analyticity, 
in our sense, is a minimal constraint on what counts as logical. None 
of the criteria on its own is sufficient to pick out logic from the 
number of formal systems which call themselves logic, because as 
we have already seen, the criteria are inter-related.
In chapter three, I examine the position which asserts that 
first-order logic is where the division lies between logic and 
mathematics. In particular, first-order logic is assessed according to 
our philosophical criteria for logicality. The arguments tend to focus 
on the limitative results of first-order logic, rather than on a 
semantic and syntactic text book presentation of the logic. This is 
because many of the arguments for the position which favours first- 
order logic as logic over second-order logic, draw on the limitative 
results. The particular results discussed are: compactness, the
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Lôwenheim-Skolem properties, completeness and decidability.
There are two opposing lines of argument. The one against first- 
order logic being considered as exhaustive of the scope of logic is 
that first-order logic is expressively inadequate to the task of 
reflecting our informal notion of logical validity. This involves 
compactness and the Lowenheim-Skolem properties. The argument 
in favour of the thought that first-order logic exhausts the scope of 
logic involves compactness, completeness and decidability. It is 
thought that the mark of logic is that it should have an effective 
proof procedure.
In chapter four I entertain the possibility that some 
extensions of first-order logic might also be logic. In particular, 
having identified certain sentences or arguments as valid, or 
identified certain notions as logical, which are deprived of proper 
representation in first-order logic, we find formal systems which are 
able to express these properly. For obvious reasons of space and 
time, not all extensions of first-order logic are explored. The 
extensions of first-order logic we examine generalise in different 
ways on the notion of quantifier as it is (incompletely) presented in 
first-order logic. More specifically, we increase the logical 
vocabulary to include more quantifiers or more variables. Along 
with these additions, what counts as a term and a well-formed 
formula are suitably modified, as is the interpretation function of 
the formal system.
The first generalisation discussed, is one which takes 
seriously the task of representing, in a formal language, quantified 
statements in natural language. This orientation holds out promise 
for meeting our validity criterion. Quantifiers are analysed as a pair 
composed of a determiner and a set expression. Loosely, we think of 
quantifiers as predicates which happen to pick out a subset of the 
domain. Any subset will have a quantity. For example, "the green 
objects in the bag" counts as a quantifier, since it picks out a 
quantity of objects, by means of a predicate. This view treats each
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determiner/ set expression pair as a new symbol, requiring a 
separate clause in the interpretation function.
The second generalisation was suggested by Mostowski in 
1957.23 He suggested that we should think of a quantifier as a 
function which names a quantity. It turns out that any cardinality 
expression can take the quantifier position. For example, Mostowski 
includes "there are finitely many", "there are infinitely many",
"most" and "half", as quantifiers. More broadly, we also discuss 
many-place quantifiers, such as, "there are more A's than B's".
We then extend Mostowski's generalisation on the notion of 
quantifier to include second-order quantifiers. In effect, we then 
have second-order logic, which is what Frege thought of as logic in 
the first place. All of these extensions of first-order logic are 
assessed in terms of our criteria: an informal notion of validity, 
analyticity and generality.
In the conclusion, I discuss the significance of the modern 
version of Frege's logicist project in the light of our characterisation 
of logic. The significance of the modern version of the logicist 
project depends, in part, on the extent to which we can argue 
persuasively that second-order logic is logic. Put another way, the 
logicist project is undermined if we find that second-order logic is 
really a ("special" in Frege’s sense) mathematical theory, or if there is 
no clear distinction to be drawn between logic and the special 
sciences.
It might turn out, of course, that much more powerful formal 
systems also conform to the criteria elicited here. In that case, more 
of mathematics will turn out to be logic. For example, it might turn 
out that second-order logic is able to subsume much more than just 
arithmetic, but also group theory. To repeat, this would indicate that 
much more of mathematics is part of logic, in exactly the sense we 
have indicated through our criteria. Again, this is the sense in which 
the thesis is programmatic. The hope is that the thesis makes as
23Andrzej Mostowski, "On a Generalization of Quantifiers," Fundamenta 
Mathematicae. vol. IVIV, (1957), pp. 12-36.
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explicit as possible the sense in which some philosophers, regard 
logic as significant, and that it indicates at least one formal system 
which exhibits that significance.
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Chapter I: A History of Logicism
Introduction
Our concern in this chapter is with the history of the 
philosophical position called logicism. A logicist will argue that 
there is a sense in which all (or most, or some) of mathematics is 
reducible to logic. The purpose of giving a history in the context of 
the thesis is threefold. We wish to provide a historical motivation 
for raising the issue of a logical foundation for mathematics, to 
locate the reader in the debate, so that he can better understand why 
it is that some questions are now being asked and not others, and to 
show that the neglect of the logicist project is partly due to historical 
accident.
All three purposes are closely interrelated. Logicism found 
prominence both around the turn of the century, with the work of 
Frege, and more recently, since 1983,-^ when it was made clear that 
second-order logic, together with what is referred to as Hume's 
principle, is sufficient to derive the Peano Axioms. Thus, insofar as 
the formal system which is composed of second-order logic and 
Hume's principle constitute a logical system, arithmetic can be said 
to be founded in logic. The doubt, as to whether or not this 
discovery vindicates logicism, concerns whether or not second- 
order logic is logic, and over whether or not Hume's principle is a 
logical principle.
Frege's logical system was what we generally recognise as 
second-order l o g i c . 25 Hume's principle was also used by Frege, but
24Crispin Wright, Frege's Conception of Numbers as Objects. (Aberdeen: 
University of Aberdeen Press, 1983).
25Not everyone agrees with this. See for example Hintikka and Sandhu "Frege's 
Alleged Realism," Inquiry, vol. XX (1977), pp. 227 - 242. However, Boolos, Wright, 
Dummett, Clark, Hale, Heck, Parsons, Shapiro and many others agree that Frege's 
formal system is essentially second-order logic. Frege has quantification over 
second-order variables, and they can be assumed to range over the powerset of
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he did not think it was obvious that it was a logical principle, 
because it could not be introduced into logic as a straightforward 
definition because it is not a definition of number (it gives the 
conditions under which two numbers are to be considered to be 
equal) since it engenders what has been referred to as the Julius 
Caesar problerh. The Julius Caesar problem is that Hume's principle 
does not have the power to tell us of an arbitrary object, such as 
Julius Caesar, whether or not it is a number. That is, while Hume's 
principle gives conditions for equality between numbers, it gives us 
no purchase on what qualifies something as a number. Thus, 
Hume's principle had to be grounded in a more basic principle. 
Frege tried to prove that Hume's principle could be better grounded 
in a more general principle. Frege introduced another axiom from 
which he could derive Hume's principle as a theorem. 
Unfortunately, this axiom turned out to be inconsistent. However, if 
we remove the offending axiom and add Hume's principle to 
second-order logic as an axiom, then we have a consistent system 
which is powerful enough to include within it second-order 
arithmetic. Hume's principle is interesting for the logicist because it 
is not obvious whether it is logical, partially logical, or wholly 
mathematical. This question will be left aside in the thesis. We shall 
focus on the prior question, whether or not second-order logic is a 
logical system in a relevant sense (for the logicist).
The second purpose of giving a historical introduction is to 
orient and locate the reader in the present issues which are being 
raised. This chapter is less philosophical than others. The 
philosophical motivation will be made clear in subsequent chapters 
of the thesis. As a motivational chapter, it does not seek to give an 
exhaustive history of the problem, for the approach of the thesis is
the domain of interpretation. This reading is consistent with Frege, p a ce  Sanhu e t  
a i  Notwithstanding, the controversy over Frege's formal system does not bear on 
the conceptual features of this thesis. I am using Frege as inspiration to further 
investigation. Thus, the attitude adopted here is that correct exegesis of Frege is 
less important than identifying aspects of his writing which prompt fruitful 
discussion.
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not primarily historical. Nevertheless, we do wish to indicate that, 
on a purely conceptual level, dropping the considerations of 
logicism was done too hastily.
There are six sections in this chapter. The first explores some 
of the earliest thoughts concerning the overall project of logicism; 
the sorts of thoughts which were the seed of the project. In 
particular, we discuss Leibniz's idea of an universal language. The 
language is meant to be universal in two respects. One is that it 
forms the basis of rational thought, and all truths emerge from it. 
The other respect in which the language is meant to be universal is 
that it is pictorially representative of these basic rational thoughts, 
and so cross culturally, and cross-linguistically recognisable. In 
section two, we discuss Frege in the context of changes in 
nineteenth century analysis. That is, we place Frege in the context of 
the tradition from which he emerged; a tradition with concerns 
about increasing the rigor of proof in analysis. In section three, we 
discuss Frege's logicism as a project in its own right. We focus on 
the aspects of his project which contribute to the historical analysis 
in this chapter, and on aspects of his work which will be discussed 
in subsequent chapters. In section four, we discuss Whitehead and 
Russell's attempt to carry out the project where Frege failed, and 
show that they too failed. In section five, we give some history 
concerning the emergence of first-order logic and the emergence of 
first-order set theory as the foundational discipline of mathematics. 
These largely superseded and precluded the logicist project. In 
section six, we discuss Frege's proposed foundational system of 
logic: second-order logic, in its present day context.
This chapter fits with the rest of the thesis in that, in contrast 
to the present day, it was clear to Frege that second-order logic just 
is logic, not only in name, (which is anachronistic anyhow) but 
according to certain philosophical criteria. He did not contrast it to 
first-order logic, since that had not yet been recognised as an 
independent formal system. For Frege, there was a strong
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philosophical basis for thinking that the formal system he proposed 
was entirely plausible as a candidate for founding arithmetic.
Since Frege, we have been confronted with a much larger 
number of logical systems. One recent train of thought which has 
been well received is that first-order logic is the strongest logic, and 
anything stronger is mathematics. Adherence to this view precludes 
logicism because first-order logic is not powerful enough to act as 
any sort of interesting foundation for mathematics, let alone 
arithmetic. Instead, people interested in foundational issues, find 
first-order set theory to be a more apt candidate. Showing that, as 
far as logicism is concerned, first-order logic falls short of the task of 
founding mathematics is the subject of the third chapter. To do this 
we have to define the task precisely. This is done in the second 
chapter, where we discuss the philosophical criteria we bring to 
bear on our judgement that first-order logic is inadequate.
Another recent train of thought has it that there is no clear 
distinction between logic and mathematics, since we have 
developed a number of systems one stronger than the other, but not 
by much. The systems overlap each other so much that the terms 
"logic" and "mathematics" seem vague. Thus, it is not clear how to 
draw a line between logic and mathematics. This blocks logicist 
aspirations because we cannot even identify which is the founding 
discipline. We cannot have grounds to favour any particular "logic", 
let alone identify one system as logical where others are 
mathematical. In this tradition, it is not clear what it is that a 
reduction of arithmetic, or any other branch of mathematics, to 
logic, would show; besides a reduction of one branch of 
mathematics to another. Both modern ways of thinking conspire to 
make the project of logicism seem hopeless.
On the other hand, having discovered that we can argue that 
Hume’s principle is logical, at least in some respects, namely in its 
analyticity;2^  we revitalise the question as to whether or not
26Whether or not Hume’s principle is analytic has been hotly debated, most 
prominently by Wright and Boolos. In this debate, insufficient attention has been
34
C hapter I: A  H istory of Logicism
arithmetic can be founded in logic. To make this argument one has 
to argue for (1) the status of Hume's principle as a logical principle, 
and (2) the claim that second-order logic is in some respectable 
sense, logic. Arguing for (2) will be the subject of chapter four.
§ 1: Leibniz and the Beginnings of Logicism
The dim beginnings of logicism can be traced back to Leibniz
who had a vision of an universal language which would: 
assign to every object its characteristic number ...[so 
that] people of different nations can communicate 
their thoughts to one another ...[and which would] 
embrace both the technique of discovering new  
propositions and their critical examination.^^
Leibniz believed we could develop such a language and called it a
lingua characteristica universalis. Essentially this was an universal
language.
Leibniz's writing on the subject is fragmented, and he assigns 
different tasks to his lingua characteristica universalis. Among them is 
the task of codifying and formalising syllogistic reasoning; although 
he recognised later, after the age of nineteen, when he first 
expressed this idea, that there are valid forms of reasoning not 
captured by the syllogism. These are arguments whose validity 
depends on relations or functions, for example. Once he recognised 
this, he thought of ways to extend syllogistic reasoning in the hope 
that his lingua characteristica univeralis would capture other forms of 
reasoning as well.
paid to the definition of analyticity, in particular, to how it is that Frege defined 
analytic. Frege's definition is different from the modern definition. I also think 
that there is a modification to Frege's definition which can accomodate Hume’s 
principle as analytic. That is, there is a sense in which Hume's principle is 
analytic, and it is a sense which is in keeping with the spirit of Frege's logicist 
project. The relevant meaning of the term analytic, is the one explored in this 
thesis. However, showing that Hume's principle and no offending principles fall 
under this definition is a question which is left unattended in this thesis.
27g . W. Leibniz, "Towards a Universal Characteristic (1677)," Leibniz. Selections, 
ed. Philip P. Wiener (New York: Charles Scribner's sons, 1951), p. 18.
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He also assigned to the lingua characteristica universalis the 
task of demonstrating correct reasoning. As such, it would produce, 
in an almost mechanical way, rational and indubitable arguments. 
He believed it would promote clarity of reasoning. This is better 
known under his idea of a calculus ratiocinator, which is a term he 
sometimes subsumed under the term lingua characteristica 
universalis.
Leibniz believed in a certain unity of reasoning, and that all 
of science could be codified by assigning numbers to the essential or 
primitive objects of scientific investigation. This was part of his 
inspiration in working on an encyclopaedia. In a sense, he wished to 
turn empirical science into number theory. But not only this. For, he 
insists that the primitive assignment of number or symbol should 
not be done arbitrarily but should act as a sort of picture which 
captures the essence of the object, and which would be universally 
recognised. He was inspired by the Chinese script where a word is 
captured in a highly abstract picture. More ambitious still, he 
believed that the unity of religion could be realised by means of 
such a language. For, he believed that all religious thinkers would 
be swayed by the indubitable arguments which would simply lead 
to the truth. Thus, misunderstanding and conflict would cease. 
There was a sense in which rational reasoning would lead to all 
truths, including empirical ones. It was the development of a lingua 
characteristica universalis which was to enable mankind to achieve 
this end.
Unfortunately, Leibniz did not progress very far with the 
technical development of the language, despite the fact that the idea 
occupied much of his thinking from a very early age. There were 
certain technical impediments to its elaboration. For example, there 
is a sense in which scientific knowledge would have to be complete 
before the basic numbers or pictures could be assigned. We would 
have to know what the basic stuff of matter is, and the natural laws 
which affect the behaviour of matter before they could be 
adequately represented. Leibniz's picture of the universe is that it is
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highly deterministic; unified by reason. Leibniz's conception was 
original, and was a precursor of Laplace's metaphysics. Laplace 
(1749 -1827) was one of the first to really work out the implications 
of a fully deterministic universe. Drawing certain metaphysical 
conclusions from Newtonian mechanics, Laplace famously 
suggested that the universe worked very much like a clock. He also 
postulated an evil demon to whom the initial conditions of the 
universe are known and for whom "nothing would be uncertain and 
the future, as the past, would be present to its e y e s ."25 In a sense, to 
realise his project, of a lingua characteristica universalis, Leibniz 
would have had to be in the position of the evil demon.
The idea of the lingua characteristica universalis is a precursor 
to Frege's concept script in that the concept script was meant to 
make logical steps evident in an almost pictorial form. Proofs were 
characterised by Frege, as being properly rigorous, if there was a 
continuous line running through the proof. We shall see this in the 
next section. The major difference between Leibniz and Frege lies in 
their view as to what constitutes logical reasoning, and what the 
scope of that reasoning is. Leibniz and Frege agree that there is an 
universal quality to reasoning, and that it is independent of human 
activity.
An indirect way in which Leibniz contributed to the 
development of logicism is by his development of the calculus. He 
did so independently of, but concurrently with, Newton. Their 
respective approaches to the subject were quite different. Newton 
was more pragmatic where Leibniz was more philosophical. 
Newton refers to the infinitesimals ambiguously, sometimes 
referring to them as moments, sometimes as limits. The latter was 
later to become standard. Newton did not engage in the 
metaphysical debate about the deterministic universe which was
25picrrc Simon de Laplace, E ssai ph ilosoph ique s iw  les p robab ilité s, (Paris, 1814), 
trans. F. W. Truscott and F. L. Emory, A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities, 
(London and New York, 1902). Also quoted Rom Harrc, "Laplace, Pierre Simon 
dc," Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards, 111 (reprint edition, 1972), p. 
392.
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taking place on the continent. The role God had to play in Newton's
metaphysical conception of the universe was to keep the stars from
colliding and maintain the stability of the solar system against
outside influences. On the continent, Leibniz's pupil. De I'Hopital,
viewed the infinitesimals of the calculus as part of physical matter.
This is a natural reading of the calculus if we recall that in the
seventeenth century, the axiomatic method was modelled after
Euclid's geometry; the principal supposition being that in proofs we
begin with facts (the axioms) and conclude more facts. The facts
could be empirical. Thus, when De I'Hopital writes:
One requires that a curve may be regarded as the 
totality of an infinity of straight segments each 
infinitely small: or (which is the same) as a polygon 
with an infinite number of sides which determine the 
angle at which they meet...29
we are to take him literally as referring to physical entities: shapes,
lines and segments. Leibniz disagreed. His conception of the
infinitesimal was more subtle. He viewed them as useful fictions.
For Leibniz, the concept of the infinitesimal simply resulted from
extending the rules of arithmetic from finite numbers. This can lead
to conceptual confusions. For example, one might ask what happens
if we add an infinite number of infinitesimals together. Several
answers seem possible. On the one hand, we might remain very
close to 0, on the other hand an infinite number of infinitesimals
might add up to the unit 1, or even beyond this to infinity!
Leibniz was interested in the metaphysical underpinnings of
mathematics, and for this reason was a philosopher of mathematics
and a precursor to Frege. Furthermore, the debate about
infinitesimals and what they signify metaphysically is also a
precursor to the nineteenth century debates about analysis. The
debate about infinitesimals seems to have petered out in the
eighteenth century, but started to pick up again with Bolzano in the
29c. F. A. De I'Hopital, A n a ly ze  des In fin in ien t p e tite s  pou r l ' in td l iç e n œ  des L inges 
C ou rbes, (first edition; Paris, 1696, second edition; Paris, 1715), translated by and 
quoted from: A. Robinson, "The Metaphysics of the Calculus," Problems in the 
Philosophy of Mathematics, ed. Imre Lakatos, p. 32.
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early nineteenth century. Bolzano gained little recognition during 
his life time, but was associated with Weierstrass and others. Frege 
saw himself as very much part of this tradition. The proposed 
solution to the problématique concerning the infinitesimals lies in the 
insistence on greater rigor in proof.30
§ 2: Frege and Nineteenth Century Analysis
Whereas we can trace the dim beginnings of logicism to
Leibniz; the more clear beginnings can be found in Dedekind and
Frege who were the first to articulate the philosophical position
explicitly. For example, in the preface to The Nature and Meaning of
Numbers. Dedekind writes:
In speaking of arithmetic (algebra, analysis) as a part of 
logic I mean to imply that I consider the number-concept 
entirely independent of the notions of or intuitions of 
space and time, that I consider it an immediate result 
from the laws of thought.3i
Frege shares with Dedekind the conviction that the concept of
number is a logical concept. However, he registers dissatisfaction
with Dedekind on account of how he goes about showing that this
is indeed the case. Dedekind does not prove that arithmetic is a part
of logic, despite his declared intention to the contrary:
In science nothing capable of proof ought to be accepted 
without proof. Though this demand seems so reasonable 
yet I cannot regard it as having been met even in the most 
recent methods of laying the foundation of the simplest 
science; viz., that part of logic which deals with the theory
of numbers.32
30William Demopoulos, "Frege and the Rigorization of Analysis". Frege's 
Philosophy of Mathematics, ed. William Demopoulos, (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 78.
3lRichard Dedckind, "The Nature and Meaning of Numbers", Richard Dedekind, 
Essays on the Theory of Numbers, Trans. Wooster Woodruff Beman, (New York: 
Dover Publications Inc., 1963), p. 31 (first page of the preface to the first edition). 
32Richard Dedekind, "The Nature and Meaning of Numbers", Richard Dedekind, 
Essays on the Theorv of Numbers, Trans. Wooster Woodruff Beman, (New York:
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Dedekind came up with some axioms for arithmetic (hence the
Peano-Dedekind axioms). This was not enough for Frege. Ironically
for Dedekind, Frege writes:
...compare [to Grundgesetze] Herr Dedekind's work... the 
most thoroughgoing work on the foundations of 
arithmetic which has lately come to my notice. In much 
less space it pursues the laws of arithmetic much farther 
than is done here. To be sure, this brevity is attained only 
because a great deal is not really proved at all. Frequently 
Herr Dedekind merely says that the proof follows such 
and such propositions... an inventory of the logical or 
other laws taken by him as basic is nowhere to be found, 
and even if it were, there would be no way of telling 
whether no others were actually used; for that to be 
possible the proofs would have to be not merely indicated 
but carried out, without g a p s . 3 3
The dissatisfaction aired by both Dedekind and Frege was very
much part of a trend in mathematics towards greater rigor in proof.
This tradition belonged primarily to the mathematicians pursuing
analysis in the nineteenth century.
Frege is part of the tradition because of his demand for proof,
where proof can be given. In order to prove, more convincingly than
Dedekind did, that numbers are an immediate result of the laws of
thought, Frege had to develop a more powerful formal system of
logic than that of the propositional calculus or the relatively weak
innovations introduced by Pierce and Boole. One of Frege's greatest
contributions to logic was to disentangle the quantifier from
connectives and predicates. Frege is often portrayed as the inventor
of the quantifier. But this is misleading. The explicit use of second-
order quantifiers together with the logical treatment of a sentence in
terms of function and argument is what separates Frege from Boole
Dover Publications Inc., 1963), preface, p. 31 (first page of the preface to the first 
edition).
33Gottlob Frege, The Basic Laws of Arithmetic. Exposition of the System, ed. and 
Trans. Montgomery Furth (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 
1964), p. 4.
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who developed a version of propositional calculus, and from Peirce 
who popularized use of the second-order quantifier.34
The second innovation Frege made in developing his logical 
foundation for arithmetic was to abandon the subject/ predicate 
analysis of a sentence and include a function/ course-of-values 
analysis as part of logic. Alongside a few other innovations, this 
turns out to be a very powerful device which increases the capacity 
of the formal language to express mathematical notions. This falls 
directly in line with the tradition of the nineteenth century analysts. 
What Cauchy, Weierstrass et a i  were trying to do, in developing an 
analysis of sentences in terms of function and argument, was to set 
analysis back on a firm epistemological foundation. What they 
understood was the philosophical importance of the fact that it is 
possible to characterise real-valued functions in terms of a many- 
one correspondence. A many-one correspondence can be expressed 
in a formal language, and this allows one to conceptually divorce 
analysis from geometry and kinematics. This in turn, frees analysis 
from the puzzles involved in trying to imagine and apply the 
obscure and abstract concept of infinitesimal straight lines, for
3^ln his article "Peirce the Logician", Putnam seeks to redress the balance between 
Pierce and Frege v is -à -v is  their contributions to logic, and in particular, the roles 
they played in introducing the quantifiers to the discipline. Notwithstanding, 
Frege’s contribution is conceptually more important. Putnam paints Frege as the 
inventor of the quantifiers, but he argues, because he presented them bound up 
(no pun intended) in a cumbersome notation coupled with a grand metaphysical 
theory, he cannot be credited with popularizing the notion. Putnam argues that 
the credit for this, must be attributed to Pierce who presented the quantifiers 
unencumbered with metaphysics and in a manageable notation. "Frege tried to 
"sell" a grand logical-metaphysical scheme with a dubious ontology, while 
Peirce... was busy "selling" a modest, flexible, and extremely useful notation." 
Hilary Putnam, "Pierce the Logician," Realism with a Human Face, ed. James 
Conant (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1990), p. 257.
Putnam's analysis is not obvious. For one thing, Aristotle can be said to 
have invented the quantifiers, since he made use of them, as we can survey in his 
syllogistic logic. Rather, Frege's contribution is more significant than Peirce's 
(despite Putnam's mercantile metaphor) because he freed the quantifier from 
logical connective and predicate. See Gregory H. Moore, "The Emergence of First- 
Order Logic," History and Philosophy of Modern Mathematics, eds. William 
Asprey and Philip Kitcher, (Minesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science: Vol. 
XI; Mineapolis: University of Mineapolis Press, 1988), p. 97.
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example. For, analysis becomes more an exercise in the formal 
expression of ideas, and manipulations of the symbols of the formal 
language. When we build into a language the capacity to analyse 
sentences in terms of function and argument, this allows the 
language to exhibit the structure of relations and functions, which is 
crucial if one wants to demonstrate the validity of certain 
mathematical arguments; those on whose validity the structure of 
the relations and functions featuring in them, depends.
Where Frege departs from the tradition of the rigorisation of 
analysis is with his preoccupation with logic playing a foundational 
role towards arithmetic, and the philosophical privilege he confers 
on logic. In this, Frege takes the project of rigorisation one step 
further. Whereas Cauchy and Weierstrass increase rigor in analysis, 
to divorce it from geometry and kinematics; Frege takes the 
foundation of analysis: arithmetic, and makes that more rigorous. 
Thus again, he divorces arithmetic from geometry and kinematics. 
Moreover, he does so by founding arithmetic in logic and 
developing the philosophical implications which accrue.
§ 3: Frege's Logicism
Frege produced his very candid and explicit articulation of 
logicism in three great works: the Begnffsschrift, (1879) the 
Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884) and the Grundgesetze der Arithmetik 
(1893,1903). Frege's technical contribution of the concept script in 
the Begnffsschrift, is that of introducing a logical system^^ which, is 
equivalent to second-order logic. Besides bringing to light new 
technical logical innovations, Frege articulated a philosophical 
theory about the reduction of arithmetic to logic in his Grundlagen. 
The concept script was meant to provide the technical underpinning
"system" 1 mean a language together with axioms and rules of inference, or 
something equivalent. A system may or may not have a set of intended models or 
domains of interpretation.
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for the philosophical logicist project of showing that numbers are 
really just logical objects.
In his presentation of the concept script in the Begriffsschrift. 
Frege laid the groundwork for his project of proving arithmetic to 
be part of logic. This is a technical work, introducing a new method 
of proof. The proofs are entirely formal and mechanical. There is a 
conceptual difference between the way in which we think of logical 
proofs today and how Frege thought of them. Today, there are 
many methods of doing proofs. For example, we might begin with 
assumptions (some of which may be known to be false!), use truth 
preserving manipulation rules and then discharge the assumptions. 
For Frege, we must begin with truths. Proofs take us from truths, 
through truth preserving manipulation rules to more truths. Frege 
did not have a device for discharging assumptions. One begins a 
proof with axioms, then one follows an unbroken line to theorems 
which are the result of manipulations of the symbols in the axioms. 
Which propositions depend on which other propositions and under 
what circumstances (of negation, for example) is indicated by 
symbols along a line. For example, a true judgement. A, is indicated 
by placing a turnstile symbol to its left:
I— A .
A simple judgement, of whose truth value we are ignorant, is
indicated by a horizontal line:
—  A.
A negation is indicated by a vertical line dropping from the 
horizontal line leading to a judgement:
■“^ A .
A material conditional which for us reads: "if B then A" takes the 
shape:
—  B.
Proofs take the form of a string of judgements dependent on one 
another, followed by a conclusion. The conclusion is separated from 
the argument by a horizontal line. For example.
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L
In modern notation we would write this:
P
.% -i-i(P  P).
That is, where "P" is a prepositional letter, and can be substituted for 
"a" in the Begriffsschrift notation, from P P, we can conclude that 
- i-.(P  ->P).
A notion which becomes pivotal in Frege's attempt to show 
that intuition and experience/ psychology play no role in arithmetic 
is that of a gapless logical proof. The design of the concept script 
shows that this is not merely meant metaphorically. It is meant 
literally. A gapless proof is one in which it is possible to trace a 
continuous line to a concluding proposition. To manipulate a pair of 
propositions by using a rule of inference, such as Modus Ponens, 
there are clear "transition signs" so that inferences have to be of a 
type which we can recognise from an already justified inventory.
What a gapless proof indicates technically is that nothing has 
been used in the proof save truths, i.e. axioms, logical rules of 
inference and definitions. The definitions are of a special type. A 
definition is logical, and therefore, may be introduced in a gapless 
proof just in case the defmiens is in purely logical notation. It turns 
out that acceptable definitions are for the most part,^  ^just a short­
hand for longer expressions. Philosophically, a gapless proof 
indicates that there has been no appeal to intuition or matters of 
experience. Pace Benacerraf,^^ the emphasis is not so much on
^^The possible exception to this is Hume's principle, and other abstraction 
principles. These are sometimes regarded as definitions of a sort, namely as 
contextual definitions.
^^Paul Benacerraf, "Frege: the Last Logicist," Midwest Studies in Philosophy, eds. 
Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr., & Howard K. Wettstein. (Vol. VI, 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981).
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insuring against contradiction, as it is on insuring that we have not 
introduced any suspect/ contingent notions into our proofs. 
Whatever can be proved by these means is considered to be logic by 
Frege. A gapless proof indicates that the conclusion of a given 
argument is analytic a priori. Thus, a proof acts as a certificate of 
justificatory pedigree.
The logical system of the Begriffsschrift was not enough to 
show that arithmetic is part of logic. While Frege was aware that his 
project was so far incomplete, he published the Begriffsschrift as an 
introduction to the concept script, confident that he could later 
provide a properly logical axiom from which he would be able to 
derive the Peano axioms.
It was suggested to Frege, by one of the reviewers of the 
Begriffsschrift. that he write a philosophical accompaniment to it in 
order to motivate the use of the cumbersome notation and inform 
philosophers of the significance he attributes to the development of 
logic in this direction. He did this, and produced one of the best 
examples of analytic philosophy in his famous: Grundlagen der 
Arithmetik. The work is a striking example of clarity, honesty and 
perspicuity of argument. In it, he spends the first half discrediting 
previous philosophical theories concerning the foundations of 
arithmetic. Having swept the floor and made room for his theory by 
showing the poor state of the foundations of arithmetic, he develops 
his own theory. While he entertains many possible objections, he 
finally indicates, in part, how one can derive the natural numbers 
from logical principles. To do this Frege needed the help of an 
additional supposition which he attributes to Hume, following 
Baumann. Call this: "Hume's principle".^^ Frege was dissatisfied
3%aumann first encountered the statement in Hume’s A Treatise Concerning 
Human Nature. In the context in which it appears, it is clear that Hume had no 
idea of the power of the principle, (that, together with second-order logic, it is 
enough to derive the Peano axioms). For the original Hume quotation see: David 
Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature. (Book I, London, 1739), part iii, § 1. The 
statement of the principle is quoted in Gottlob Frege, The Foundations of 
Arithmetic, trans. J. L. Austin, (Second revised edition; Evanston, Illinois: 
Northwestern University Press, 1980), § 63.
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with taking Hume's principle as an assumption for philosophical
reasons. Essentially Hume's principle introduces the notion of
cardinal number. Hume's principle is:
(VF)(VG)(Nx:Fx = Nx:Gx F -  G)
It reads: for any concepts F and G, the number of F's is equal to the
number of G's if and only if F and G can be placed into one-to-one
correspondence. That is, it introduces the notion of number in terms
of one-to-one correspondence, Frege does not consider it to be
obvious that this is a purely logical truth, so it is not acceptable as a
logical axiom. The trouble, he says, is that it does not give us the
resources to tell whether or not an arbitrarily given object is a
number. Hume's principle cannot really be counted as a definition
of number for this reason. Furthermore, Hume's principle is not
basic enough to count as an axiom either. Leaving aside his
misgivings, and confident that he could provide an axiom from
which he would be able to derive Hume's principle as a theorem, he
strides ahead. Towards the end of the book he sketches a proof of
the infinity of the natural numbers.
He was well aware of the fact that his project was still
incomplete. Very candidly he writes:
I [Frege] do not claim to have made the analytic 
character of arithmetical propositions more than 
probable, because it can still always be doubted 
whether they [the natural numbers] are deducible 
solely from purely logical laws, or whether some other 
type of premiss is not involved at some point in their 
proof without our noticing it. This misgiving will not 
be completely allayed even by the indications I have 
given of the proof of some of the propositions; it can 
only be removed by producing a chain of deductions 
with no link missing, such that no step in it is taken 
which does not conform to some one of a small 
number of principles of inference recognized as purelylogical.39
^^Gottlob Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic, trans. J. L. Austin (Second 
revised edition; Evanston Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1980), § 90.
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To bring his logicist aims to a conclusion, Frege wrote another
technical work in two volumes: the Grundgesetze der Arithmetik. The
first volume was published in 1893, and the second in 1903. The aim
was to give a more formal presentation of concepts which would
extend the work begun in Begriffsschrift. and would prove
rigorously that Hume's principle, and therefore arithmetic, are
grounded in logic.
It is significant that Frege felt he had to prove Hume’s
principle to be logical. He was thereby indicating that he did not
think it obvious that it was part of logic, but that it can be justified in
terms of more basic and obviously logical principles.
Of course the pronouncement is often made that 
arithmetic is merely a more highly developed logic; yet 
that remains disputable so long as transitions occur in 
proofs that are not made according to acknowledged laws 
of logic, but seem rather to be based upon something 
known by intuition. 40
Frege wanted to derive the natural numbers from clearly logical
axioms, and thus demonstrate that arithmetic is really just logic and
that numbers are logical objects, requiring only basic suppositions.
In the tradition of the nineteenth century analysts, he wanted to
produce a rigorous proof: one from which it is clear that no "special"
considerations have crept in. A conception is "special" just in case it
is based on empirical observation or is based on intuition. To this
end, Frege had to derive Hume's principle from more basic axioms.
In the first volume of Grundgesetze. Frege introduced a new
axiom, which was not present in the Begriffsschrift. This is the
infamous axiom V (otherwise known as basic law V). It governs the
relationship between objects and concepts. It is:
(VF)(VG)([x]Fx = [x]Gx (Vx)(Fx Gx))
In the left to right direction, it says that there is a mapping from 
concepts to objects. In the right to left direction, it says that the
49Cottlob Frege, Tire Basic Laws of Arithmetic, Exposition of the System, ed. and 
trans. Montgomery Furth (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 
1964), p. 3.
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mapping is one-to-one. Frege expresses some reservations about it
in the introduction to Grundgesteze. There he writes:
A dispute can arise, so far as I can see, only with 
regard to my Basic Law concerning courses-of-values 
(V), which logicians perhaps have not expressly 
enunciated, and yet it is what people have in mind, for 
example, where they speak of the extensions of 
concepts.41
Frege was right to be apprehensive. In 1902, Bertrand Russell read 
the first volume of Grundgesetze and indicated that a paradox is 
derivable from axiom V. He wrote a letter to this effect to Frege, 
who published the second volume anyhow, but included an 
acknowledgement to Russell, a derivation of paradox from axiom V, 
and the very candid comment: "I have never concealed from myself 
its [basic law Vs] lack of the self-evidence which the others [laws] 
possess, and which must properly be demanded of a law of l o g i c . "47 
He then suggests a possible patch on axiom V in the second 
appendix. He called the patch: "basic law V*". The patch axiom is 
ineffectual. Contradiction can be derived from that as well. We shall 
see an example of a property which generates a contradiction from 
axiom V shortly.
The contradiction has come to be known as Russell's paradox 
despite the fact that it was first discovered b y  Zermelo in 1897 .43  
Nevertheless, Russell seems to have discovered it independently, 
and its application to Frege's logical system is the most famous 
example of the paradox being deployed. The problem, manifested in 
Russell's paradox, runs deep. Once Frege realised this, he was 
devastated. Even before full realisation of the extent of the problem 
had taken hold, Frege wrote:
4lGottIob Frege, The Basic Laws oF Arithmetic. Exposition of the System, ed, and 
trans. Montgomery Furth (Berkeley, California; University of California Press, 
1964), pp. 3 -4 .
47Gottlob Frege, The Basic Laws of Arithmetic, Exposition of the System, ed. and 
trans. Montgomery Furth (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 
1964), p. 127.
43b . Rang and W. Thomas, "Zermeio's Discovery of the 'Russell Paradox'," 
Historia Mathematica, vol. VIII, (1981), pp. 15 - 22.
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Hardly anything more unwelcome can befall a scientific 
writer than that one of the foundations of his edifice be 
shaken after the work is finished.
I have been placed in this position by a letter of Mr. 
Bertrand Russell just as the printing of this (second) 
volume was nearing completion.44
After the publication of the second volume of Grundgesetze. Frege 
did not put pen to paper for fourteen years; and then, it was to re­
found arithmetic on geometry!
The problem which Russell's paradox poses for axiom V is a 
conceptual one. Axiom V is an unrestricted axiom of abstraction: for 
all objects there is a corresponding concept, and for all concepts, 
there is a corresponding object. A special case of this is the axiom of 
extensionality: which says that for all properties, there is an 
extension, and for all extensions there is a corresponding property. 
That is, the mapping from properties to extensions is one-to-one and 
onto. The extension is a set: the set of objects which have the 
property. Unfortunately for Frege, the relationship between some 
properties and their extensions is not straightforward.45 In 
particular, axiom V allows for the possibility of what Dummett calls 
indefinitely extensible concepts. These are concepts, the object 
corresponding to which, are not totalities in the sense that they are 
sets which cannot be amassed together. This is because any attempt 
to amass the set fails because it immediately grows. For example.
44Gottlob Frege, The Basic Laws of Arithmetic, ed. and trans. Montgomery Furth, 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964), p. 127.
45charles Chihara, Ontology and the Vicious Circle Principle, (Ithica & London: 
Cornell University Press, 1973), p.2. It does take some work to justify this reading, 
however, bear in mind that we are using the notion of set in a naive way, that is, 
we are not yet committing ourselves to a sophisticated set-theoretic semantics. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that in the literature, axiom V is often confused 
with an axiom of extensionality: that every property has an extension and every 
extension has a property. It is irrelevant to the point here that historically, the 
paradox was presented to Frege in much the same was as above. Frege recognised 
that this was not the best way of presenting as a paradox derivable from his 
system. He re-formulated the presentation in the Appendix to G ru n d g ese tze . For a 
thorough discussion of the Russell paradox as it applies to Frege's formal system  
sec Michael Resnik. Frege and the Philosophy of Mathematics, (London: Cornell 
University Press, 1989), pp. 211 - 224,
49
C hapter I: A H istory of Logicism
consider the concept, R: "being a set which s not self-membered". 
The object corresponding to this is a set. We ask the question: is R a 
member of itself? Say it is, then by the meaning of the concept under 
consideration, it is not a member of itself - contradiction. Try the 
other tack. Say it is not. If the object corresponding to the set is not 
in its own set, then again by the fact that all sets which are not self- 
membered are members of the set, the set itself must be a member 
of the original set - contradiction.
There is a tension between, on the one hand, an imprecise but 
powerful idea of the perfect generality and universality of the 
relationship between objects and concepts. On the other hand, we 
know that there is no one-to-one correspondence between objects 
and concepts. For any set of objects, all the subsets of that set will 
have a corresponding concept. That is, the number of concepts is 
equal to the powerset of the number of objects. The two sets are 
always of different size, and therefore, there is no one-to-one 
correspondence between objects and their corresponding concepts. 
This, of course, presupposes a certain amount of set theory, and that 
a domain of objects can be thought of as a set of objects. The issue 
about exactly how much set theory has to be presupposed and to 
what extent this is in keeping with Frege, is a complicated one. It 
will not be addressed here.
All is not lost for the logicist, since, interestingly, if we ignore 
Basic Law V, that is, simply subtract it from second-order logic, and 
include Hume's principle as an axiom, then we have a consistent 
system, powerful enough to derive the Peano axioms as theorems! 
Another way of putting this is to say that we ignore Grundgesetze. 
and add Hume's principle to Frege's system as it is developed in the 
Begriffsschrift. This was first suggested by Wright. In a further 
technical development, Heck showed that the only essential use 
made of axiom V is in the derivation of Hume's p r i n c i p l e . 4 6  All
46Richard Heck Jr., "The Development of Arithmetic in Frege's G ru n d g ese tze  der  
A rith m etik ,"  Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. LVIII.2 (1993), pp. 579 - 601.
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other mentions of axioms V in the Grundgesetze. can be replaced by 
other axioms and definitions.
The philosophical problem left us, is to once again argue that 
the newly derived foundation is a logical one, i.e. argue that second- 
order logic is logic and that Hume's principle is logical too. The 
logicist has to do these tasks separately because Hume's principle is 
independent of the axioms of second-order logic, in the sense of not 
being derivable from them. The philosophical situation is 
complicated by the fact that second-order logic does not have a 
finite and complete set of axioms. This gives us explicit scope for 
suggesting new ones. We are not free to add anything we like. The 
constraints applied in practice are very rigid and largely technical, 
but we can also be philosophically motivated to add new axioms, as 
in the case of Hume's principle. Ideally, the logicist would like to 
justify Hume's principle in terms of logic, that is, either derive it as a 
theorem of logic (possibly by adding another axiom instead of 
axiom V), or by arguing philosophically that Hume's principle is a 
principle of logic. What is interesting in Frege is that while he firmly 
states that a logical axiom is such that it cannot admit of further 
justification; he believes that arithmetic is a part of logic, that 
Hume's principle is a logical principle, but feels that he has to prove 
it to be such. Frege treats Hume's principle as a theorem. Logical 
theorems are derived using a gapless proof from logical axioms. 
Thus, they are logical principles which can be justified in terms of 
other, more basic logical principles. In this sense, logical axioms are 
not chosen arbitrarily, but according to philosophical criteria. The 
theorems are just what is entailed by these basic truths.
Given that there is hope for the logicist, but that we now  
recognise that the situation is more complicated than Frege perhaps 
realised, let us return to Frege's earlier concerns to see what we can 
salvage. Frege wished not so much to fend off paradox, thus 
inconsistency in arithmetic; but to banish the idea, which comes 
partly as a legacy from Kant, that arithmetic is synthetic. Unlike the 
nineteenth century analysts, Frege is not so concerned with
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epistemology and certainty per se. Instead, he is interested in the
type of justification which can, and ought, to be given for the truths
of arithmetic. When Frege does mention certainty, he is not
concerned with knowing for certain that 2 + 8 = 10, for example.
Rather, he is interested in the sort of justification needed for the
assertion; so what it is the assertion depends on. In particular he
wishes to show clearly that arithmetic does not depend on (Kantian)
intuition. Another way to put the point is that Frege was interested
in demonstrating the autonomy or even objectivity of arithmetic.
How Frege expresses what he means by logical or ultimate
justification varies. It is partly meant in the sense of independence
from temporal intuition and from kinematics. It is also meant in the
sense of independence from psychological considerations. Frege
was very concerned that we should distinguish between (a) how it
is that we arrive at our knowledge of mathematics and (b) the
(ultimate) justification for mathematical statements.
It not uncommonly happens that we first discover the content 
of a proposition, and only later give the rigorous proof of it, 
on other more difficult lines; and often this same proof also 
reveals more precisely the conditions restricting the validity 
of the original proposition. In general, therefore, the question 
of how we arrive at the content of judgement should be kept 
distinct from the other question. Whence do we derive the 
justification for its assertion?47
For Frege, it is crucial we preserve the distinction between how we
happen to arrive at a statement in mathematics and the conditions
which justify it. A statement is justifiably asserted to be true just in
case it is proved. The nature of the proof, so what assumptions or
axioms have to be appealed to, form the basis of the justification.
For Frege, the confusion is made most blatantly by those who
think of mathematics as an empirical science and those who identify
mathematics with biological or psychological processes. Frege is
concerned to discredit psychologism: the doctrine that enquiry into
the nature of mathematics is ultimately empirical in the sense that it
47Gottlob Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic, trans. j. L. Austin (Second 
revised edition; Evanston Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1980), § 3.
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should focus on psychological, biological or neurological
phenomena. Psychologism seeks to trace or reduce mathematical
operations to psychological states. Frege crudely characatures the
psychologistic position as one which identifies mathematics with
muscular movements which are then organised in the brain:
When Strieker, for instance, calls our ideas [or images] 
of numbers motor phenomena and makes them 
dependent on muscular sensations, no mathematician 
can recognize his numbers in such stuff or knows 
what on earth to make of such a proposition.^®
Put in terms of muscular sensations, it is easy to dismiss such an
idea of mathematics, as a nineteenth century aberration which was
short lived. However, the spirit of the idea lives on in the new
sophisticated language of neuroscience where mathematics is
somehow "hard-wired" into our brains in the form of a
predisposition. The philosophical tendency which underpins this
way of thinking is naturalism. Nevertheless, the diagnosis Frege
offers is revealing. Rather bitingly, he drives the point home:
An arithmetic founded on muscular sensations, would 
certainly turn out sensational e n o u g h , 4 9  but also every 
bit as vague as its foundation. No, sensations are 
absolutely no concern of arithmetic. No more are 
mental pictures, formed from the amalgamated traces 
of earlier sense-impressions. All these phases of 
consciousness are characteristically fluctuating and 
indefinite, in strong contrast to the definiteness and 
fixity of the concepts and objects of mathematics.®®
Thus, as far as Frege is concerned, there is a mis-match between
mathematics and psychology; something psychologism is hard put
to explain. Mathematics is fixed and, we might say, timeless. The
advocate of psychologism cannot account for this in any way which
is satisfying to their opponents. An advocate of psychologism can
describe our mathematical behaviour well enough. He can even
4®Gottlob Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic, trans. J. L. Austin (Second 
revised edition; Evanston Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1980), p. v.
49While this is a pun in the English translation, it is not in the original German. 
®®Gottlob Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic, trans. J. L. Austin (Second 
revised edition; Evanston Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1980), pp. v - vi.
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predict it, by just observing as an empirical fact that we are least 
willing to revise mathematics when we experience a surprising 
result which involves mathematics. For example, when presented 
with a puzzling situation, we will say that we have mis-counted, 
rather than say that the laws of arithmetic are wrong. However, 
what the advocate of psychologism does not offer is an account of 
this phenomenon, which is convincing to someone not swayed by 
naturalistic thinking. As far as the opponent of psychologism is 
concerned, an advocate of psychologism owes an explanation as to 
why mathematics gives the appearance of being more fixed than 
other sciences. We can accumulate mathematical truths. We cannot 
revise them, in the same way as we do in physics, chemistry, 
history, economics and so on. The advocate of psychologism will 
search for an explanation in evolutionary theory, history, 
psychological disposition or the composition of the brain. But these 
are not enough to account for the prominence given mathematical 
truths. That is, even if we tell a story about its being to our 
evolutionary advantage to learn some mathematics, the opponent to 
psychologism will insist that we have then to supply some 
explanation as to why it is advantageous to do arithmetic this way; 
why, in other words, there is a right and a wrong mathematics, and 
how it is that we develop mathematical notions well beyond their 
ability to satisfy our need to eat, sleep, procreate and so on.
There are two general sources of worry for Frege. One is that 
philosophers like Mill seem to think that arithmetic is a posteriori: 
Mill argued that even arithmetic is an empirical science. For, he 
argues that arithmetic is based on counting, and counting is 
something we learn through sense experience. To learn to count we 
pick up pebbles, and organise them in a line. Counting is thereby 
reduced to the physical manipulation of objects. Frege very 
cuttingly disparaged this view by pointing out that we can only 
have inaccurate physical experience of very large numbers, and we 
cannot be said to have any experience of zero:
54
C hapter I: A H istory of Logicism
But what in the world can be the observed fact, or the 
physical fact (to use another of Mill's expressions), 
which is asserted in the definition of the number 
777864? Of all the whole wealth of physical facts in his 
apocalypse. Mill names for us only a solitary one, the 
one which he holds is asserted in the definition of the 
number 3. It consists, according to him, in this, that 
collections of objects exist, which while they impress 
the senses thus, *.*, may be separated into two parts, 
thus,. . . .  What a mercy, then, that not everything in 
the world is nailed down; for if it were, we should not 
be able to bring off this separation, and 2 + 1 would 
not be 3! What a pity that Mill did not also illustrate 
the physical facts underlying the numbers 0 and 1!®^
For Frege, it is ludicrous to suggest that physical observations 
underpin arithmetic, since for large numbers, it is impossible to 
distinguish observations which differ from each other by a small 
number.
The second worry for Frege concerns philosophers who 
follow Kant in thinking of arithmetic as synthetic rather than 
analytic. Kant argued that mathematics is a priori synthetic. He 
needed the notion of the a priori synthetic for his metaphysical 
system, in order to account for the possibility of the application of 
mathematics and the grounding of metaphysics. For this purpose, 
then, Kant argues that there is an applied intuition which works 
directly with sense experience, and that there is pure intuition 
which relates and organises concepts. For Kant, there are two sorts 
of pure intuition: spatial and temporal. Geometry relies on spatial 
intuition and arithmetic relies on temporal intuition. We shall 
discuss this further in the next chapter, in section three, when we 
discuss analyticity. We retain analyticity as a criterion for logic, 
since it indicates justificatory pedigree for logical sentences.
There are two aspects to justifying an assertion. One is to 
show that the assertion is true, but more subtly, a proof indicates
®^Gottlob Frege, The FoundatiOTis of Arithmetic, trans. J. L. Austin (Second 
revised edition; Evanston Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1980), § 7. The 
text that Frege is referring to is Mill's System of Logic.
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upon what the truth of the assertion depends. For the logicist, 
favour is extended to purely logical proofs of an assertion, because 
this shows that the truth of the assertion depends only on logical 
truths: truths of which there is none more basic. Logic, is thus given 
a certain conceptual priority over other disciplines. This is because 
logic is thought to be omnipresent, in the sense of being basic to all 
systems of rational enquiry, be they physics, mathematics, or even, 
political science. One reason for spelling out a justification in the 
form of a proof is to give the pedigree of the assertion, logical 
assertions, having the highest pedigree: logical justification is 
ultimate in this sense. Rather unhelpfully, Frege suggests that we 
know that we have traced a justification back to the most basic (and 
therefore logical) axioms, because they are self-evident. The 
relationship between how basic the logical axioms are and their self­
evidence is ultimately unstable. For, while logic might be thought of 
as being basic and universal, and while this might suggest self­
evidence, self-evidence does not imply truth. On the other hand, to 
declare something to be self-evident is a way of saying that the 
justification has ended.
The notion of self-evidence, while often associated witli 
Frege's logicism, must be handled carefully. On the one hand, often 
in mathematics it has been shown that what we took to be self- 
evident turned out not to be so in the light of more rigorous proofs 
which expose assumptions as not invariably true. Take for example, 
Euclid's fifth postulate. It states that "if a straight line falling on two 
straight lines make the interior angles on the same side less than 
two right angles, the two straight lines, if produced indefinitely, 
meet on that side on which are the angles less than the two right 
angles."®  ^Once we overcome the convoluted turn of phrase, this 
may seem self-evident. After all, it is included as a postulate, or 
axiom, and its seeming self-evidence is reason to count it as an
®7Euclid, Euclid's Elements, Book 1 : On Postulate 5. commentary by Proclus,
trans. and published in The History oF Mathematics, eds. John Fauvel and Jeremy
Cray, (London: MacMillan Press, 1987), p. 101.
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axiom. Proclus, who wrote a commentary on the definitions and
postulates recognises the self-evidence of the postulate. However,
he regards the fifth postulate essentially as a theorem, requiring
proof from definitions. He writes:
But perhaps some persons might mistakenly think this 
proposition deserves to be ranked among the 
postulates on the ground that the angle's being less 
than two right angles makes us at once believe in the 
convergence and intersection of the straight lines.®®
He then argues that this is a mistake, but gives no proof, i.e. no
derivation of the fifth postulate from the other postulates. No clear
proof or disproof was given until the nineteenth century when it
was shown to be independent of the other axioms, and therefore,
not provable from them at all! Before that, mathematicians were
interested in showing the postulate to be a theorem since they
regarded it as a truth, but recognised the unease expressed in
Proclus. This is reminiscent of Frege's ambivalence towards Hume’s
principle. He wants to treat Hume's principle as a theorem, yet he
believes that it is obviously true (unless all of arithmetic is false).
Moreover, Frege believes that Hume's principle is a truth of logic;
similarly with Euclid's fifth postulate being a truth of geometry. For
centuries, whenever mathematicians found some principle was
inconsistent with Euclid's fifth postulate, they took this as a reductio
argument, and jettisoned the suspect principle in favour of the fifth
postulate. It was not until non-Euclidean geometries, such as
Lobochevski's geometry on a sphere, were explicitly and rigorously
developed, that the (sometimes falsity) of the fifth postulate, from
the other postulates, was recognised. An example of a case where
the fifth postulate is false, was developed by Poincaré in a so called
®®Euclid, Euclid's Elements. Book 1 "On Postulate 5", commentary by Proclus, 
trans. and published in The History of Mathematics, eds. John Fauvel and Jeremy 
Cray, (London: MacMillan Press, 1987), p. 104. We might also add to the grounds 
for believing this that many centuries later the independence of Euclid's fifth 
postulate had not been proved. Its truth was a subject of debate both with the 
Arab mathematicians and the Western mathematicians until the nineteenth 
century when non-euclidean geometry was properly understood and 
investigated. See the same book, pp. 508 - 540.
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"inner model" of Euclidean geometry. Poincare's example is as 
follows: take a circle as the universe. This can have a chord and a 
point not on the chord through which an infinite number of straight 
lines can pass without intersecting with the first chord.®4 Thus, there 
is a model of the other four postulates in which the fifth postulate is 
false. In this sense, the fifth postulate is sometimes refer to as being 
independent of the other axioms of Euclidean Geometry.
The discovery of the so called independence of Euclid's fifth 
postulate from the rest of the postulates has changed our thinking. 
Previously we thought that axioms were fundamental truths, 
mathematical truths were self-evident and they formed an unified 
system. Frege thinks this of logical and a fortiori, the arithmetical 
axioms and Hume's principle, but not of geometrical axioms. What 
came to be questioned was the relationship between truth and 
axioms, and what the grounding of mathematical truths is. Tire 
negation of an independent axiom is consistent with the original set 
of axioms. This, in fact, is what led to talk of systems. For, with the 
independence of certain axioms, we found that we had to qualify 
their truth, and make it relative to a system. We say, for example, 
that Euclid's fifth postulate is true in Euclidean geometry. This may 
give the impression of undermining the unity of truth in 
mathematics.
The idea of an unified theory of truth is very appealing. We 
do not give it up easily. Indeed, it is one of the motivations for 
logicism. For, the thought goes, we want to review the foundations 
of our reasoning. The hunch is that the foundation is logic, and this 
is analytic and universal since the axioms of logic are self-evident, 
timeless and unshakeable - as were the Euclidean axioms before the 
discovery of the independence of Euclid's fifth postulate. This 
notion of self-evidence, unity and independence is what lies at the
®4Another example is due to Riemann. In this, we take another inner model, this 
time the sphere. A straight line on a sphere is any line which traces a great circle. 
A great circle is one which bisects the sphere into two equal halves. Consider one 
such straight line and an arbitrary point distinct from the line. There is no straight 
line which can pass through the point and not intersect with the original line.
58
C hapter I: A H istory of Logicism
heart of Frege's insistence that logic and arithmetic are analytic, and 
for this reason provide a foundation for the rest of mathematics. It 
would have been inconceivable for Frege to think of the logical 
axioms as independent of each other in this sense, i.e. that there 
should be alternative logical systems which differ from each other 
by the negation of one of the axioms of the original system. This is 
because the logical axioms are universal truths for Frege. It is 
exactly in this conviction about the conceptual priority of logic over 
everything else, that Frege most disagreed with Hilbert.
Contrast Frege's to Hilbert's view of axioms.®® Hilbert has the 
more modern view. He is more impressed, than Frege is, by the 
independence of certain axioms. Rather than thinking that this 
problem only infected a few (geometrical) axioms, he thought that 
so called logical and arithmetical axioms could also be thought of as 
essentially arbitrary. They then lose their arbitrariness through 
considerations of applicability and formal considerations such a 
mutual consistency. Thus, logic and arithmetic do not assume a 
privileged position over other mathematical theories. For Hilbert, 
the only justification for axioms are formal or mathematical criteria, 
and come in the form of limitative results about the body of 
theorems which are generated by the system which is encapsulated 
in the axioms and rules of inference. The most important 
justification for a set of axioms is that they should be mutually 
consistent. A system that is consistent is thereby thought to be prima 
facie legitimate. Of lesser import are considerations of completeness 
and finiteness; where the latter is an expression of concern for 
methodology, and does not imply that Hilbert was only interested 
in finite numbers. Our methods of investigation have to be finite, 
not the objects/ sets investigated. The notion that logical axioms are
®®Thc dearest place to see the contrast is in the Frege/ Hilbert correspondence, 
published and translated into English in Frege: Philosophical and Mathematical 
Correspondence, tans, (of Frege) Hans Kaal, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980). For 
an excellent discussion, see Michael Hallett, "Hilbert's Axiomatic Method and the 
Laws of Thought," Mathematics and Mind, ed. Alexander George, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 158 - 200.
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universally true is erased, as is any sense of self-evidence. Similarly, 
Hilbert cannot entertain the notion that axioms are true 
independently of the system which they encapsulate. Instead, one 
formal system might be found to be easier to apply to one situation 
than another. Thus, a notion of fit or applicability replaces that of 
truth.
Hilbert's conception of the logical axioms enjoys certain 
advantages over Frege's conception of logic. For, it avoids much of 
the metaphysical baggage which accompanies Frege's formal 
system, namely, Frege's philosophy concerning the conceptual 
priority of logic, the self-evidence of the logical axioms, and Frege's 
platonism towards logical objects. However, it should be noted that 
in order to show that a system is consistent or complete, one has 
make appeal to a stronger system. The question then arises as to 
how we regard the more powerful system we used to generate the 
results concerning the original system. Is the more powerful system 
true? Hilbert disallows this question in this form. Is the system 
consistent? To answer this, we have to move to a yet more powerful 
system, and we are faced with the threat of an infinite regress. 
Furthermore, the only information we are allowed to seek is 
technical, and defined within the confines of the practice. The 
metaphysical importance of logic is then sadly neglected. In 
contrast, Frege thought of his logic as the ultimate point de repair just 
because of the supposed self-evidence and truth of the axioms, 
Hilbert did not have recourse to a notion of self-evidence.
Hilbert's view spawned other philosophical attitudes 
towards logic. For example, first-order logic, second-order logic, 
propositional calculus and other formal systems were thought of 
only as tools. As such, the only merit one formal system could have 
over another concerns its suitability to a given application. Frege's 
formal system, or second-order logic in general are then seen to be 
just a formal system amongst others, as opposed to one which lies at 
the source of our reasoning.
60
C hapter I: A H istory of Logicism
A concern with applications, in turn, seeded the limiting idea 
that applications were only legitimate if made outside mathematics. 
That is, to justify a formal system, one has to do this in terms of its 
application to physics, or engineering, or whatever. Under this 
conception, logic and mathematics lose their privileged status, and 
worse still, are restricted to the finite and the mundane.
§ 4: Logicism after Frege: Whitehead and Russell
Despite having discovered a fatal flaw in Frege's attempt to 
elaborate logicism, Russell found logicism appealing. He took up 
the slack where Frege left off and tried, with Whitehead, to develop 
a more ambitious project: that of showing that all of mathematics is 
ultimately based on logic. He and Whitehead published the three 
volumes of Principia Mathematica from 1910 to 1913. Russell was 
most interested in the philosophical implications of the project; 
whereas Whitehead was more interested in the mathematics.
Russell is often counted among the logicists, and while he was 
certainly inspired by Frege's work, the Russell and Whitehead 
project differs markedly. Their project is more ambitious than 
Frege's, and they found that with the technical differences between 
their's and Frege's system, they had to also modify the philosophical 
agenda. Russell and Whitehead developed a ramified type theory. 
This forces a conception of a typed/ stratified universe. Frege 
considered an elaborate type stratification briefly, but found it 
unacceptable because it is too elaborate, and therefore, not general 
enough.®^
The criticism usually levelled against the ramified type 
theory qua vindication of logicism; is that the type theory is 
arguably not a theory of pure logic. This is because it includes an 
axiom of infinity and an axiom of reducibility which are not 
logically necessary. That there should exist an infinite set in the
®^Howcver, also see Michael Potter, Chapter two of forthcoming book.
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universe cannot just be stipulated, and then taken to be a necessary 
truth of logic.
The failure of Russell and Whitehead’s attempt should not be 
the last word on logicism. From it, we know that a ramified type 
theory is not the best basis from which to prove logicism. The 
existence of an infinite set has to be proven. This is what Frege tried 
to do, by deriving the infinity of the natural numbers as a theorem 
from Hume's principle, which in turn was meant to be derived from 
axiom V, which in turn was meant to be a logical axiom. This was 
the strategy Frege employed to show that the infinity of the natural 
numbers was a matter of logic, not of mathematics. We shall be 
ignoring Russell and Whitehead's attempt at vindicating logicism 
on two counts. One is that the project turned out to be quite 
different from that of Frege's version of logicism, and two, the 
recent revival of logicism largely concerns Frege's attempt, not 
Russell's.
After Russell's failed attempt, there was a long silence on the 
issue. In part this was due to an interest in rival foundationalist 
theories and a concern to avoid set theoretic paradox; in part, silence 
was due to the promotion of first-order logic.
§5: The Rise of First-order Logic
The promotion of first-order logic started in 1923, when 
Skolem argued that first-order logic exhausted the scope of logic. At 
the time, the proposal met with strong opposition. However, with 
the proof that set theory could be done in a first-order language, 
Godel's incompleteness results (1931,1932) together with a growing 
sensitivity to suggestions from the intuitionists to re-found 
mathematics on a firmer epistemological footing, Skolem's position 
began to dominate. Philosophers too, joined the first-order camp, 
and the idea that first-order logic is the most powerful logic remains 
entrenched in the corpus of philosophical myth.
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Before 1923, this was not at all the case. As we have noted 
already, Frege's logical system, as it is presented in the Begriffsschrift, 
is more-or-less equivalent to second-order logic.®7 Russell and 
Whitehead's theory of types is sometimes considered to be a sort of 
higher-order logic. With the developments introduced by Frege, 
Peirce, Poincaré and others, what was considered logic tended to be 
second-order or higher. It was only in 1917 that a clear exposition of 
first-order logic appeared. This was due to Hilbert.®® He called his 
system the calculus of functions, and developed it for the purposes 
of some lectures on logic in Gottingen. His philosophical comments 
on the logical system are revealing. He believed that the logic was 
sufficient for the purposes of "formalising logical deduction."®9 
However, if we wish to investigate the foundations of mathematics:
®7Exactly where the differences lie between the system of the B egriffsschrift and 
second-order logic is not entirely straightforward to determine. This is mainly 
because exactly what constitutes second-order logic is not a settled issue. What 
we do know, for example, is that in the system of the Begriffsschrift there is 
quantification over second-order variables. We also know that Frege did not have 
an axiom of comprehension, the need for such an axiom was not pressing until 
Frege wanted to ground Hume's principle. To do this Frege introduced axiom V. 
This is an abstaction principle, which is not quite the same as a comprehension 
principle. As far as I know, a clear discussion of the exact differences is absent 
from the literature. Furthermore, insofar as a reconception of logicism is needed 
in the light of the many formal systems which present themselves as logic, what is 
being argued for here is that second-order logic, in its modern guise, can be 
characterised as logic, and this constitutes a partial vindication of logicism. To 
what extent the vindication is loyal to Frege's original project, in part, depends on 
the perceived rapport between modern second-order logic and the formal system 
of the B egj'iffsschrift. For exmple, whether or not what Frege explicitly proves in 
the system of the Begriffsschrift could also be proven in a weaker system than that 
of second-order logic, such as many-sorted logic, is an open question, as far as I 
know, Many-sorted logic is an obvious choice because it also has quantifcation 
over second-order variables, but it is complete.
®®Hilbert: P rin zip ie it der  M a th em atik  u n d  Logik. Unpublished lecture notes of a 
course given at Gottingen during the winter semester 1917-18 (math. Institute, 
Gottingen). Referred to in Gregory Moore, "The Emergence of First-order Logic," 
eds. William Asprey and Philip Kitchcr, History and Philosophy of Modern 
Mathematics, (Minnesota Studies in Philosophy of Science, XI, Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1988), pp. 95 - 138.
®9 Gregory Moore, "The Emergence of First-order Logic," eds. William Asprey 
and Philip Kitcher, History and Philosophy of Modern Mathematics, (Minnesota 
Studies in Philosophy of Science, XI, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1988), p. 114.
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"to examine in what relation mathematics stands to logic and to 
what extent mathematics can be obtained from purely logical 
operations and concepts,"^® then we need a much stronger logic. 
There is no hint, in Hilbert, of the scope of logic per se being 
exhausted by first-order logic. Indeed, Hilbert viewed the formal 
system of first-order logic as a restriction to log ic .In stead , how  
strong a logical system is needed depends on our purpose: to 
capture deductive reasoning or to measure the scope of logic vis-à- 
vis mathematics.
It was mentioned in the introduction that we can compare 
the strengths of systems according to different criteria. Similarly, 
there are different ways of characterising formal systems. We can 
characterise them in terms of the presentation of syntax and 
semantics: so a formal system is identified with a particular 
presentation; or we can characterise a formal system in terms of its 
characterising (or limitative) results. In some ways,^^ the latter is 
cleaner since it avoids problems in ambiguity of presentation, where 
we are not sure whether or not two sets of notation, for example, are 
really equivalent. When we identify a formal system by its limitative 
results, we might identify systems with very different looking 
presentations.®®
For reasons of hygiene, and because limitative results were 
central to the debate about the logical status of first-order logic, we
®®Grcgory Moore, "The Emergence of First-order Logic," eds. William Asprey and 
Philip Kitcher, History and Philosophy of Modem Mathematics, (Minnesota 
Studies in Philosophy of Science, XI, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1988), p. 114.
®^David Hilbert, " P rinzip ien  der M a th em a tik  u n d  Logik," Unpublished lecture notes 
of a course given at Gottingen during the winter semester 1917 -1918, 
(Mathematics institute, Gottingen), pp. 222 - 3, cited in Gregory H. Moore, "The 
Emergence of First-order Logic," eds. William Asprey and Philip Kitcher, History 
and Philosophy of Modern Mathematics. (Minnesota Studies in Philosophy of 
Science, XI, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), p. 115.
®7in other ways, this will depend on the meta-language we use to present a 
system in the first place, and our ability to translate from one presentation to 
another.
®®Wc have already mentioned the case of many-sorted logic and first-order logic. 
These share limitative results, but differ markedly in their semantics.
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shall favour that characterisation in general. Having said that, note 
also that the debate between Quine and Boolos, discussed in section 
six of this chapter, is about the interpretation of the quantifiers, so 
again, about the presentation of second-order logic, as opposed to 
its characterising results.
In 1923, Skolem suggested in print®^  that set theory be 
formulated in the language of first-order logic with set-theoretic 
membership added in. Thus, he was implicitly viewing set theory as 
a first-order theory.®® He wanted to do this in order to demonstrate 
clearly the relativity of set theoretic notions. This relativity is 
evident, for example, in what we refer to as Skolem's paradox: that 
first-order (Zermelo) set theory can be modelled with a countable 
model "even though this system implies the existence of 
uncountable sets."®® The problem is to fit the uncountable model 
into the countable model, and this is impossible because it 
contradicts Cantor's theorem: that two sets have the same size if 
they can be placed into one-to-one correspondence. Cantor also 
showed that the powerset of a set is strictly greater than the original 
set.
Central to Skolem's understanding of the paradox is the 
consideration that set-theoretic membership is a non-logical 
relation. In particular, it is not a logical constant. This makes room 
for non-standard interpretations and competing set theories. Each 
defines (implicitly), by means of axioms, the set-theoretic 
membership symbol in its own way. Skolem's proposal that we 
view set-theoretic membership as a non-logical relation, makes it
®4Hg made the suggestion a year earlier at a conference. It took a year for the 
conference proceedings to be printed.
®®Thoraf Skolem "Einige B em erkungen  zu r  axiom atischcn  B cgriin du n g  der  
M cngenlehre"  in V iden skapsse lskapcts s h if te r . /. M atcn m tik -n a tu rv iden skabelig  klasse, 
no.4. Translation of section 1 in Van Heijenoort, From Frege to Godel: A Source 
Book in Mathematical Logic. 1879 -1931. (Third printing, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 252 - 63.
®®Gregory H. Moore, "The Emergence of First-order Logic," eds. William Asprey 
and Philip Kitcher, History and Philosophy of Modern Mathematics, (Minnesota 
Studies in Philosophy of Science, XI, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1988), p. 123.
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obvious that it should be subject to various interpretations. This had 
a knock-on effect. If set-theoretic membership is only a relative 
notion ("ambiguous" would have been better, but Skolem uses 
"relative"), then so is that of set, subset, powerset and so on.
Also of significance to how we view logic is that Skolem 
ousted the membership relation, from its privileged position among 
the logical symbols, to the more common-place position of being a 
non-logical constant relation. Ramsay too,®7 made a similar point 
about Whitehead and Russell's type theory: that they treat "e " as a 
logical constant, when really it is a variable, as far as logic was 
concerned. This is because the axioms governing its use are 
contingent (relative to logic). Grosso modo, Ramsay criticised them 
for using a mixture of logical and non-logical notions, so not 
founding mathematics on logic but on more mathematics.
Viewing set-theoretic membership as a non-logical constant 
relation, allows the Skolem paradox to arise because what 
characterises a set, in particular, the cardinality of a set, becomes a 
relative notion. Skolem believed that this revealed a feature of 
mathematics which runs very deep. This is a mistake if we consider 
that the paradox is confined to first-order set theory. Unfortunately, 
this is an oversimplification since there is a sense in which the 
paradox is ubiquitous. For, it is true, not only of mathematics, but of 
every discourse. The Skolem paradox only points out (in a 
particular instance) that any judgement we make about a formal 
system has to be expressed and demonstrated in another (meta­
language). This other formal system can in turn come under 
question, particularly when it conflicts with pronouncements made 
in a third (meta-meta level) formal system. The Skolem paradox is a 
twist on this where we seem to get contradictory results about one 
formal system (first-order set theory). At the time, the Skolem 
paradox presented a very real difficulty. There was a marked lack of 
clarity concerning what it was that the paradox indicated. The
®7 Frank Plump ton Ramsay, The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical
Essays, ed. Richard B. Braithvvait, (London: 1931).
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difference between first and second-order logic had not yet been 
fully appreciated. Reviews by Fraenkel (1923)^ ® and von Neumann 
(1925)^  ^of Skolem’s results concerning the Lowenheim-Skolem 
theorems seem to have been unclear about the difference between 
first and second-order logic. As a result, it was assumed that the 
results generalised to all axiomatic systems, and that the Skolem 
paradox is ubiquitous. Even Godel, in his doctoral dissertation, 
seemed unclear about the scope of the results with respect to a 
distinction between first and second-order logic.^  ^The supposed 
ubiquity of the result was only beginning to be undermined in 1930 
when Godel realised that another limitative theorem: the Skolem- 
Godel theorem is restricted to first-order logic. The Skolem-Godel 
theorem is: that every "denumerably infinite set of formulas... is 
simultaneously satisfiable or else possesses a finite subset whose 
logical conjunction is refutable. Godel was aware that this 
theorem implies compactness, and that not all theories are compact. 
This shows that by 1930 Godel had the resources to show that there 
is a significant difference between first and second-order logic: that 
they differ in their limitative results. This might have suggested to 
Godel, and others, that the scope of the Skolem results, and the 
Skolem paradox, could not be immediately extended to any system. 
In fact, this is exactly what Zermelo implicitly suggested in his
^^Fracnkcl, "Review of SkolenVs E inige B ennerkungcn  z u r  ax iom atischen  B egrtin du n g  
dcr M cngcnlehre,"  Jahrbiich uber d ie F ortsch ritte  der M a th e m a tik , XLIX (1923). 
Referred to in Gregory H. Moore, "The Emergence of First-order Logic," eds. 
William Asprey and Philip Kitcher, History and Philosophy of Modern 
Mathematics. (Minnesota Studies in Philosophy of Science, XI, Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1988), pp. 95 - 138.
von Neumann, "Eine A x io m a tis ieru n g  der M engenlehre," Journal fiir d ie  re ine u n d  
a n g e iva n d te  M a th e m a tik , CLIV (1925) pp. 219 - 40. Translated in Jean van 
Heijenoort (ed.). From Frege to Godel: A Source Book in Mathematical Logic. 1879 
-1931. (Third printing, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
1967), pp. 393-413.
^^^Gregory Moore, "The Emergence of First-order Logic," eds. William Asprey and 
Philip Kitcher, History and Philosophy of Modern Mathematics. (Minnesota 
Studies in Philosophy of Science, XI, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1988), p. 125.
^Ijohn W. Dawson Jr., "The Compactness of First-order Logic," History and 
Philosophv of Logic. XIV (1993), p. 17.
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letters to Skolem where he insists on clarification of the Skolem 
results. His letters seem to have had no effect on Skolem. This is due 
in part to the fact that a new set of considerations was coming to the 
fore in support of first-order logic over second or higher-order logic.
The considerations came from Brouwer and Heyting. They 
were worries about the epistemological foundations of mathematics. 
These worries were taken seriously by Godel and Skolem, and 
interpreted in such a way that it was thought that if mathematicians 
confined their mathematical enquiries to first-order logic, then these 
epistemological worries would be alleviated.^^ Tarski and Bernays 
criticise Godel on exactly this point, namely that this is not a 
sufficient reason to confine logic to first-order. Thus, what was 
emerging despite the efforts of Tarski, Zermelo and Bernays was 
what we might call, following Wolenski,^^ "the first-order thesis": 
that first-order logic exhausts the scope of logic. That is, there is no 
stronger logic and any stronger formal system is mathematics, or 
something else.
One person's proof is another person's reductio. Skolem 
interpreted the non-categoricity of first-order logic (which follows 
from the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem, and allows the Skolem 
paradox to be generated) to indicate the wholesale relativity of set 
theoretic notions. He then shifted to intuitionistic considerations to 
continue advocating first-order logic as a foundation for 
mathematics. In contrast, Tarski, Zermelo and Bernays interpreted 
the Loweheim-Skolem theorem as a rediictioJThey suggested 
moving to a more powerful system, such as second-order logic or 
second-order set theory or type theory, where there is reason to
^^One piece of evidence for this is that when Godel was asked why it took so long 
for the mathematical community to come to grips with the compactness theorem, 
he said that mathematicians were not taking the relevant mathematical attitude 
towards mathematics. See also Wolenski, talk at St. Andrews, where he signals 
that one of the points where Godel and Tarski diverged most dramatically, was 
in their epistemological attitude. Tarski was unmoved by such constructivist 
considerations.
^^Jan Wolenski, "In Defence of the First-order Thesis," Logica '93. Proceedings of
the 7th International Symposium, eds. P. Kolar & V. Svoboda, (Praha: Filosofia,
1994), pp. 1-11.
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think that the relativity of set theoretic notions is eradicated. Of 
course, this is not entirely the case.^ '^  What is established, is that 
second-order arithmetic is categorical. That is, models for the 
natural numbers are isomorphic. Similar results occur when we 
move to a higher-order set theory. However, to show exactly the 
relationship between categoricity and the relativity of set theoretic 
notions requires certain assumptions which tend to be built into a 
meta-language, and the justification for the choice of meta-language 
is then an open question. An infinite regress threatens. This is the 
sense in which the Skolem paradox runs deep. On the other hand, it 
is a problem which is hardly confined to formal languages. There 
will be further discussion of this issue in chapter three, section two.
These arguments were then succeeded by others which 
centred around compactness, undecidability and completeness. By 
this time it was clear that first-order logic was not very powerful 
and that it was to be distinguished from first-order set theory.
The prevailing thought that first-order logic is both the 
strongest logic and yet not very powerful, combined to make the old 
logicist project look hopeless. Two ideas emerged. One was that 
first-order logic should be considered all of logic because anything 
stronger, like first-order set theory, is relative and mathematical.
The second, is that we could not possibly consider second-order 
logic to be logic because if it is in any respect stronger than first- 
order set theory, then it violates our epistemological sensitivities. In 
fact, those who were sensitive to the epistemological problems of 
mathematics often advocated a more stringent system to fall under 
the title "logic", namely, intuitionistic log ic .H ow ever, as we shall 
see in subsequent chapters, there is a sense in which the neo- 
Fregean logicist can side-step these considerations.
7^For an excellent discussion see Stewart Shapiro, Foundations Without 
Foundationalism: A Case for Second-order Logic. (Oxford Logic Guides: 17; 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), pp. 204 - 8.
Brouwer was not entirely happy with the idea of intuitionism being given a 
formal expression. However, in a sense, this was inevitable.
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§ 6: The Present-Day Status of Second-Order Logic
Confusion persists. Quine has made one of the most 
influential contributions towards how it is that we view second- 
order logic. He argues that second-order logic is really set theory.^  ^
His argument has four steps. First, when we bind a variable with a 
quantifier we treat that variable as a potential name, in the sense 
that it stands in a place where a name could stand (if we were to 
instanciate), A  fortiori, this is also true of second-order variables. 
Second, names are such, in virtue of the fact that they refer. Thus, a 
(first-order) name has an individual as its referent. A predicate may 
have a number of individuals in its extension. This implies that 
predicates refer to entities of some sort. Third, what they refer to are 
subsets of the domain of individuals, and the only way to 
understand this, is in terms of set theory. Fourth, since set theory is 
the study of sets, second-order logic is also covertly about sets, and 
therefore, makes the same ontological commitment as set theory, 
and therefore, in all essential respects, second-order logic is really 
set theory.
Why we are so slow to recognise that second-order logic is 
set theory, Quine diagnoses, is because we believe that there is a real 
distinction to be drawn between treating bound predicates as being 
thus and so and treating bound predicates as standing in the place 
where a name could stand, an so referring to entities which are thus 
and so. By virtue of the choice of words, the first analysis is proper 
to logic; the second is proper to set theory. But, Quine argues, this is 
a distinction without a difference since the only way to understand 
the first is in set theoretic terms, i.e. in terms of the second. He 
concludes that second-order logic is misleading since it poses as 
logic but is really set theory. To keep second-order logic honest, 
Quine suggests we translate predicate expressions into set-
^^Wilfrcd Orman van Quine, Philosophy of Logic, (Cambridge Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1970),
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membership expressions. For example, "Fx" would be written as "x e
F". Since set theory is clearly not logic, the only way we can be
assured of remaining within the realm of logic proper is by sticking
to honest first-order logic. His argument is this:
Consider first some ordinary quantifications: '(3x)(x
walks)', '(Vx)(x walks)', '(3x)(x is prime)'. The open 
sentence [formula] after the quantifier shows 'x' in a 
position where a name could stand; a name of a 
walker, for instance, or of a prime number. The 
quantifications do not mean that names walk or are 
prime; what are said to walk or be prime are the things 
that could be named by names in those positions. To 
put the predicate letter 'F' in a quantifier, then, is to 
treat predicate positions suddenly as name positions, 
and hence to treat predicates as names of entities of 
some sort.77
In "On Second-Order Logic,"^  ^Boolos argues that Quine's argument 
is fallacious. He exposes the hidden assumption in Quine's 
argument, namely, that we are obliged to treat bound predicates as 
standing in name positions. He denies the assumption, claiming that 
there is no reason to think that by binding predicates we thereby 
treat them as potential names. Thus, no confusion need arise 
between treating them as being thus and so, and treating them as 
being in a position which could be occupied by a name.
In Quine's favour, the appeal in treating all bound variables 
as standing in a place where a name might stand is that, if we treat 
individual (first-order) bound variables as standing in name 
positions, then it seems reasonable that we should treat anything we 
bind with a quantifier as standing in a name position. Of course, this 
does not immediately follow. For, bound individual variables may 
stand in name positions, not in virtue of their being bound by 
quantifiers, but in virtue of being individual variables as opposed to 
predicate variables. To argue against Quine's position, we have to
^^Wilfrcd Orman van Quine, Philosophy of Logic. (Cambridge Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 66 - 7.
^^George Boolos, "On Second-order Logic." The loiirnal of Philosophv. LXXII 
(1975), pp. 509-527.
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argue that bound predicate variables are different from bound 
individual variables in the respect that the one lot of variables are 
individual variables, and the other lot are predicate variables. 
Names do not engage the issue.
There are different ways of understanding second-order 
quantification qua extension of first-order quantification.^^ One of 
these is that the salient feature of bound variables is that we can 
instanciate them using names. But this is not the only way of 
extending first-order quantification to second-order. At the risk of 
labouring the point, we are not constrained to treat second-order 
bound variables as standing in name positions, since we can argue 
that this is not the relevant feature of quantifiable variables we wish 
to preserve in the extension from first to second-order.
What is the alternative? Boolos suggests we treat bound 
predicate variables, not as standing in a place for names, but as 
having a range. Crucially, this allows us to deny that they stand for 
objects.
...[W]e have no reason not to think that there might be 
a sort of variable, a predicate variable, that ranges over 
objects in its range (these will be extensions) but does 
not name them "indefinitely" or any other way; rather, 
predicate variables will have them "indefinitely," as 
(constant) predicates have their extensions definitely.®^
In other words, the suggestion is that we treat bound predicate
variables not as individual variables qua bound variables, but as
bound predicate variables qua predicates. That is, when we extend
first-order logic to second-order by allowing quantification over
predicates, the way we should understand the extension is that
predicates are treated in much the same way as they were in first-
order logic, as having a different status than individuals (variables
or constants/names), except that now we can bind these new sorts
^^Notice the shift in language. This reflects the history of second-order logic. We 
now think of second-order logic as an extension of first-order logic, rather than 
thinking of first-order logic as a peculiar fragment of logic (which could be either 
second-order or higher-order).
^%eorge Boolos, "On Second-order Logic." The fournal of Philosophy . LXXII 
(1975), p. 511.
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of variables. This is in keeping with Frege, since he proposes a first 
level consisting in all the objects there are, and above that is a level 
of first-order concepts. For Frege, the nature of concepts is very 
different from that of objects. Implicit in Boolos' argument is the 
following characterisation of Quine's reasoning.
Quine's understanding of the extension of first-order logic to 
second-order, is one where we confuse the role of predicates 
between that of a name for some entity and as being some entity. In 
fact, the extension is best understood as one into set theory. For, if 
the predicates are treated as standing where names can stand, then 
the best way to understand this is that names name subsets of the 
domain, and the obvious way to understand the domain (since it 
now includes all subsets of any other original domain) is in terms of 
the iterative hierarchy.
In contrast, Boolos understands the extension of first-order 
logic to second-order as one which preserves the distinction 
between an individual variable and a predicate variable. The 
difference is that:
'(3F)' does not have to be taken as saying that some 
entities of the sort named by predicates are thus and 
so; it can be taken to say that some of the entities 
(extensions) had by predicates contain thus and such.
So some variables eligible for quantification might well 
belong in predicate positions and not in name positions.^^
(Italics mine.)
The argument is that we may choose to read a variable in one of two 
ways. In case we do so one way, it is read as a predicate variable. If 
we read it in another way, it is an individual variable. Typically, we 
signal the two readings typographically: by the use of lower-case 
(for individuals) and upper-case (for predicates). The two ways of 
reading variables amounts to referring to individual entities in the 
domain (in the case of individual variables) or to the extension of 
the predicate to those individuals in the domain which have the
George Boolos, "On Second-order Logic." The fournal of P h ilosophy, LXXII
(1975), p. 511.
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predicate. The purpose of stating the predicate variable reading in 
the passive is that every individual in the domain has some 
predicates (features). Quantifying over a predicate allows us to 
attempt to section off those individuals, to partition the domain into 
those which have F and its complement: those which do not. This 
does not sanction treating the sectioned off part of the domain as an 
entity in its own right. Concepts, which are what second-order 
variables refer to, are not objects. Only their extensions are 
composed of objects. All we know when we write the false sentence 
'(Vx)(3F)(3G)((Fx Gx) -4 (Fx a Gx))’ in second-order logic is that 
given a domain, the sentence is true when all the individuals in it 
have two distinct properties. We have not committed ourselves to 
predicates or properties being entities, since we also have said 
nothing about the status of the domain.
To make explicit the divergence between set theory and 
second-order logic, Boolos gives some examples of sentences which 
are valid in second-order logic but not in set theory. Quine thinks 
that the two sentences: "Fx" and "x £ F" are equivalent. However, 
then Quine is faced with the quandary that the sentence: 
(3F)(Vx)(Fx) is valid in second-order logic (it just says that there is a 
domain of individuals, and follows from an axiom of 
comprehension) whereas his proposed translation into set theory: 
(3y)(Vx)(x 8 y) is false in set theory.^^ Quine believes the translation 
to be more honest. However, it cannot really be a translation since 
the suggested way of translating sentences produces false, from 
true, sentences.
This divergence in truth value is underpinned by the 
divergence in ontological commitment between set theory and 
second-order logic. As Quine puts it, set theory makes staggering 
ontological commitments. It assumes, as domain of quantification, 
all proper subsets of the iterative hierarchy. In contrast, under
^-George Boolos, "On Second-ordcr Logic," The journal of P hilosophy, LXXII
(1975), p. 512.
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Boolos' reading, second-order logic is not even committed to the 
existence of a two-membered set. This is because, the sentence: 
(3X)(3x)0y)(Xx A  X y  A  X  y ) , 8 3  
expressing the existence of a property which holds of two distinct 
individuals is invalid. As a counter-example, consider a universe 
with only one member. In set theory, the property, under the 
Quinean translation:
(3X)(3x)(3y)(x eXAyeXAx?&y) ,  
expresses the existence of a two-membered set. We are assured of its 
existence by inspection of the set theoretic hierarchy. In logic, no 
assumption is made as to which domains exist.
To summarise, the dispute between Boolos and Quine shows 
that Quine’s conclusion does not follow from the premises. Boolos 
succeeds in doing this by pointing out that there is a consistent, 
alternative, way of extending first to second-order logic. 
Furthermore, the conclusion is false tout court. This is demonstrated 
by the divergence in truth values between second-order sentences 
and their set theoretic counterparts (under Quine's translation).
This makes it clear why certain axioms in set theory are not 
considered to be logical axioms. For, they pertain to the construction 
of the hierarchy.
In conclusion, around the turn of the century, when logic 
suddenly became much stronger, the issue of the distinction 
between mathematics and logic did not arise. At the time, logicism 
was criticised for different reasons. Logicism was a project with a 
clear goal and clear boundaries. It seemed obvious that logic was 
distinct from mathematics, and that logic held a philosophically 
privileged place over mathematics. Now this is less clear. With the 
plethora of logics which confront us, there seems to be no obvious 
cut-off point between logic and mathematics. Moreover, there are 
rival logical systems which are not mutually compatible. It is not at 
all clear that logic has to found mathematics in any sense. On the
^^Georgc Boolos, "On Second-order Logic," The Journal of P hilosophy, LXXII
0975), p. 513.
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other hand, rival foundational theories do not fare much better. 
When it seemed clear which formal systems were logic, and when it 
was thought that there was only one way to reason and that logic 
captures this; the importance of the logicist project was obvious.
With the collapse of Frege's system and the emergence of the 
Lowenheim-Skolem results, the logicist project was abandoned. 
Skolem raised the question as to the relativity of powerful set 
theoretic notions. It emerged that what counted as a truth of logic 
would depend on what system was used - not in the sense of one 
system being more powerful than another, but in the sense of 
conflicting candidates for logical truth emerging. The debate over 
logicism did not really survive the criticisms of Ramsay levelled 
against Russell and Whitehead’s type theory. Since there does not 
seem to be a clean cut off point between logic and mathematics, 
there seems little point in trying to revive the logicist project. The 
only sense in which it could be revived, according to popular 
opinion, is by taking a formal system which is definitely logic, such 
as first-order logic or propositional calculus, as foundational. But 
then, logicism is uninteresting, since first-order logic and 
propositional calculus are so very weak, and therefore, we can 
reduce very little of mathematics to it. But that is only the prevailing 
dogma, fostered by Quine.
In 1983, with the publication of Frege’s Conception of 
Numbers as Objects, Wright suggested that if we remove axiom V 
from Frege's formal system and promote Hume’s principle to the 
status of axiom, then we have a consistent theory which partly 
vindicates the logicist project. The extent to which second-order 
logic is logic, is the subject of the rest of the Thesis. In chapter two 
we discuss philosophical criteria which a formal system should 
meet in order to be considered to be a logic.
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Chapter II: Philosophical Characteristics of Logic
- A distinction can be important and principled 
without being sharp.
-C. Peacocke "What is a Logical Constant."
Introduction
"There is no sharp border between mathematics and logic. 
While in some respects this might be true, it does not entail that we 
cannot draw a principled distinction between logic and 
mathematics, and that such a distinction cannot serve any purpose. 
Furthermore, once we do this, we shall find that there are some 
formal systems which are clearly logic, and some which are 
mathematics. The philosophical project of determining which 
formal systems deserve the honorific title "logic" has largely been 
abandoned. Many mathematicians and philosophers think that no 
line can be intelligibly drawn between logic and mathematics. 
Others do not see that drawing a line could be fruitful.
In this chapter, we shall be examining some philosophical 
notions which characterise a logic for the logicist, and which 
motivated Frege in the writing of his three great works. Of course, I 
am not interested in resurrecting Frege's project in exactly the way 
he intended. Rather, I believe that his writings serve as an 
interesting starting point for this aspect of the philosophy of 
mathematics: one which can inspire a moderate logicism.
Having discussed some of the philosophical notions which 
inspired logicism, we shall apply them in the next chapter. We shall 
examine the limitative, or characterising results, of first-order logic 
to assess whether they engage, and if so are in conformity with, the 
philosophical notions discussed in this chapter. In this sense, the 
philosophical notions are adopted as criteria for assessing the claim
'^^Stewart Shapiro, Foundations without Foundationalism. A Case for Second- 
order Logic, (Oxford Logic Guides: 17; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), p. vi.
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that first-order logic is "logic", and that any stronger system is 
mathematics or science.
In section one of this chapter, we shall discuss validity. The 
chief idea is that logic tracks validity, in the sense of reflecting an 
informal notion of logical validity. There are various ways of 
defining validity formally. One is to say that an argument is valid 
just in case it has one of a particular list of forms (usually 
inductively defined). That is, we give some base forms and then 
show how to break up arguments into units which fit the forms, or 
not. This sort of definition obviously begs the question against the 
purposes here, since our task is to determine which formal systems 
best reflect an informal notion. If we use a list taken from an already 
existing formal system, then obviously that system will be the one 
which perfectly conforms to our criterion of validity. However, in 
doing this, we have not assessed the formal system, we shall simply 
have adopted it as our measure of validity. This ignores any pre- 
theoretic or intuitive notion of logical validity.
To reflect our informal notion without begging the question, 
it is useful to explore the distinction between the form and the 
content of an argument. The form of an argument is often associated 
with the "logic" of an argument, and the content with the subject 
matter, or the application of the form to a subject. This is alright as a 
starting point for our intuitions, however, we soon find that we 
have to make them sharper.
To then distinguish content from form, we need to appeal to 
other notions such as universality, or generality. "Generality" and 
"universality" are used inter-changeably. They are discussed in 
section two. We interpret "universality" to mean that when applying 
a logic, as opposed to a theory, no restriction is placed on the 
domain of individuals we may consider.
Careful examination of this criterion, reveals that while we 
have said something about the models of a given formal system, we 
have placed no restriction on the language. Thus, any language will 
do. It may be very sophisticated and abstruse. Not all notions in a
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language will find application within all domains, but that is alright, 
according to our criterion. However, under the criterion of 
universality, we wish to restrict the language too. Thus, we add in 
another aspect to the criterion of universality, and that is that the 
universality of logic should involve its being topic neutral. Tins 
aspect is elaborated in terms of not being able to distinguish 
between members of a domain, in the sense of not being able to pick 
out particular members. We then have to say something about what 
counts as a particular feature, or particular object For this we shall 
need to appeal to our other criteria for logicality.
In section three, we shall discuss the idea that the sentences 
of logic are analytic, as opposed to synthetic. The analyticity of 
sentences in logic ensures their purity and independence from what 
Frege called "special" concepts. A concept is special just in case it 
belongs to a particular discipline or practice but does not belong to 
all discourses. One way of ensuring that no special considerations 
are included in a proposition is to prove it by means of what Frege 
referred to as a gapless proof which uses only logical axioms and 
definitions as premises. A gapless proof is one in which the 
conclusion follows from the premises using only logical rules of 
inference. It is natural to assume that the method of proof must be 
effective. That is, that it can be carried out by a Turing machine in a 
finite number of steps. We shall challenge this assumption, and 
suggest an alternative: that we relax the constraint of effective 
gapless proof and accept the corresponding model theoretic notion 
of the conclusion being satisfied in all models in which the premises 
are satisfied. Put in terms of analytic sentences: for Frege, a sentence 
is considered to be analytic if follows from logical axioms by means 
of a gapless proof. Gapless proofs can be generated in any science. 
Making a gapless proof is just a matter of being explicit about the 
assumptions and rules of inference used to justify the conclusion. 
The conclusion to a gapless proof is an analytic truth only if it 
follows from definitions, the assumptions are all logical axioms, and 
the rules of inference are all logical rules of inference. Returning to
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our re-formulation: a sentence will be analytically true if it is true in 
all models. Recognition of this or its contrary: that there are models 
in which the purported conclusion does not hold, should not 
depend on the use of sense perception or on Kantian spatial or 
temporal intuition. Thus, the notion of "logical proof" becomes a 
little broader then just meaning a finite formal proof of natural 
deduction, or an effective proof, the generation of which only 
involves the application of an algorithm, or mechanical proof 
procedure.
What is interesting is that while it may require ingenuity 
(and so possibly intuition in some sense) to generate a "proof" which 
relies on semantics, and not on a mechanical proof procedure or an 
algorithm; recognition that the proof is a gapless proof, relying only 
on logical assumptions does not require intuition or sense 
experience.
A sentence will be analytic (but not necessarily true) if it can 
be written in a logical formal language, that is, one which can be 
written without recourse to any non-logical constants. This does not 
preclude the possibility of sentences being analytic if they are 
written using non-logical constants, or if they depend on the use of 
definitions. The point here is that there is a core of analytic 
sentences which are logical sentences. It is these which we focus on. 
The presence, in a sentence, of non-logical constants often, but not 
invariably, indicates of that sentence that it is synthetic. At least, we 
take this as our default position, in the sense of our being suspicious 
of such sentences. Our suspicions can be shown to be unfounded if 
we then prove that we can show that the truth or falsity of the 
sentence does not depend on sense experience or on Kantorian 
intuition. We show this when we show that a given notion can be 
defined in terms of logical vocabulary. The reason non-logical 
constants are suspicious is that they have an intended 
interpretation. The non-logical constants are distinguished from 
both the logical constants and the rest of the of vocabulary. "The 
rest" includes variables and descriptive vocabulary such as
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predicate and relation symbols. Non-logical constants are distinct 
from the rest of the vocabulary in that there are axioms governing 
their use. The rest of the vocabulary have no axioms governing their 
use, although they figure in the axioms. They have no intended 
interpretation.
The importance of the intended interpretation has to do with 
the generality criterion. Both logical and non-logical constants are 
accompanied by axioms governing their use. However, whereas a 
logical constant is invariant across domains, a non-logical constant 
is interpreted by a member of the domain or by a subset of the 
power set of the domain. That is, the interpretation function picks 
out a member, or subset of the powerset, of the domain to assign to 
non-logical constants. For instance, the interpretation function will 
pick out one member in the case of an individual constant, such as 
"0". The interpretation function will pick out a subset of the domain 
in the case of a one-place predicate constant, such as "is a number". 
The interpretation function will pick out a subset of the full 
powerset of the domain in the case of 2-place relation and function 
constants, such as "4-" or ">". The interpretation function might get it 
wrong. That is, it might mis-interpret a given function symbol, and 
interpret "+" as "x", for example. This might, for example, be due to 
there not being a suitable element or subset of the powerset of the 
domain available, such as if we try to interpret the relation "is 
friends with" in the domain of natural numbers. The intended 
interpretation is independent of the setting up of the language. That 
is, we know before we set up a formal language, what is meant by 
the particular non-logical constants. We can tell that a constant has 
received an unintended interpretation when the interpretation 
makes the axioms for the non-logical symbol come out false. Put the 
other way around, the non-logical constants, together with ensuring 
that their axioms come out as true, constrain both the interpretation 
function and the domains of interpretation we are allowed to 
consider. The absence of non-logical constants indicates analyticity 
and logicality, but not necessarily truth. The following
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characterisation of analyticity is in keeping with Frege's. A sentence 
is analytic if detecting its truth or falsity does not have to depend on 
sense experience or temporal or spatial intuition. As we shall see in 
this chapter, the extension of this characterisation of analyticity is 
not obvious to determine.
The notions of analyticity, reflection of an informal notion of 
logical validity, and generality, are ambiguous, in the sense of not 
being sharp enough to decide between competing formal systems 
which lay claim to being logic. Thus, in chapter three, we shall home 
in on specific arguments of a technical nature to do with the 
limitative or characterising results which hold of first-order logic. In 
this sense, we use first-order logic as a test case.
§ 1: Validity
Our criterion for validity is: "to be called a logic, a formal 
system has to have the capacity to track validity". I am taking 
validity to be synonymous with semantic entailment in the sense 
that if an argument is valid, its conclusion is entailed by the 
premises. The entailment is semantic in the sense that any 
interpretation which makes the premises true will also make the 
conclusion true. An interpretation is a pair, consisting in a domain 
(of interpretation) and an interpretation function. The interpretation 
function assigns members of the domain arbitrarily to variables, 
subsets of the domain to one-place predicate symbols, and subsets 
of the powerset of the domain to n-place relation and function 
symbols. Constant symbols receive a fixed interpretation.
Validity is often identified with a formal requirement: that all 
valid arguments display one of a disjunction of forms of argument. 
These are already determined to be valid in the formal system. To 
think of validity in this way is to reverse the perspective adopted 
here, because which forms end up being the valid ones, is a function 
of the limitations of the formal system (namely its expressive
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power). Instead, we are trying to match an informal notion of 
validity to a formal system. The informal notion informs the formal 
notion, in the sense that when we set up a formal system, the 
extension of valid sentences and arguments of the formal system  
should mirror, as closely as possible, our informal intuitions about 
what counts as a logically valid argument. This is not to say, of 
course, that we cannot be surprised by the conclusion of a (valid) 
argument. That we do not always correctly anticipate the 
conclusion, either indicates our weakness in carrying out many 
logical manipulations in our head, in the cases where we reach the 
conclusion by means of a system of deduction, or our surprise 
indicates our weakness in being able to imagine what models there 
might be, or which models are mutually inconsistent. Thus, our 
being surprised by a given conclusion does not indicate a 
shortcoming of the formal system to match our informal notion of 
validity. It only indicates our limitations in time, space, ink, 
concentration and imagination.
Of course, things are not so simple. The very fact that the 
informal notion of validity is informal entails that there is scope for 
disagreement as to what constitutes an optimal formal 
representation. That is, as a matter of fact, we have divergent 
intuitions concerning logical validity.
In practice, when a formal system fails to reflect our informal 
notion, we tend to react in one of two ways. We either reject the 
formal system, and try to construct a better one, or we revise our 
notion of validity. For example, in classical logic, from a 
contradiction, anything follows: A a -iA  I- B, where A and B are 
well-formed formulas. On encountering this "artefact" of classical 
logic, students are told to suppress their intuitions and become 
accustomed to this as an instance of a valid argument. However, not 
all logicians or philosophers have grown accustomed to this as an 
instance of a valid argument. Some have developed alternative 
logics, such as systems of relevance logic. Which is the more 
appropriate response, philosophically, is determined by further
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argument involving other features of the formal system. We leave 
those aside. Nevertheless, even within a classical conception of 
logic, there is some room for play, in deciding which formal system  
best reflects our informal notion of validity. For instance, there is a 
debate over whether weaker or stronger logics, such as first-order 
logic and second-order logic, better reflect our informal notion of 
validity.
The contrast between form and content is usefully invoked to 
make sense of our informal notion of validity. If our formal system 
seems (intuitively) to be too crude, i.e. has low expressive power, 
then we say that the formal system will not recognise certain aspects 
of the form, which an argument takes, which make the argument 
valid. Put another way, if one logic has lower expressive power than 
another, it will pick out fewer arguments as valid! For example, we 
say that first-order logic has greater expressive power than 
propositional calculus. All arguments which come out as valid in 
propositional calculus come out as valid in first-order logic, but not 
the other way around. For instance, consider the argument:
Everybody laughs at Daffy.____________(Vx)xLd
Therefore, even Daffy laughs at Daffy. dLd
To show the validity of the argument formally, we need first-order 
logic, because in it, we have descriptive vocabulary in the form of 
relations and functions, we have individual variables and we have 
the quantifiers. In propositional calculus we cannot show the 
validity of the argument. For, the form of the two sentences cannot 
be shown to be inter-connected in propositional calculus. We would 
formalise the premiss by a proposition symbol: "P", and the 
conclusion by "Q". The argument represented as: P, therefore Q, is 
invalid.
Similarly, first-order logic falls short of the task of tagging, as 
valid, certain arguments which we often intuitively think are valid. 
These will be any arguments involving concepts not formalisable in 
first-order logic; they might be formalisable only in second-order 
logic. Included in such concepts are infinite cardinalities such as
84
C hapter II: Philosophical Characteristics of Logic
"Dedekind infinite" and "uncountably many", but on a more 
mundane level so are: "most", "same property", "even", "is one of 
them" and so on. For example:
the even numbers form a proper subset of the natural 
numbers.
The even numbers can be placed into one-to-one
 correspondence with the natural numbers.
Therefore, the natural numbers are Dedekind infinite. 
The notions of "one-to-one correspondence", and Dedekind infinite 
are only uniquely captured by second-order formulations. This is 
because we have to quantify over the proper subset of the set of 
natural numbers and over the relation of one-to-one 
correspondence. No attempt at a first-order formulation of these 
notions will represent the above arguments as valid. As a second 
example consider:
more people suffer from tooth decay 
than get run over by a car.
Therefore, there are people who suffer from tooth 
decay, but are never run over by a car.
The quantifier "more" is not first-order expressible.
But now comes the question as to where to draw the 
distinction between form and content, because Dedekind infinite, 
for example, does not appear, prima facie, to be a logical concept: it is 
numerical. Thus, an argument which relies on the formalisation of 
Dedekind infinite to show its validity, might not be thought of 
intuitively as a logically valid argument. By moving to a powerful 
logic we seem to be able to analyse, in terms of form, notions which 
we intuitively deem to be non-logical: and, a fortiori, the conclusion 
follows because of the content of the notion in the argument, not 
because of the form of the argument. Here, "content" is being 
identified with particular ideas, or ideas proper to what Frege 
referred to as "special sciences". That is, there seems to be a point 
where languages become so strong as to include notions proper to a 
special science in the form of a non-logical a constant with its
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accompanying axioms. Then, what is represented as a formal 
property is really content. For example.
Everything that comes into being has a first moment.
Therefore, in particular, the universe had a first moment.
Therefore, there was a first moment of time.
Displaying the validity of the argument depends on using modal 
temporal notions. We just add these to the language, together with 
appropriate axioms, and we can formally represent valid arguments 
with the new language. This is an example of what we shall refer to 
as the "representing content as form problem". The problem is that 
in designing formal systems, we seem to be able to represent 
formally what we intuitively think of as subject matters or 
contentful notions. Our capacity to give formal representation over 
reaches what we intuitively think is the boundary between what is 
the formal logical aspect of a given argument and what is particular 
to the subject matter that the argument deals with.
Before going any further, we should discuss an associated 
problem. Content is often associated with ontology. Thus, one way 
of construing the "representing content as form problem" is in terms 
of the ontological commitment of the formal systems. This is alright 
except that one of the problems associated with formal systems 
endowed with great expressive power is that they seem to make a 
proportionately (to their expressive power) great ontological 
commitment. Loosely, this is because content is associated with 
ontology, and the more content we can express, the more 
ontological commitment we must be making. After all, it would be a 
fictional science which could give such precise and detailed 
characteristics of objects, to whose existence it remained 
uncommitted. We usually do not think of logic and mathematics as 
fiction because of the degree of certainty which we confer on logic 
and mathematics. The certainty must be grounded in something.
Thus, to parry the accusation that logic is a fiction, it is customary to 
posit entities which ground our certainty, in the sense of committing 
ourselves to the existence of a platonic heaven of (mathematical)
8 6
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entities. Of course, it is never clear how this is to ground our 
certainty.
In particular, strong formal systems seem to be committed to 
the existence of objects not deemed to be logical per se, such as 
infinite sets. That is, we might take a logic's great expressive power 
as evidence for the logic making ontological commitments which 
are outwith the business of logic. The thought would go, roughly: 
showing that an argument is valid, involves showing that when the 
premises are true, so is the conclusion. Showing that a sentence is 
(sometimes) true, involves showing that there are models which 
satisfy the sentence. The thought then goes that we must be 
committed to the existence of all these models which vindicate all 
sentences which are not self-contradictory. This makes for a lot of 
models. We end up with a staggering ontology. Moreover, some 
pairs of sentences laying claim to which models exist are mutually 
inconsistent. For this reason, we have to keep the models separated. 
We then arrange them in a hierarchy. Our formal system then 
begins to look more like mathematics than logic, because part of the 
system will be dedicated to the study of the hierarchy and its levels 
and members and so on. In particular, we soon find that we need an 
axiom asserting, for example, the existence of a Dedekind infinite 
set. However, we have now shown that we have strayed from logic. 
For, the existence of a Dedekind infinite set has nothing to do with 
logic, but with how the world happens to be. Therefore, when we 
are shown a formal system which can express such notions, we 
judge that it is not logic but mathematics or science, because it has 
content.
However, this whole train of thought misses the mark. We 
should remember that just because we can express something using 
logical vocabulary, this does not make it a logical truth. This is born 
out on a technical level, in that the sentence asserting the existence 
of a Dedekind infinite set is not valid, i.e. it is false under some (all 
finite) interpretations. Furthermore, the sentence asserting the 
existence of a two-membered set is invalid. Consider a universe
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consisting in a one membered set, such as, the empty set. The 
existence of a Dedekind infinite set might be necessary (relative to a 
theory), but not logically necessary. Similarly, the existence of an 
even prime is necessary, but not logically necessary. For, the 
universe (logically) might have been such that there were no primes 
at all, consider the universe composed of the natural numbers with 
all primes removed.
Driving the point home: it turns out that, arguably, the only 
ontological commitment made by first or second-order logic is to 
the empty set.®® But even this argument relies on accepting a 
convention! We say that first or second-order logic is committed to 
the existence of the empty set because the empty set is a subset of 
any set. However, this reasoning rests on a particular set-theoretic 
understanding of domains to which we can apply the subset 
operation. So, all domains are thought of as composed of sets. 
However, in the case of logic, we do not need to think of domains as 
composed of sets. We are free to think of them as domains of 
objects. If there are no sets in a domain, then there may be no empty 
set figuring as a subset. Thus, even the insubstantial ontological 
commitment attributed to first and second-order logic to the 
existence of the empty set is debatable. It is a stipulation which is 
not logically motivated, it is methodologically motivated. Moreover, 
it is motivated from mathematical (set-theoretic) considerations. It 
only makes things technically easier. Thus, the greater ability of one 
logic to track validity over another, does not imply that the one 
makes any ontological commitment whatsoever, let alone in 
proportion to its expressive power.^^
Let us return to our question about form, content and their 
distinction. In general, a lot of expressive power in a formal 
language allows us to capture more arguments as valid. Consider 
just the following arguments.
George Boolos, "On Second-order Logic," The lournal of Philosophy. LXXII 
(September, 1975), p. 513.
®^What the ontological status of objects, such as infinite sets turns out to be is a 
matter for mathematics or metaphysics to decide, not logic.
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(i) Betty has a sister.
Mary has a sister.
Therefore, Betty and Mary have some property in 
common.
Or:
(ii) most of the people in the room listen to opera.
Most of the people in the room play chess.
Therefore, there is someone in the room who listens to 
opera and plays chess.
These all, plausibly, count as valid. However, formal representation 
of the validity of these arguments requires the expressive resources 
of second-order logic.®  ^The question is whether or not these are 
logically valid, as opposed to valid because of the subject matter. 
Argument (i) does not rely on an understanding of what it is to be a 
sister. To recognise the validity of (i), all we have to do is recognise 
that the same property pertains to both Mary and Betty. Also, we do 
not need to know who Betty and Mary are, to recognise the validity 
of (i). In the language of second-order logic, we can represent the 
argument as:
Sb,
Sm,
(3p)(PbAPm).
The conclusion is read: there is a predicate P, b falls under it and m 
falls under it. S is an arbitrary descriptive letter, P is a variable, and 
this is why the expressive resources of second-order logic are 
required for displaying the validity of the argument. Similarly with 
argument (ii). This can be represented as:
(Most x) Ox,
(Most x) Cx.
(3x)(Ox A Cx).
The reason the conclusion of the argument follows is because of 
how we characterise "most". If "most" is construed in the usual way
®^For other examples see: George Boolos, "Nonfirstorderizability Again", 
Linguistic Inquiry. XV, (1984) pp. 343 - 4.
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as: "more than half", then the conclusion follows. We can either take 
"most" to be a primitive quantifier, or define it in terms of the 
second-order quantifiers and relations. Either way, we first have to 
give a characterisation of "most" which is sufficiently precise to be 
captured by a formal language. There are many ways of doing 
this.®® Let us just take one example. Characterise "most" as: more 
than half of a finite domain. We shall leave aside the interpretation 
of "most" in infinite domains. (Most x)Px can be thought of as saying 
that there are more things in the (finite) domain that have P than 
things that do not. We can use P to partition the domain in to two: 
the P things and their complement: the [ -iP] things. We know that 
most things are P if there is a mapping from the complement set 
[ -iP] into the set P, and the mapping is not one-to-one. That makes 
the [ -iP] set strictly less than the P set. We can then express in the 
language of second-order logic (Most x)Px as:
(3P)(Vf)((Vx)([-iP]x Pfx) A 
~'(^x)(Vy)(([-iP]x A [-iP]y A fx = fy) x = y)).®^  
Then, insofar as we accept second-order quantification as logical we 
have shown that we can express the notion of "more than half" in 
the language of second-order logic. Insofar as we think it is 
important to capture this notion in order to reflect our informal 
notion of logical validity, we have shown that second-order logic is 
better at tracking our notion of logical validity than is first-order 
logic.
As a matter of empirical fact, informally, we happen to think 
that these sorts of argument are logically valid. This suggests that 
we should adopt second-order logic as logic because, just on 
empirical grounds, it better represents our notion of informal logical
®®For a scattered catalogue see Gila Sher, The Bounds of Logic, (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts; MIT Press, 1991).
All the necessary components for this can be found in Stewart Shapiro, 
Foundations Without Foundationalism, (Oxford Logic Guides: 17, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1991), p. 102. The more perspicuous way to represent this is in 
terms of the P partition being strictly greater than the —iP partition, but then we 
would have to argue for accepting the symbols for inequality in the list of logical 
constants.
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validity. However, now we have a problem. We can no longer 
distinguish a (merely) mathematically valid argument from a 
logically valid one. For example, there are arguments which include 
the notion of well-ordering and which are such that, accurate 
(second-order) representation of well-ordering is essential to 
displaying the validity of the argument in question. For example: 
the well-ordering of the set X by the relation R (WO X by R) is 
expressed:
(3X)(( Vx)(-iRxx) A (Vx)(Vy)( Vz)((Rxy A Ryz) Rxz)
A  ( Vx)( Vy)(x y —> (Rxy v  Ryx))
A (3y)(Xy A ( Vz)(Xz (y = z V Ryz)))).
Intuitively, R is usually read as the relation of "preceding". The first 
conjunct says that no individual member of a class (of numbers, 
say), X, precedes itself. The second conjunct is transitivity of the 
"precedes" relation, R. If one member precedes a second, and the 
second precedes a third, then the first precedes the third. This is 
enough to give us a partial ordering of X by R. Now we have to add 
the condition for a simple ordering: that if x is distinct from y, then 
either x precedes y or y precedes x. The fourth conjunct is what 
distinguishes a simple ordering from a well-ordering: that in a non­
empty class of individuals X there is a first individual member, i.e. a 
member which precedes all the others.^ ^^  The argument:
(3x)WO XbvR
( Vx)( Vy)(x ^ y (Rxy v  Ryx))
is valid. Because well-ordering is prima facie a mathematical notion, 
we seem to have included too much. For, our logic is tracking not 
only logical validity but mathematical validity as well!
This conclusion rests on a mistake. The validity of the above 
argument does not rely on the content of the notion of well- 
ordering. It relies on the very simple rule that if a conjunction is 
true, then so are all of the conjuncts. In particular, one of the 
conjuncts is true of a true conjunction. Thus, if there is a well-
Alonzo Church, Introduction to Mathematical Logic, (vol. I; Princeton, New  
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1956), p. 338.
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ordered set X, then it will obey one of the constraints placed upon 
being a well-ordered set.
However, the worry is not idle. If we simply opt for a very 
expressive logic, and decide that the capacity to display validity of 
arguments in a formal language, is what shows them to be logically 
valid, then any notion is a candidate for being considered to be a 
logical notion. For, it seems that the greater the sensitivity we can 
display in a given formal language, or the more notions we can 
accurately represent, the more arguments will be classed as valid. In 
particular, we will very quickly see that all of mathematics is logic, 
that possibly all of science is logic, metaphysics is just a branch of 
logic and even moral theory could be part of logic. For, we just 
introduce symbols to our language which represent a notion 
particular to a special science, and gives some axioms governing its 
use such that mis-interpretation is precluded. This, of course, harks 
back to Leibniz's idea of an unified science. The worry is one of 
ending up with a formal system which is too powerful for logical 
validity, in the sense that it has the resources to exploit the contents 
of particular subject matters to indicate formal validity, and the 
formal validity clashes with our informal notion of what counts as 
logical validity.
If we generalise this sort of argument, we might end up 
having to include not only second-order quantifiers as part of logic, 
but also modal operators, deontic operators, temporal operators, 
set-theoretic membership, addition, and all manner of symbol. In 
this case, our problem is to distinguish an argument which is 
logically valid from an argument which is legitimate in a particular 
discourse because of the content of the notions in question. These 
will be arguments which hold good of one domain or type of 
domain, for example, but not of another. This will be indicated by 
their reliance on intended interpretations of non-logical constants. 
Our problem now is to find some way of distinguishing logical from 
non-logical constants which is non-circular.
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Here is a circular way of doing this. It is not entirely silly to 
run through the argument since it is tacit in much of the literature, 
and the argument brings to light many presuppositions which 
warrant being questioned anew. In other words, this argument may 
be circular, but it is not viciously circular. It forms a step in our 
enquiries into the characterisation of logic.
A structure is a set together with possibly some non-logical 
constants (often called distinguished elements), functions and 
relations. Two structures are isomorphic if their respective sets have 
the same cardinality; and all of the relations, functions and 
constants are preserved in a one-to-one and onto mapping from one 
structure to the other. Put another way, there is a function which 
takes constants in one structure to constants in another structure, 
relations and functions in one structure to relations and functions in 
another, respectively, such that the two structures will satisfy the 
same set of sentences which include the constants relations and 
functions in question. Being able to show that two structures are 
isomorphic, when they are, is considered by mathematicians, to be a 
desirable property of a formal system. Why we want structures to 
be identified up to isomorphism and not beyond, is because this is 
considered to be the nature of the subject. We would go beyond 
mathematics or logic were we to identify structures on the basis of 
something other than their cardinality and properties associated 
with characterising structures. The properties which characterise 
structures are then certain mathematical constants, relations and 
functions. Expressing relations and functions in a formal language 
allows us to suppress aspects of certain concepts used in arguments. 
In particular, we suppress what the objects in a domain actually are, 
or what instances a relation might have, such as sisterhood. Instead,
^^Sgg for example, Michael Hallett, "Putnam and the Skolem Paradox," Reading 
Putnam, eds. Peter Clark and Bob Hale, (Oxford; Basil Blackwell, 1994) pp. 66 - 97. 
Rudolph Carnap, Logical Foundations of Probability, (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1950), Stewart Shapiro, Foundations Without Foundationalism, 
(Oxford Logic Guides: 17, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), and Gila Sher. The 
Bounds of Logic. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1991).
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we are interested in the mathematical aspects of how it is that 
individuals are related to each other. We tend to identify content 
with the particular elements of a domain, and formal properties 
with how it is that arbitrary, but structurally similar elements are 
mathematically related to each other; which functions a domain is 
closed under, and so on.
Why it is that mathematicians are interested in identifying 
structures all the way up to isomorphism is that they want to 
examine all the relations which hold between elements in the 
domain. To elaborate further, take for example, a typical scenario 
where there is an intended domain of interpretation, say the natural 
numbers. There are a number of sentences which give mathematical 
truths (as opposed to philosophical. Cabalistic or scientific truths) 
about the natural numbers. We say that a theory has high (even 
optimal) expressive power just in case it can identify the set of 
natural numbers uniquely up to isomorphism.
There are two aspects to this. One is that there is an 
independent (pre-theoretic/ intuitive/ meta-linguistic) perspective 
from which it is judged that there are languages which cannot even 
express functions powerful enough to characterise sets uniquely up 
to isomorphism. For example, first-order arithmetic has non­
standard interpretations. These either have a different number of 
members than does the set of natural numbers, or they have 
different constants or relations. They are judged to be non-standard 
from a meta-linguistic perspective. The judgement says that the 
non-standard structures are not isomorphic to the natural numbers. 
Therefore, as far as mathematicians are concerned, non-standard 
models of the natural numbers are different from the natural 
numbers. Nevertheless, the two sets will satisfy the same set of 
sentences (theorems) of first-order arithmetic such as: "0 + 8 = 8".
For this reason, we find first-order arithmetic inadequate because 
while the axioms and theorems are true of the natural number 
structure, they are also true of other structures which are not (from 
the meta-linguistic perspective) isomorphic to the natural numbers.
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First-order arithmetic cannot pick out the natural number structure 
uniquely up to isomorphism. This judgement has to be made from a 
more powerful, sensitive or fine-grained theory, such as that of 
second-order arithmetic. Thus, in the practice of mathematics, a 
formal system's incapacity to characterise structures uniquely up to 
isomorphism seems, prima facie, to be a limitation. Later it is 
sometimes considered to be a very fruitful limitation, because we 
then go on to study non-standard models in their own right. Be that 
as it may, in general, mathematicians are interested in a formal 
system's capacity to characterise structures uniquely up to 
isomorphism. It seems that in terms of describing mathematical 
practice, while many mathematicians work with first-order theories, 
their judgements about the adequacy of those theories tends to be 
made in a second-order meta-language.^-
The other aspect of identifying structures uniquely up to 
isomorphism, is that the business of mathematics is often negatively 
characterised as that of not being interested in any further details 
about structures. For example, the mathematician is not interested 
in which is the platonic set of natural numbers, in the instantiation 
of the Fibonacci series in nature, in the history of numbers and so 
on. Qua mathematician, he is only interested in any sets isomorphic 
to the set of natural numbers.^^ Moreover, there are many 
philosophers who think that this is the best way to characterise the 
business of mathematics, and that as a result, any further questions 
as to the true or deeper nature of the subject matter of mathematics, 
are misguided.^^ Here, we do not wish to make such a strong claim, 
but examine (not necessarily to undermine) the basis upon which it 
is made: that there is something sacrosanct about the notion of 
isomorphic structures in mathematics as characterised in a second-
^^This is very much one of the thrusts of Stewart Shapiro's book. Foundations 
Without Foundationalism, (Oxford Logic Guides: 17, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1991).
Michael Hallett, "Putnam and the Skolem Paradox," Reading Putnam, eds. Peter 
Clark and Bob Hale, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1994) p. 72.
^^These philosophers are called structuralists. Among them count David Hilbert, 
Michael Resnik, Stewart Shapiro, Paul Bcnncccrraf and Geoffrey Heilman.
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order language.^^ If we characterise mathematics as the study of 
structures, then, as a consequence we shall favour branches of 
mathematics which can identify structures uniquely up to 
isomorphism. In other words, there is no principled reason for not 
being interested in aspects of structures which reach beyond their 
cardinality, constants, relations and functions. It is only descriptive 
that this is implicit in the practice of mathematics.
There are three perspectives adopted here. One is that what 
counts as isomorphic structures is just whatever satisfies a set of 
sentences in a theory. Thus, in first-order arithmetic, the natural 
numbers and any non-standard models are isomorphic (relative to 
first-order arithmetic). The second-perspective is that adopted at a 
meta-linguistic level which then judges of structures which satisfy 
sentences formulated in the object language, whether or not they are 
isomorphic. The more powerful the meta-language relative to the 
object language, the more inadequate the object language will seem 
in its capacity to characterise structures. The meta-language is a 
precisely delineated language, which can be formally represented, it 
may be a first-order language or a second-order language or the 
language of some theory such as set theory (again in first or second- 
order versions). The third perspective is that of a more intuitive 
conception as to what counts as isomorphic structures. What we 
observe is that in general, mathematicians adopt a second-order 
language to judge the adequacy of an object language's capacity to 
characterise structures uniquely up to isomorphism. Thus, if the 
object language is first-order, it will often be judged inadequate in 
its expressive capacity.
Let us shift from mathematics to logic. The languages in 
which mathematical theories are written, have to have the resources 
to pick out structures. Moreover, to have optimal expressive power, 
they have to be able to identify isomorphic structures. Since we are 
thinking of logic as a formal language together with the freedom to
Carnap, The Logical Syntax of Language. Trans. Amethe Smeaton, 
(Third Impression; London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1951), p. 265 - 67.
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consider any domain as a domain of interpretation, isomorphism of 
structures will enable us to sharpen what our understanding of 
logic amounts to. Thus, we might say that, for the mathematician, 
our logic is expressively optimal if it can pick out domains uniquely 
up to isomorphism.
That is good for the mathematician, but what of our 
intuitions concerning logical validity? The problem with our 
intuitive notion of logical validity is that the language of logic has to 
attain a certain level of expressive power to match the intuitions. 
Otherwise the logic will fail to characterise as valid certain 
arguments which we intuitively think of as logically valid. Relating 
this to our three perspectives from which we characterise structures, 
the intuitions seem best reflected by the expressive power of 
second-order languages than first-order languages. It turns out that 
if we insist that our logic has sufficient resources to characterise 
structures uniquely up to (what a second-order language would 
judge to be) isomorphism, this is enough to take care of arguments 
(i) and (ii): the Betty and Mary case and the "most" case. So, here is 
the proposal. The mathematician's intuitions are good ones, prima 
facie, because they accord with ours over the logicality of arguments 
(i) and (ii) above. We should consider a formal system to be capable 
of reflecting our (mathematical) informal notion of validity just in 
case it is capable of identifying structures/ domains uniquely up to 
what is deemed in a second-order language to be isomorphism.
There is a caveat. Prima facie, not even the resources of a 
second-order language are, in fact, sufficient to characterise any 
structures uniquely up to isomorphism. For example, no countable 
(in the sense of finite or denumerable) language can characterise all 
cardinalities, and therefore, no formal system whose language is 
countable can characterise all structures uniquely up to 
isomorphism. There simply are not enough symbols in the 
language. However, this does not have to worry us. For, we are 
trying to capture an informal notion of logical validity. Insofar as it 
is informal, it is probably safe to say that people's intuitions run out
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when faced with very large cardinals: those which need more than 
countably many symbols to express. Thus, it will suffice for our 
purposes to measure the adequacy of the expressive power of a 
language in terms of its being able to characterise uniquely up to 
isomorphism a number of models with which we feel familiar. The 
expressive power of first-order logic is inadequate on this score 
because it can only express particular finite numbers. In contrast, 
second-order logic can also express the notion of finite, countable, 
uncountable, and since we can also express the powerset operation, 
any powerset (iterated) of these is also expressible.
This will not quite do. The proposal is limited because it is 
dependent on what it is mathematicians consider to be relevant to 
characterising a structure. In particular, we are owed a reason, 
which is relevant to our project, for considering the relation of 
sisterhood not to be mathematical or logical, and the relation of 
"having a property in common" to be logical. The difference is 
already assumed in our practice. It is embedded in the vocabulary 
of the language before we even check whether or not the logic has 
the capacity to characterise structures uniquely up to isomorphism.
For example, the logical constants are guaranteed in advance 
to receive the same "interpretation" in any structure, whereas the 
non-logical constants are fixed anew in each domain. This is why 
arguing that the traditional logical constants ought to be so 
considered on the grounds that they are invariant across domains is 
a circular way of arguing for the distinction between logical and 
non-logical constants. It is circular because what we discover is a 
stipulation. One set of constants is presented as logical, the other as 
non-logical. So the question for us is: whence the discrepancy? On 
what basis do we decide, when we set up a language, which 
symbols are to count as the logical constants, and which are to count 
as the non-logical constants? The reason the question is relevant is 
that the term "logical constant" determines the extension of formal 
logical validity. The list of logical constants will also determine what 
is a logical axiom or rule of inference and what is not.
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What lies at the heart of this sort of argument are the 
background assumptions for the claim that there exists a one-to-one 
correspondence between two sets/ domains. Technically, logical 
constants are fixed independently of domains. That is, the fixed part 
of the structure, common to all the structures are the ways in which 
the logical constants work, the truth of their axioms; and all this by 
(technical) stipulation! This is what we mean when we say that 
logical constants are "invariant". We shall argue in subsequent 
sections of this chapter that individual variables, relation and 
function letters, are harmless enough. We interpret those arbitrarily, 
given a domain. What makes the non-logical constants, non-logical, 
is that they get fixed in each new interpretation, and they have 
intended interpretations which dance attendance on them. The 
intended interpretations are determined independently of the 
language, and constrain our choice of domains of interpretation. 
When we mis-interpret non-logical constants, we pick the wrong 
domain or interpret the non-logical constant relations or functions 
incorrectly. Notice that, in contrast, we have no room to mis­
interpret a logical constant (by convention), and there is no such 
thing as mis-interpreting an individual variable or an arbitrary two 
place relation letter because of the role these symbols play in the 
language.
Conventionally, the logical constants of, say, first-order logic, 
are: — <->, 3, V, a , v and =. In contrast, symbols such as: x, +, 
<, € , K, B, □, 0, are not usually considered to be logical symbols. If 
we want to include them in our language, then we either have to 
introduce them as logical constants, and give a philosophical 
argument for this, or we have to introduce them as non-logical 
constants and give some (a fortiori) non-logical axioms governing 
their use (it is these which a mis-interpretation will fail to satisfy). 
Under this second possibility, we should also have to give an 
indication as to what was the intended interpretation for our theory 
(which is de dicto not a logic!). This strategy rules out the constants 
from being treated as logical, from the outset, since they will not be
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uniformly interpreted, and therefore, some mis-interpretations will 
make the axioms governing their use, false.
What if we were to break with convention? We can do this in 
two ways. We can add, what are generally considered to be, non- 
logical constants to our (conventional) list of logical constants. In 
this case, a fortiori, the axioms governing their use would be slotted 
under the heading: "logical axioms"! Or say we were to break with 
convention the other way and pare down our logical vocabulary, 
and, say, remove 3 and V ? Besides finding ourselves ostracised 
from the company of classical logicians; we would adjust what it is 
we look for in trying to show that two structures are isomorphic. In 
particular, our "logical" connectives would be fixed across 
interpretations/ structures/ domains. They would have clauses in 
the satisfaction function, but not in the interpretation function. Also, 
we would know in advance that we were only allowed to consider 
interpretations which confirmed the axioms governing them. For, 
the axioms would now be in the list of logical axioms. Similarly, if 
we were to pronounce 3 and V as non-logical, then we would be 
free to interpret them unconventionally, that is, mis-interpret them. 
That is, make the axioms for 3 and V false. These are the two ways 
of breaking with convention regarding logical constants, and the 
impending repercussions in setting up a formal system.^^
Let us work through an example. Say we had some very 
persuasive and independent (philosophical) arguments to the effect 
that □, 0 and e were all to be considered to be logical constants. 
When we present our logical system, we would include them in the 
list of logical constants. The axioms governing their use would be 
logical axioms. In setting up the relevant formal system, the new  
logical constants would be accompanied by satisfaction conditions. 
For example, where A is any sentence:
Sat(t3A) iff A is provable in first-order logic, say.
Sat(OA) iff A is not provably a logical contradiction.
Actual formal systems which break with convention are often called deviant 
logics.
100
C hapter II: Philosophical Characteristics of Logic
Sat(x G y) iff x is a member of the set y.
Arguments in which these symbols figured in the determination of 
their validity or invalidity, would either be logically valid or 
logically invalid, so, valid under any appropriate interpretation.
That is, under any interpretation in which the axioms, governing the 
use or meaning of the symbols, would be true.
We can generalise further. Any non-logical constant can be 
imported to the list of logical constants. We remove mention of 
them in the clauses of the interpretation function and write clauses 
for them in the satisfaction function, in the presentation of the 
formal system. We would then, by fiat, ensure the formally ascribed 
logicality of the constant. The extension of the notion of 
isomorphism would be adjusted accordingly, so that the symbol 
would tell us beforehand which domains are appropriate for 
interpretation of the variables and logical constants.
We proceed similarly with the paring down of the logical 
constants. We remove these from the clauses of the satisfaction 
function and subject them to the wiles of interpretation. In this case, 
their interpretation becomes domain dependent, and the extension 
of the notion of isomorphism undergoes suitable adjustment.
The upshot is that the reasoning is circular which tries to get 
a grip on characterising logic, by saying that logic is that discipline 
which reflects our informal notion of logical validity, when this is 
made precise in terms of the accepted practice as to what counts as 
isomorphic structures. This begs the question because it amounts to 
identifying form with properties used to characterise structures. In 
contrast, from our point of view, which properties and so on remain 
invariant across domains is ad hoc. Nevertheless, this does give us a 
starting point. We now know that we have to account for the choice 
of logical constants. We are less interested in giving a description of 
practice than of motivating a coherent practice. Less circular 
arguments will come from considerations of our other two criteria.
In conclusion, one of the virtues of logic is that it ignores the 
contents of arguments and concentrates on the form, and
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furthermore, logic can be brought to bear in any reasoning situation, 
i.e. it can be applied to any domain of interpretation. However, if 
we argue too narrowly, these are only so many words. For, what 
counts as "any domain" is not wholly arbitrary, it is constrained by 
convention, or at least by specifying a formal language. We cannot 
lend "any" interpretation to all the symbols in the formalisation of 
an argument, since the logical constants receive a fixed 
interpretation, and which symbols those are, is regulated in 
advance, in the language. Even worse, how we distinguish content 
from form is decided in the same way. In other words, there are 
alternative underlying logics to theories.
Nevertheless, the discussion of validity has helped us to gain 
greater precision as to the distinction between a logic and a non- 
logical theory. It seems that, prima facie, we would like expressive 
resources rich enough to identify domains of interpretation 
uniquely up to isomorphism. This would accord with mathematical 
practice and would optimally reflect our informal notion of validity. 
However, we have also discovered that the extension of what 
constitutes identity of domains or structures uniquely up to 
isomorphism, is hostage to our language. More particularly, it is 
hostage to which symbols we include in our list of logical constants 
and which we include in our list of non-logical constants. The 
descriptive vocabulary and the variables do not affect the extension 
of "isomorphic structure". To avoid begging the question we have to 
argue on philosophical grounds for inclusion or exclusion of 
particular symbols in the list of logical constants. I suggest that it is 
the criteria of universality and analyticity which will help to 
motivate a list of logical constants.
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§2: Universality /  Generality
We begin with a preliminary comment. In characterising 
universality or generality as "interpretability in any domain" we 
have departed from Frege, whose logic was interpreted. What he 
meant by universality was that the domain of interpretation (to use 
vocabulary strictly not in keeping with Frege) is all that there is. In 
other words, Frege believed that there is a sort of universal domain, 
this is the one logic presides over. Logic is thereby ubiquitous. All 
other "special" disciplines preside only over subsets of this. This 
view of Frege's contributed to the contradiction in his system. This 
is one reason why I choose to interpret universality to mean 
"interpretable in any domain" or "applicable to any domain". "Any 
domain" does not include the whole universe on pain of 
contradiction. Any particular domain is a proper subset of all that 
there is, which itself is a proper class. However, the two conceptions 
of universality are not so far removed from each other. If we could 
take the union of "any domain", we would have, in effect, the proper 
class: "the universal domain".
Logic is universally applicable. This has two aspects: the 
universality aspect and the applicability aspect. We shall discuss 
applicability later. With respect to universality, the necessary but 
not sufficient condition for this aspect of universality is that we can 
give any domain of interpretation. In a sense then, one difference 
between logic and theory concerns whether or not there are any 
non-logical constants in the language. If there is a restriction on the 
domains of interpretation, be it either on how they must be 
arranged relative to each other, or a restriction as to which sets 
(domains) we consider, then we have wandered out of the realm of 
logic. For, we have violated the notion of universality. In the case of 
restricting the domains brought under consideration, before we 
apply a logical "calculation" concerning the satisfaction of sentences; 
we effectively restrict the sorts of counter-examples we are allowed 
to invoke. In logic, we are allowed to entertain any counter­
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example. In the case of relations restricting our choice of domains of 
interpretation, what we mean is that the restriction is due to a 
consideration which does not belong to logic. For example, 
relationships, such as "is friends with", "is more beautiful", or even 
"has a sharper curve", (unless these are subsequently shown to be 
logical) will not do. Exactly which relationships should be 
considered to be logical and which not, depends on philosophical 
considerations and their interpretation by formal systems. 
Hopefully, we shall hone our intuitions by considering particular 
examples.
First-order logic is generally accepted as being the 
quintessential logic. It has three sorts of vocabulary: logical 
constants, individual variables and descriptive vocabulary. The 
logical constants we accept, for now. Individual variables range 
over the domain. There being a domain of individuals is what 
ensures that we are able to apply the logic. That there should be 
variables at all, assures that the language can be applied. What those 
individuals are, is specified not as a matter of logic but from outside 
logic, since the interpretation function picks them out arbitrarily. 
Thus, there is no conceptual quibble with individual variables.
Previously, in this thesis we have run rough-shod over 
descriptive vocabulary. We shall now examine its role more closely. 
Descriptive vocabulary consists in predicate, relation and function 
symbols. They are not variables because we cannot quantify over 
them. When we apply first-order logic to a specific domain, we 
specify a key which interprets the descriptive vocabulary. We 
include in that key, a translation for the predicate, relation and 
function symbols used in a given argument. The symbol has a fixed 
meaning relative to a given domain. It looks as though first-order 
logic has within it some (other than logical) constants because the 
descriptive vocabulary receives a fixed interpretation which is 
domain dependant.
This is a false impression. For, the reference of descriptive 
vocabulary is not fixed until we specify a key, and there are no
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restrictions on the key except in terms of type. That is, an n-place 
relation symbol must be interpreted by n-tuples. For example, a 
one-place predicate letter is to be interpreted by a subset of the 
domain. A two-place relation letter is interpreted by ordered pairs. 
The first of each pair is taken from the domain, and the second is 
taken from a copy of the domain, thus the set of ordered pairs is 
said to be a subset of the square of the domain, or Cartesian product 
of the domain, and similarly for triples and any n-tuple. What is 
instructive is that in looking for a counter-example, we can shift 
domain and re-interpret the key. In this sense, the descriptive 
vocabulary only gains constancy once a domain is given and an 
interpretation is fixed. We have no quibble with these as vocabulary 
of a logical language (a language which can figure as the basis of a 
logic). A language passes the universality test just in case it (1) can 
be interpreted in any domain, (2) has no non-logical constants, and 
(3) has a legitimate set of logical constants. What makes a logical 
constant legitimate is that it has passed muster with our other 
philosophical criteria, to which we turn now.
As we noted in the previous section, the logical constants are 
fixed commonly to all structures we use to interpret a given formal 
language. How do these earn their status?
Among the logical constants are one and two-place 
connectives such as: a  and v .  Their meaning is fixed by
the satisfaction function. They by-pass the interpretation function, 
that is, they are defined independently of a domain of 
interpretation. We need them in order to calculate the truth of 
sentences which include several terms. The terms are logically 
related to each other if they modify the truth of sentences according 
to the truth assignment given to the terms.
It is helpful to look at this from an algebraic perspective (that 
of the calculation of the Boolean combinations of any two terms). 
From this perspective, it is irrelevant which connectives we choose 
to be primitive. All we need is to be able to consider all the truth- 
value (Boolean) combinations between terms. This is what allows us
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to say that a rule of inference is truth-preserving, for us to establish 
the validity of an argument, or sentence, and so on. In other words, 
we can think of the logical connectives as fulfilling a function: that 
of enabling us to calculate all the two-valued (true and false (1 and 
0)) Boolean combinations of terms. Call this the "logical connective 
function". If a term is given the value 0, we want a connective which 
will transform the value to 1. Negation usually fulfils this part of the 
function. When two terms are connected, under the four possible 
(truth) value assignments to the pair, we want to have available all 
sixteen possible (truth table) outcomes to the (truth) valuation. In 
more familiar terminology, for two terms connected by arbitrary 
logical connectives, there are sixteen possible truth table results for 
the whole connected proposition.
A logic must be able to fulfil this logical connective function 
for many reasons: in order to assess validity, to preserve the idea 
that in following a logical rule of inference we preserve truth, to 
preserve the idea that logical axioms are true in all domains, and so 
on. In other words, we need logic to fulfil the logical connective 
function in order for logic to distinguish truth from falsity at all.
Without this logical connective function, we would be unable 
to do even propositional calculus or syllogistic reasoning. For, we 
would have no basis upon which to indicate a transformation in 
truth value of either a proposition on its own or in combination with 
others. A valid sentence is one which is connected in such a way 
that, any truth-value assignment to the basic propositions 
(whichever are the smallest units in the sentence which can have a 
truth value assigned to them) will still yield the truth-value "true" 
for the whole connected sentence. This idea is extended in the 
obvious way for valid arguments and the preservation of truth 
through logical inference. Thus, the logical connective function is 
integral to logic.
Exactly how this is done, in terms of which connectives we 
chose to be primitive, and so on, is unimportant. Indeed, our choice 
of primitives is somewhat ad hoc relative to the considerations here.
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In our traditional and standard list of logical constants, we 
also have the two quantifiers: 3 and V. The universal quantifier can 
be interpreted in any domain. However, unlike the logical 
connectives, it needs a domain. Similarly, for the existential 
quantifier, it needs a domain, but any will do. In both cases, the 
understanding of the symbols does not depend on any particular 
domain or feature of a domain, there just has to be one. The very 
existence of a domain of interpretation is a precondition for the 
application of logic. An inapplicable language may be of technical 
interest, but it will not be of philosophical interest. The logicist is 
interested in logic functioning as a sort of ultimate justification, in 
the sense of its being universally applicable, analytic and 
conforming to our intuitive sense of what constitutes a logically 
valid argument. In order for a language to count as a logic, in the 
sense of conforming to our philosophical criteria, it has to be 
applicable to domains of objects. We want to be able to say of a 
given domain whether or not it contains any objects which have a 
certain property P, for example. For this, we minimally need the 
existential quantifier. We tend to choose the existential and 
universal quantifiers because we do not seem to require any special 
knowledge, in order to understand how they operate on a formula.
The criterion of universality, or generality, is also sometimes 
understood in terms of topic neutral i tyThis  is when the 
applicability aspect of the criterion becomes important. I propose 
we understand this as requiring that logical sentences can receive a 
meaningful interpretation in any domain. "Meaningful" here just 
means "has the capacity to make sense", no matter what domain it is 
we consider. For example, we can make sense of the claim that there 
is some individual in a domain which fulfils certain criteria, or all 
members of the domain fulfil certain criteria. That is, in invoking the 
quantifiers, we have not decided beforehand, of what type the
^^See, for example, Jan Wolenski, "In Defence of the First-order Thesis," Logica '93 
Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium eds. P. Kolar, V. Svoboda, 
(Praha, 1994), p. 4, and Christopher Peacocke, "What is a Logical Constant?" The 
lournal of Philosophy, vol. LXXIII.9 (1976), p. 229ff.
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domain has to be, or what category of things are allowed to figure in 
a domain. In particular, both the universal and existential quantifier 
are neutral with regard to what properties the objects in the domain 
has, or how members of the domain are related to each other, or 
anything particular about them at all. We shall further develop 
these arguments concerning quantifiers in chapter four.
Bearing in mind the topic neutrality aspect of generality, 
consider the important example of the set theoretic membership 
relation. This too, has to be interpreted in a domain which includes 
sets or can be thought of as a set itself. However, there are many 
domains, which are simply not composed of sets, pace Maddy, and 
no logical considerations, so far (pending a definition in already 
accepted logical vocabulary), force us to consider domains 
themselves as sets in the very rich sense of being part of a set- 
theoretic hierarchy. Put very succinctly.
Those who have wished to include ’e ' among the 
logical constants have probably been influenced by the 
feeling that it satisfies some intuitive requirement of 
topic neutrality.... When, however, a genuine ontology 
of sets is required for interpretation... the topic
neutrality claim for 'e ’ seems indefeasible (sic!): 
though it is indeed the case that any object whatsoever
may be a member of a set, talk involving 'e ' has a 
genuine subject matter - the sets.98
Thus, it would be up to us to show that it is legitimate to include the
set theoretic membership symbol as a logical constant. Showing this
involves defining set theoretic membership in terms of the other,
already accepted, symbols in a logical language. We have to do this
on pain of violating the topic neutrality aspect of the generality
criterion for logic.
The violation of topic neutrality by "e " shows up in a more
obvious sense when we consider the axioms of set theory. Axioms,
at least partially, determine the use of a symbol, and in that sense
^^Christopher Peacocke, "What is a Logical Constant?" The Tournai of Philosophy, 
vol. LXX1II.9 (1976), p. 237.
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give it an implicit definition. Thinking now in terms of the axioms of 
theories, rather than logical axioms: axioms are such that they are 
always true in a theory (short of a contradictory theory). So, a theory 
can be thought of as the study of the consequences of certain 
axioms. Under this view, axioms testify to the content or subject 
matter of a theory.For example, the set theoretic axioms include 
the axiom of regularity, which precludes the existence of sets which 
are members of themselves or cycles of sets which are such that the 
membership relation cycles through them. That is, one set will be a 
member of a second set which will be a member of a third set and so 
on, to set n, and this in turn is a member of the first set. 
Traditionally, this has been viewed as a non-logical axiom. Why this 
offends logical scruples is that it violates universality. The axiom of 
regularity precludes the possibility of certain sorts of set or certain 
relations holding between a number of sets, and this offends against 
a sense of logical possibility which says that we do not contradict 
ourselves if we imagine that the universe might contain such sets. 
Contradiction only occurs when such sets are included in the set 
theoretic hierarchy, for instance. For this reason, the axiom is ad hoc 
relative to our characterisation of logic. If "e " were considered to be 
a logical constant, and it were taken with its full set theoretic 
meaning (i.e. all the axioms involving "e " would then be considered 
to be logical truths) then the axiom of regularity would be 
considered to be a logical truth. It would then be inappropriate to 
consider "irregular" sets or cycles of sets.
Another useful way of discussing the universality of 
applicability of a logic is in terms of invariance under permutations 
of the domain.io^ Under this conception of universality, domains of
the case of logical axioms, the content will then be formal properties of 
reasoning. Rather confusingly, the content of logic is logical form, under this 
view.
100 Alfred Tarski, "What are Logical Notions", History and Philosophy of Logic, 
vol. VII, (1986), pp. 143 -154, see also Gila Sher, The Bounds of Logic. 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1991), pp. 36 - 66.
109
C hapter II: Philosophical Characteristics of Logic
interpretation are logically the same just in case they are invariant
under permutations of the members of a domain onto itself. 
...[Cjonsider the class of all transformations 
[permutations] of the space, or universe of discourse, 
or 'world', onto itself. What will be the science which 
deals with the notions invariant under this widest 
class of transformations? Here we will have very few 
notions, all of a very general character. I [Tarski] 
suggest that they are the logical notions, that we will 
call a notion 'logical' if it is invariant under all possible 
one-one transformations of the world unto itself."^ ^^
The "general notions" are those of the connectives, equality and
cardinality notions, such as the universal and existential quantifiers.
Furthermore, any notion we can define in terms of these also turns
out to be a logical notion. Thus, all of our default logical constants
pass the Tarski criterion for generality. The criterion rules out non-
logical individual constants, relation constants and function
constants. Arbitrary expressions will conform to the criterion of
topic neutrality, just in case they do not contain non-logical
constants in any position which is significant for their truth-
evaluation. With the interesting exception of notions of cardinality,
this falls very much in step with our thinking so far. Tarski's
"general notions" turn out to be the logical constants, and cardinality
n o t io n s .  Qn the other hand, this should not come as a great
surprise since the logical constants are just those which remain
invariant across domains anyhow, and therefore, could not possibly
change under permutations of a domain onto itself. A logical
constant is invariant in two closely related senses. One is that
axioms governing the use of logical constants are true in all
domains. The second sense in which logical constants are invariant
is that the satisfaction conditions for the constants is fixed
independent of any domain of interpretation. For example, the truth
table for P v Q is the same regardless of what propositions we
Alfred Tarski, "What are Logical Notions", History and Philosophy of Logic. 
vol. VII, 0986), p. 149.
(^^^These will be examined explicitly in chapter four.
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substitute for P and Q. In contrast, "+", for example, will receive a 
different interpretation in a domain consisting in partially-ordered 
objects than in a domain where the objects are totally ordered.
The account of how the invariance of certain symbols in a 
language testify to the topic neutrality of that language is what is 
interesting. The account runs: the truth of sentences containing non- 
logical constants, in a position which is significant for their truth 
evaluation, depends upon reference to particular objects or 
concepts. Particular objects are not the business of logic. Logic is 
meant to be general in the sense of being indifferent to what subject 
matter it is being applied to.
This elicits an interesting point. Sometimes it turns out that 
we can define, in terms of a logical language, what we previously 
thought was not a logical notion. By means of such a definition we 
might discover that particular objects or concepts are not being 
referred to. Rather, they are logical objects, or logical notions. This 
discovery depends upon finding a definition of the object or concept 
which is written without using non-logical constants. For example,
G is prima facie a non-logical constant. This is because if we replace it 
by another two-place relation, the truth-value of many sentences 
which contain g will change. This, in turn, is because set- 
membership is a particular sort of relation. Sets are not generally 
defined using only logical vocabulary. Were we to define "g " in 
terms which did not include non-logical constants, then we would 
learn that " g  " is a logical relation after all. It will have earned its 
place among the logical constants.
In contrast, the number seven might be thought of as a 
particular object. Or rather, the judgement that a set is composed of 
seven objects, might be considered, prima facie, not to be a logical 
judgement. However, we subsequently find out that w e can define 
the number seven in terms of already accepted logical vocabulary: 
in terms of the existential quantifier, variables, negation and 
equality. Thus, if we accept the existential quantifier, variables, 
negation and equality to be logical symbols, then the number seven
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is a logical notion. This is not to say that the existence of seven 
object is a logical truth, only that discussion of the number seven is 
perfectly general, and when mention of it modifies the truth of a 
sentence, this does not require that we pay attention to particular 
features of a domain. More will be said about what counts as a 
particular feature in the next section.
We now leave aside the quantifiers and logical connectives, 
and turn to the last member of our list of logical constants: "=" is
an interesting case. Reason for thinking that is not a logical 
relation is that we may only come to know that two things are equal 
a posteriori. For example, that Hesperus is Phosphorus, was only 
discovered through empirical investigation. However, to be 
tempted by this sort of consideration is to confuse knowing that two 
names refer to tht same thing with two things being equal. We 
avoid this temptation if we look to mathematics where is either 
thought of as a licence for substitution or as an equivalence relation. 
That is, a relation which is reflexive, symmetric and transitive: x = 
x, x = y “^ y = x ,  ( x « y A y  = z) ”^x = z. Either way of defining 
equality passes the Tarski criterion of remaining invariant under 
permutations of the domain. What is equal in one presentation of a 
domain, will be equal in a permutation of that domain. Passing the 
Tarski criterion is not enough to warrant "=" occupying a place in 
our list of logical constants, so let us leave with the following 
provisional argument.
"=" can be defined in second-order logic. Other arguments for 
considering to be a logical constant aside, if second-order logic is 
logic, then we have grounds for accepting as a logical 
connective. This is because "=" will then be given the same 
interpretation in any structure, because it will have been defined 
using only logical vocabulary which remains invariant across 
domains, or is arbitrarily interpreted. Of course, if second-order 
logic turns out not to be a logic (but mathematics) then we either 
have to find some other reason for accepting as a logical symbol.
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or we have to subtract it from our list of logical constants in first- 
order logic.
To summarise, why it is that we do not allow non-logical 
constants into the language of logic, is because, for a formal system 
to deserve the title "logic", we have to be able to apply it to any 
models we like. This is our criterion of universality. The symbols in 
a language are interpreted by objects, concepts and various sorts of 
connectives. The symbols which make up a language suitable for 
logic must either be commonly interpreted in any domain (logical 
connectives) or they must be capable of being arbitrarily 
interpreted, as in the case of descriptive vocabulary and individual 
variables. These last are necessary in order to allow us to apply logic 
at all, but logic is applied in a topic neutral way. This is the other 
aspect of our criterion of universality. This is what elaborates our 
idea that validity, for example, is considered to be independent of 
content, i.e. a matter of form, i.e. universally applicable. Similarly, 
prima facie, it is not a matter of logic that the universe includes (or 
excludes) certain objects: provided that denial (or affirmation) of 
their existence does not elicit contradiction. As we have seen, the 
conception of universality, understood as interpretation in any 
domain, is still not entirely satisfactory as a means of determining 
which symbols should be excluded from a list of logical constants.
We still have some unfinished business in characterising a 
logic from philosophical considerations, and these have to do with 
the axioms and truths of logic. These have to be analytic.
§3: Analyticity
One feature which is identified with logic is obviousness. 
When a logically valid inference has been made with Icnown 
premises, we are compelled to accept the conclusion. Anyone who 
fails to accept it is thought to be justifiably accused of not fully 
understanding, perversion or madness. This is because ultimately
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we can break up logical inferences into smaller components each of 
which is, in itself, obvious. Of course, we end up with a few 
"primitive" components which we cannot further break up. These 
either take the form of axioms or rules of inference. These should be 
obvious in the case of logic: "...we select as axioms certain laws 
which we feel are evident from the nature of the concept 
i n v o l v e d . W h a t  signals that something is "evident" is that there is 
no need for further elaboration.
It might appear dogmatic to claim that there are such rules or 
laws. For, one may argue, that we are owed some account as to why 
logical laws are evident since their obviousness seems, at best, just 
to report a psychological fact. In this sense logical laws may be 
obvious to us, but may not be obvious to someone or something 
else. This makes the obviousness contingent upon something 
outside logic, such as, culture, education, psychology, physiology, 
and so on. For this reason, obviousness can be a misleading guide to 
logicality. Obviousness has too strong a phenomenological 
connotation, as does the idea of being compelled to accept the 
conclusion of an argument. Thus, we still have to supply arguments 
for what it is we consider to be obvious or compelling.
One way philosophers have tried to deny that there is any 
contingency to logic is to say that logic is a priori, and analytic. It is a 
priori because we do not rely on facts gained from sense experience 
to recognise the validity of a proof. We rely on sense experience 
only insofar as this enables us to read a proof from a page or do 
some equivalent act. Put another way, there is no particular set of 
sense experiences with which we have to be familiar, before we can 
judge an argument to be valid.
Very close to this characterisation of a prioricity is analyticity. 
If a proposition is analytic, then it should reveal something internal 
to the concepts invoked in the proposition. It should not bring 
together disparate concepts. How to draw the distinction between
Joseph R. Shoenfleld, Mathematical Logic, (Addison-Wesley Series in Logic; 
Reading Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1967), p. 1.
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what lies internal to a concept and what lies outside, is notoriously 
difficult to motivate, and proportionately difficult to defend.
Logic is thought to be analytic in the sense that logical truths, 
and definitions of logical concepts, do not introduce anything new. 
They reorganise and re-acquaint us with basic concepts. We do not 
need the "basic" or "primitive" concepts to be defined because they 
"should be so simple and clear that we can understand them 
without precise definition."'^^  ^Instead, it is the whole body of 
sentences generated by the logic which act as a collective or implicit 
definition. In fact, logic just is, on this view, the study of the 
combination of a few ill-defined concepts with which we happen to 
feel very familiar.
To use Quine's metaphor, logical truths are located at the 
centre of our web of belief. For Quine, this brings us back to 
obviousness. For, it is merely descriptive of the fact that when a 
prediction given in science, say, is not met, we are least inclined to 
revise our logic or mathematical practice. It seems that, this is by 
implicit stipulation. Ayer seems to agree with Quine when he writes 
that "the principles of logic and mathematics are true universally 
simply because we never allow them to be anything else."^^  ^The 
sentiment expressed by this sentence sounds like it could have 
inspired Quine's "Two Dogmas of Empiricism".For,  preceding it, 
Ayer suggests that the necessity of logic and mathematics consists in 
just the fact that, should we find a situation where it appears as 
though the laws of logic or mathematics are contradicted, the last 
explanation we offer ("as it happens", for a deflationist such as 
Quine) is that logic is at fault. Instead, we say that we have 
miscalculated or there have been intervening circumstances which 
we failed to observe. Indeed, this might be read as a report on a
Joseph R. Shoenfleld, Mathematical Logic. (Addison-Wesley Series in Logic; 
Reading Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1967), p. 1.
!05 Alfred Jules Ayer, Language Truth and Logic, (New York: Dover Publications 
Inc., 1935), p. 77.
106w. V. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," The Philosophy of Language, ed. 
A. P. Martinich, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 26 - 39.
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psychological, evolutionary, anthropological or genetic fact, which 
locates logic at the centre of our web of belief.
Call Quine's parochial reading of the basic axioms of logic 
"weakly necessary", since ultimately, it is left unexplained why it is 
that we favour logical concepts over others. Also, we cannot have 
any guarantee that they will remain in their favoured position in the 
future. We also lose any normative force we might wish to attribute 
to logic, since any "rational compulsion" we feel to accept the 
conclusion of a valid argument, would just be an artefact of 
psychology or whatever. Then, someone who does not feel such a 
compulsion is psychotic. Worse still, we cannot rule out the 
possibility that such a person might be vindicated by future 
communities. To end our explanation of the necessity of logic here, 
would be to embrace a more-or-less conventionalist position in the 
philosophy of mathematics, one which very naturally leads to 
instrumentalism. This is because, we might then seek to justify logic 
in terms of science, as a tool of s c ie n c e .  ^
A stronger sort of necessity is advocated by Ayer. For, he 
believes that our practice, of explaining apparent contradictions, last 
of all by revising our logic, or arithmetic, is meant to be taken as 
symptomatic not.diagnostic. Part of the symptom is that the truths 
of mathematics and logic are analytic. He continues after the above 
quotation:
And the reason for this [behaviour] is that we cannot 
abandon them [the basic laws of logic] without 
contradicting ourselves, without sinning against the 
rules which govern the use of language, and so 
making our utterances self-stultifying. In other words, 
the truths of logic and mathematics are analytic 
propositions or tautologies.^^^  ^(Italics, mine)
for example, Hilary Putnam, "Mathematics Without Foundations," 
Mathematics Matter and Method. (Philosophical papers, vol. I, Second edition; 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 43 - 59.
0^8 Alfred Jules Ayer. Language Truth and Logic, (New York; Dover Publications 
Inc., 1935), p. 77.
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That is, logic forms not only an internally coherent system, i.e. one 
free from contradiction, but also, it is one of which we perforce 
make constant use of, in our linguistic practice. Logic is a 
prerequisite to language in the sense that we could not recognise, as 
a language, something which is not underpinned by a structure or a 
set of rules; and those rules must be consistent.^^^ Furthermore, the 
truths of mathematics and logic must be analytic, since they are 
justified by consistent and analytic axioms. Here, "recognise" is not 
to be read psychologically. Rather, it is a metaphysical point. It has 
to do with the nature of language itself and of features which it 
must possess necessarily to count as a language. Tire argument for 
this point is a transcendental one about the necessary conditions for 
language.
At this stage in our discussion, it is worth comparing Quine 
to Frege. While Quine's general position is one which we are trying 
to oppose, Quine and Frege use very different definitions of 
analytic. Of course, Quine tries to show that there are no stable 
analytic truths. Nevertheless, to show this, he still has to have a 
definition of the thing he tries to show does not exist, before he can 
show, that it does not exist. For Quine, a sentence is analytically true 
if it is true in virtue of the meaning of the words in the sentence and 
nothing else. In the light of the differences in the target of debate, it 
is not relevant to pit Frege directly against Quine. Nonetheless, from 
a Quinean perspective, we can still discern a challenge to the 
Fregean: to make the distinction between analytic and synthetic 
sentences clear enough that we can pick out, for a significant class of 
sentences, whether it is analytic or synthetic. Put in the terms of a 
question: if logic is to play a justificatory role, and it is analytic, then 
what is the difference between this sort of justification and a 
synthetic one? One might suppose, for example, that an analytic
am aware of the fact that I am ignoring logics which allow contradictions. In 
these, it will be noted, the damage wrecked by any particular contradiction is 
limited. What we do not have in these formal systems is a purely random 
language, there are rules, and one can have disputes over whether or not one is 
adhering to them.
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justification is just a trivial, or tautological, justification. To answer 
this, it will be useful to turn to the debate between Frege and Kant 
over the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions.
Kant's discussion of the analytic/ synthetic distinction 
provides a good foil for Frege's definition of analytic because Frege 
spends some time discussing his differences with Kant. For Frege, in 
marked contrast to Kant, arithmetic is analytic. Frege respects Kant 
as a philosopher and finds that some of the formulations he gives of 
the analytic/ synthetic distinction fall very close to his own. Others 
sound very different. The difference between the two conceptions is 
a subtle one to locate since it has to do with the scope and role of 
logic, so with the terms of the debate, rather than its substance.
In his Grundlagen Frege maintains, contra Kant, that 
arithmetic is analytic. He agrees with Kant that geometry is a priori 
synthetic. The truths of geometry are not based on logic alone, 
"everything geometrical must be given originally in intuition.
Later in his life Frege thought that arithmetic too is synthetic, since 
he thought it is based on geometry; but this does not concern us 
here. From the texts, it is unclear to what extent, geometry's being 
synthetic, is attributed by Frege to rest on Kantian spatial 
intuition.^^^ That is, it is not clear how well Frege understood the 
Kantian doctrine of intuition or to what extent he endorsed the 
doctrine, as opposed to just accepting it by default. On the other 
hand, Frege certainly thought he largely agreed with Kant. "I [Frege] 
consider Kant did a great service in drawing the distinction between 
synthetic and analytic judgements. In calling the truths of geometry 
synthetic and a priori, he revealed their true nature." Frege sums 
up his dispute with Kant by saying that Kant sometimes defined 
"analytic" too narrowly.
Gottlob Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic, trans. J. L. Austin (Second 
revised edition; Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1980), § 64.
Michael Dummett, "Frege and Kant on Geometry," Inquiry, vol. XXV (1980), p. 
234.
-Gottlob Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic, trans. J. L. Austin (Second 
revised edition; Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1980), § 89.
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We shall begin with Kant's construal of the distinction. We
shall not analyse this in detail, since careful exegesis of Kant is not
as important for us as a grasp of what Frege thought Kant meant.
In BIO/A7 of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant relates
analytic judgements to ones "thought through identity". That is,
analytic judgements expose aspects of an object or concept which
figure in the form of an identity between the subject and predicate
of a sentence. He writes:
Analytic judgements are... those in which the 
connection of the predicate with the subject is thought 
through identity; those in which the connection is 
thought without identity should be entitled synthetic.
The former, as shedding nothing through the 
predicate to the concept of the subject, but merely 
breaking it up into those constituent concepts that 
have all along been thought in it, although confusedly, 
can also be entitled explicative. The latter, on the other 
hand, add to the concept of the subject a predicate 
which has not been in any wise thought in it, and 
which no analysis could possibly extract from it; and 
they may therefore be entitled ampliative.^^^
One obvious difference between Kant and Frege which emerges
from the quoted passage is that Kant is still analysing sentences in
terms of subject and predicate, whereas Frege analyses them in
terms of function and argument. Frege's mode of analysis is much
more expressively powerful, especially with respect to mathematical
concepts, and this makes for a greater number of judgements being
counted as analytic.
Let us focus on the terms ampliative and explicative. Often
analytic judgements are glossed as trivial. This is even the case in
Kant. On this conception, they cannot provide us with new
information. Nevertheless, the construal of analytic judgements as
explicative indicates that we can learn from them to some degree.
The information we gain is limited. It is in the form of an
explanation which does not go beyond the concept in question.
Immanuel Kant. Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (Second 
impression; London: MacMillan Education Ltd., 1986), B10/A7.
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Nevertheless, through analysing a concept we deepen our
understanding.
To use Kant's example: "bodies are extended" is an analytic
judgement. Any familiarity with the concept "body" will make the
truth of the statement immediately apparent. Being extended is part
of what it is to be a body. Kant contrasts "bodies are extended" with
the judgement "all bodies are heavy". The difference between the
two may not be obvious; but this is partly due to our modern
conception: that mass, body and energy are inseparable since we see
them as aspects of the same thing, due to a post-Kantian relativistic
physical theory. Kant is a bit clearer on the difference when he
elaborates on the two examples:
...it is evident: 1. that through analytic judgements our 
knowledge is not in any way extended, and that the 
concept which I already have is merely set forth and 
made intelligible to me;^’^^
This is more conservative than what he says earlier and diverges
markedly from Frege. Concerning the example of a synthetic
judgement, Kant continues:
2. that in synthetic judgements I must have besides the 
concept of the subject something else (X), upon which 
the understanding may rely, if it is to know that a 
predicate, not contained in this concept, nevertheless 
belongs to it. ...For though I do not include in the 
concept of a body in general the predicate 'weight', the 
concept none the less indicates the complete 
experience through one of its parts; ...By prior analysis 
I can apprehend the concept of a body through the 
characters of extension, impenetrability, etc., all of 
which are fhought in this concept. To extend my 
knowledge, I then look back to the experience from 
which I have derived this concept of body, and find 
that weight is always connected with the above 
characters.^^^
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (Second 
inrpression; London: MacMillan Education Ltd., 1986), A8.
^^^Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (Second 
impression; London: MacMillan Education Ltd., 1986), AS.
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In the above example we draw on experience to test the truth of the 
claim. This makes the claim a posteriori, and a fortiori for Kant, 
synthetic. In the case of geometry, we draw on spatial intuition. 
Knowledge from intuition counts as a priori for Kant, since spatial 
and temporal intuitions are part of what enable us to make 
judgements about the physical world. "But intuition takes place only 
in so far as the object is given to us. This again is only possible, to a 
man at least, in so far as the mind is affected in a certain way."^^  ^
Under this conception, the propositions of geometry are a priori 
synthetic.
Frege wanted to divorce arithmetic from the stain of the
synthetic. Frege did not think that numbers do not have to be given
to us in such a way as to engage our temporal intuition. Instead,
Frege extends Kant’s notion of analyticity through identity, to
anything which follows from definitions plus logic. As was
mentioned in the introduction, we favour "is justified by" to "follows
from" because of the restrictive connotations of having an effective
procedure at our disposal.
The problem [of discovering the ultimate justification 
for a mathematical truth] becomes, in fact, that of 
finding the proof of the proposition, and of following 
it right back to the primitive truths. If, in carrying out 
this process, we come only on general logical laws and 
definitions, then the truth is an analytic one,... If, 
however, it is impossible to give the proof without 
making use of truths which are not of a general logical 
nature, but belong to the sphere of a special science, 
then the proposition is a synthetic one.^i?
The issue of effectiveness gained new impetus with Godel's
incompleteness results of the 1930's. The Godel incompleteness
results made it clear that the truths of formal systems could not all
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (Second 
impression; London: MacMillan Education Ltd., 1986), A19. Presumably, the 
"certain way" is one which engages intuition, because we have to use our intuitive 
faculty to recognise a given object.
TT^Cottlob Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic, trans. J. L. Austin (Second 
revised edition; Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1980), § 3.
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be proved by means of an effective (mechanical) system of 
deduction. We can forgive Frege his lack of foresight. What 
incompleteness indicates vis-à-vis Frege's definition of analyticity is 
that there is space between Frege's positive and his negative 
characterisations of analyticity. It is possible to justify a sentence 
without appeal to intuition or sense experience, and yet not be able 
to prove it using an effective method of proof! In such instances, we 
have to rely on semantic, as opposed to syntactic, justifications, so 
justifications in terms of models. I shall be calling "analytic" any 
sentence whose justification does not rely on sense experience or 
intuition, where the justification need not take the form of a 
mechanical proof. What I propose to do then, is focus on logic as a 
sort of justification, as opposed to thinking of logic as a tool of 
demonstration. For, I am interested in the very nature of logic, not 
in its adaptability to computers or in its usefulness as a learning 
tool. Thus, while the deductive system of the Begriffsschrift is 
certainly sufficient to show that a proposition is analytic, it is not 
necessary. In the light of the Godel results, we must make a decision 
as to whether to favour the negative or the positive characterisation 
Frege gives to analyticity. Here we choose his negative 
characterisation, and the complement of this is considered to be 
synthetic. A gapless proof is sufficient for justification, but not 
necessary. After all, Frege's motivation for making arithmetic more 
rigorous was to establish the justificatory dependence of arithmetic 
on logic, as opposed to temporal intuition. This is why the negative 
aspect of his definition of analyticity is so important.
Relevant to this conception of rigor, is Frege's concern to rid 
logic of what he refers to as "special" or "foreign e l e m e n t s " . A  
proof is rigorous if it is g a p l e s s . I t  demonstrates what it is, that
nSw illiam  Demopoulos "Frege and the Rigorization of Analysis," Frege's 
Philosophy of Mathematics, ed. William Demopoulos (London: Harvard 
University Press, 1995), pp. 68-88.
^^^William Demopoulos "Frege and the Rigorization of Analysis," Frege's 
Philosophy of Mathematics, ed. William Demopoulos (London: Harvard 
University Press, 1995), p. 73.
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the conclusion depends on. Demonstration aside, a justification is
logical if it contains no foreign elements. Frege negatively
characterises foreign elements as extra-logical notions; these are
notions requiring experience or intuition in Kant's sense. Tliey
include assumptions about kinematics, or appeal to physical
properties, for example. We make such reference, for example,
when we describe equality between triangles in terms of rotating
one triangle and moving it across the graph paper and
superimposing it on another. This description is not a logical
justification for the equality of two triangles, since it appeals to
foreign elements, namely to notions belonging to kinetic theory.
This sort of proof makes appeal to our spatial intuition.
Later on, in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant explains how it
is that we arrive at analytic judgements from a given concept. Here
he is closer to Frege. He writes:
I have only to extract from it [a given concept], in 
accordance with the principle of contradiction, the 
required predicate, and in so doing can at the same 
time become conscious of the necessity of the 
judgement - and that is what experience [or intuition] 
could never have taught me.'^ O^
Analytic judgements are formed by breaking up a concept. This
breaking up, or analysing, relies entirely on logic; expressed above
in terms of the law of non-contradiction. We come to a second
explicit difference between Kant and Frege. This has to do with the
scope of the law of non-contradiction; or what is here considered the
same thing: the scope of logic.
The formal logic available to Kant was Aristotelian syllogistic
l o g i c . F r e g e  worked with a very flexible and powerful formal
system which he considered to be logic. So, we ask: would Kant
recognise a justification, which might take the form of a proof, in
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (Second 
impression; London: MacMillan Education Ltd., 1986), B12.
2^1 There is question in the literature whether Kant might not have had something 
broader in mind. This is not really relevant here because whatever he had in mind 
was always much weaker than Frege's logic. For one thing, Kant is still analysing 
sentences in terms of subject and predicate instead of function and argument.
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second-order logic, as being analytic? Put another way, if Kant were 
introduced to second-order logic and were he to accept it as logic, 
would he then have recognised the extension of his definition to 
include all that can be derived from a concept using logic plus 
definitions, as Frege would have it? If the answer is in the 
affirmative, then from what we have discussed so far, the only 
differences in the characterisation of analytic judgements as given 
by Kant and Frege, are in extension, i.e. in what counts as logic, and 
in the analysis of propositions in terms of function and argument, as 
opposed to subject and predicate.
Another interesting question we might anachronistically ask 
Kant is whether the truths of second-order logic are synthetic, in the 
sense of being justified by intuition. After all, we know that second- 
order logic is incomplete. This implies that all the truths of second- 
order logic are not theorems: that is they cannot be generated by 
algorithms for proof procedures. This suggests that there will be 
cases where demonstrating^^^ that a given sentence is true or false, 
does not only involve generating a syntactical proof. We may have 
to invoke models to demonstrate the truth or falsity of a sentence. 
Coming up with such a demonstration requires ingenuity. We 
might then think that this ingenuity is, to the intents and purposes 
here, just as bad as Kantian spatial and temporal intuition. That is, 
the ingenuity is only reducible to some intuitive faculty.
In good Fregean tradition, let us distinguish how it is that we 
come up with a proof or demonstration, with the ultimate 
justification for the conclusion of our proof or demonstration. The 
coming up with a proof may well require ingenuity, and this may 
well be thought of as drawing on some intuitive faculty. However, 
what counts as a logical truth for the logicist is one which receives 
an ultimate justification. This is one which we can explicitly
2^ 2 "D0 n-jo,^ s(;i-ate" is being used as a loose word for "proof" in that proofs have to 
follow a rigid procedure, and rely solely on syntactical devices. Demonstrate 
includes syntactical proofs and semantical proofs: ones which rely on our 
semantic understanding, or more precisely: on models being invoked as evidence 
or counter-evidence for a claim.
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demonstrate only relies on logical laws, logical rules of inference 
and definitions. That is, we want to be able to recognise that the 
justification for the claim that a given sentence is true or false is a 
logical justification; even if we are not guaranteed in advance to be 
able the come up with such a justification. A demonstration can be 
gapless, in the sense of being explicit about all the assumptions 
which are made and all the definitions which are invoked. A gapless 
demonstration can be logical just in case all the assumptions and 
definitions turn out to be l o g i c a l . " ^  ^ 3  ^  logical and gapless 
demonstration can be analytic in the sense of not requiring of 
someone following the demonstration that they draw on sense 
experience or Kantian intuition. There is no reason to think that 
there could not be such demonstrations.
However, these are not the only differences between Kant 
and Frege. In other passages, the difference between Kant and 
Frege, has to do with the role and potentialities of logic. For Kant, 
analytic judgements can, at best, clear up confusions. They are 
merely explicative, not ampliative. Frege disagrees with this.
For Frege, analytic truths may be r e v e l a t o r y . ^ ^ . 4  They include 
anything which can be said at a purely general level about a 
concept. The point is that often the truths we deduce from a given 
set of assumptions "cannot be inspected in advance".^^  ^It is because 
we then "extend our knowledge", that Kant could argue that a 
given proposition is synthetic. Yet, for Frege, we can extend our
*23This is not logical only in the sense of being analytic, but in the sense of 
meeting our three criteria: that a logic should reflect an informal notion as to what 
constitutes logical validity, that the truths and axioms should be universal and 
that understanding claims in the logic should not rely on sense experience or 
Kantian intuition.
124 William Kneale and Martha Kneale. The Development of Logic. (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1988), pp. 435 - 47.
^^^Cottlob Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic, trans. J. L. Austin (Second 
revised edition; Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1980), § 88.
1-^Gottlob Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic, trans. J. L. Austin (Second 
revised edition; Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1980), § 88.
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knowledge by purely logical means. Dummett aptly sums up
Frege's insight:
Frege is virtually the only philosopher who both 
recognised the power of deductive reasoning to yield 
knowledge that we did not previously possess and 
tried to explain what gave it this p o w e r . ”^27
For Frege it is crucial that logic is powerful and revealing. This is
why it was important, for Frege, to free logic from the "legend of
sterility". The richness and power of Frege's logic is what justifies
his view that logic is not sterile, and explains the power of
deductive reasoning to provide new knowledge. If logic
(philosophically characterised) were best exemplified by a very
weak formal system, deductive reasoning would not have such
power. Second-order logic has great expressive power, and yet it is
based on a small vocabulary and a small number of a x i o m s a n d
rules of inference.
What is it then, that makes these axioms analytic as opposed
to the axioms of geometry, which are synthetic? As an interesting
aside, we can see Frege's attempt to derive the Peano axioms from
logical axioms as an attempt to remove any doubt as to whether or
not they rest on temporal intuition. Hume's principle, because it
presupposes the notion of number, also had to be proved, in order
to show that it does not rely on temporal intuition. By means of
Hume's principle, "the concept of Number has not yet been
f ix e d ."^29 This situation is reminiscent of the one we were left with
at the end of the last section. If we can define a prirna facie non-
logical constant in terms of vocabulary which does not include non-
l^^Michael Dummett, "The Justification of Deduction," The Logical Basis of 
Metaphysics, ed. Michael Dummett (Cambridge, Massachussetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1991), p. 195.
^^^Second-order logic is unaxiomatizable. That is, whatever set of axioms we 
propose, this will be incomplete. This does not, however, detract from the fact 
that to justify any particular assertion written in the language of second-order 
logic, we need only appeal to a finite number of axioms, and that in practice, we 
use very few axioms.
^?^Gottlob Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic, trans. j. L. Austin (Second 
revised edition; Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1980), § 63.
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logical constants, then we can accept the symbol as a logical symbol. 
Similarly, if we can justify a sentence by means of logical axioms 
and logical definitions then the sentence is analytic in our sense.
This may sound odd. We usually speak in terms of analytic 
truths, not just analytic sentences. I am allowing analytic falsehoods 
in the sense that "bachelors are married men" is an analytic 
falsehood. The sentence is false, and what makes it false are the 
definitions of the words, not some empirical fact. Similarly, I have at 
times been lax in my use of language and talked of notions as being 
analytic. What I mean by this is that grasp, understanding, or 
knowing the notion does not require appeal to sense experience or 
to intuition.
Returning to the analyticity of the logical axioms: one way of 
arguing for this, is in terms of the component parts of the axioms. 
First-order logic is analytic because it is written in a logical 
language. The language is analytic because it does not have the 
resources to exploit our sense perception or intuitive faculties, in 
Kant’s sense. We break with this constraint on a language, prima 
facie, when we add mathematical constants to the language such as 
+, 0, 8, point, line, plane, and so forth. If something is a logical truth 
then it can be expressed in a logical language. This does not imply 
that all analytical truths are so expressible or that logical languages 
only express logical truths, they also express logical falsehoods and 
just sentences which are sometimes true and sometimes false. This is 
not quite enough. For, showing that the axioms of logic are 
expressible in a logical language shows that the logical axioms are 
analytic, but not that they are true. To justify them as true, we have 
to show that they are universally applicable. In particular, we have 
to argue that there is no domain in which they are f a l s e . W i t h i n  
the classical tradition, all the axioms of first-order logic are accepted 
as being universally applicable. The true sentences of first-order
arguments tend to come from constructivists, intuitionists, relevance 
logicians, or logicians using quantum logic. These arguments lie outside the scope 
of this thesis, and I shall not address them here.
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logic are all either axioms or they are justified by the axioms plus 
logical definitions. The definitions are logical definitions in the sense 
that they are all a shorthand for expressions written using only 
logical symbols.
To summarise, Frege’s conception of analyticity exhibits 
several features. The positive characterisation is that a proposition is 
analytic if it follows from (is justified by) logical axioms plus 
definitions expressed in a logical language. Justifying is to be 
distinguished from proving by means of an effective deductive 
procedure. Analytic judgements are explicative and informative.
The negative feature of analytic propositions is that their truth is 
determined without appeal to either sense experience or to 
intuition, in Kant’s sense. The propositions of a formal system 
display analyticity just in case they display these features.
In the next chapter, we shall examine some of the limitative 
results of first-order logic, since it is upon the basis of these that the 
first-order thesis tends to be defended. We shall judge whether or 
not each limitative result is salient to our characterisation of a logic: 
as a formal system which is universal, reflects our informal notion 
of logical validity, and whose truths are analytic.
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Chapter III: Limitative Results of First-Order Logic 
Introduction
Thanks to Lindstrom we have a precise characterisation of 
first-order logic. Lindstrom describes first-order logic as the most 
powerful logic which (a) has the downward Lowenheim-Skolem 
property and (b) either is compact or has the upward Lowenheim- 
Skolem p r o p e r t y . ^ 3 1  The last is sometimes referred to as the Tarski 
property. A logic, L, has the downward Lowenheim-Skolem 
property if every theory T (a possibly infinite set of sentences) in the 
language of L, if T has a model of whatever cardinality k, where ic > 
Xo, then T has a countable model. The upward Lowenheim- 
Skolem property is: for any theory T, in the language of L, if T has a 
finite model, then T has a countable model. A logic, L, is compact 
when for every theory T in the language of L, if every finite subset 
of T is satisfiable, T is satisfiable.^^^
When Lindstrom's characterisation of first-order logic was 
published, in 1969, it was considered surprising, since first-order 
logic was defined in terms of its syntax and semantics, not in terms 
of characterising results. Due partly to the influence of abstract 
model theory,^we have grown accustomed to the Lindstrom 
characterising results acting as a stipulative definition of first-order 
logic. This is all very well, except that implicitly a move has been 
made, which is widely accepted, from the descriptive to the 
normative claim that not only do the Lindstrom results describe 
first-order logic but they delimit the scope of logic tout court.
131 Pqj. Lindstrom, "On Extensions of Elementary Logic," Theoria. XXXV (1969), p. 
8 .^^
^Joseph R. Shoenfield, Mathematical Logic. (Addison-Wesley Series in Logic; 
Reading Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1967), p. 79. 
^^^George S. Boolos and Richard C. Jeffrey, Computability and Logic. (Second 
edition; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 140.
^ '^^This is a fairly recent development in which it is natural to compare logics by 
means of their characterising results.
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Following Wolenski/3^ I shall refer to this as the "first-order 
thesis". The better arguments for the first-order thesis deal 
piecemeal with the limitative results we shall be investigating, and 
argue that these are necessary for a formal system to qualify as a 
logic.
There are two considerations which are salient to this thesis. 
One speaks in our favour, and concerns compactness and the 
Lowenheim-Skolem properties. These entail the expressive 
inadequacy of any formal language which has them, and this in 
turn, bears on the inability of a formal system to reflect our informal 
notion of logical validity.
The other consideration speaks against us, and concerns 
compactness, completeness and decidability. These properties speak 
in favour of the first-order thesis. For, compactness, completeness 
and decidability entail, of a logic which has them, that it has an 
effective proof procedure. In support of the first-order thesis, it is 
argued that effectiveness is more important than expressive 
adequacy. I shall be arguing for the opposite conclusion: that 
effectiveness is worth sacrificing for the advantage of expressive 
adequacy. Throughout this chapter we shall be applying our criteria 
of validity and universality to these results in order to show that 
the first-order thesis does not hold.
There are three sections in this chapter: (1) compactness, (2) 
the Lowenheim-Skolem properties, and (3) decidability and 
completeness.
§1: Compactness
Let us begin by saying what compactness is. A logic, 
L, (a logical language together with any domain) is compact 
when for every theory T in the language of L, if every finite
Wolenski, "In Defence of the First-order Thesis," Logica '93 Proceedings of 
the 7th International Symposium eds. P. Kolar, V. Svoboda, (Praha, 1994).
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subset of T is satisfiable, T is satisfiable. Put this way, 
compactness is a corollary of completeness.
The proof is very simple. Contrapose compactness and 
we have that: for every theory T in the language of L, if T is 
not satisfiable, then there a finite set of sentences G which is 
also not satisfiable, and G is a subset of T. By completeness, if 
T is not satisfiable, then T contains a contradiction. By 
completeness again, the proof a contradiction is finite. The 
proof's being finite implies that it only has a finite number of 
premises. Thus, there is a subset of T which proves that T 
contains or implies a contradiction. By soundness (which is 
part of completeness) there is a finite subset of T which is 
unsatisfiable.^3^
There are formal systems which are not compact, they will 
also be incomplete in the sense given above. For compactness to fail, 
the antecedent of the conditional must hold while the consequent 
does not. That is, for L not to be compact, there must be a theory T 
in the language of L whose every finite subset is satisfiable, but T as 
a whole is not.
For example, second-order logic is not compact. To show that 
a logic is not compact, we simply have to add a sentence, G, which 
is only satisfiable in finite models. For example, we might add the 
sentence, G:
(Vf)(-i(Vx)(Vy)(fx = fy x = y) v (3x)(Vy)(fy ^  x)).
The second disjunct asserts that there is, what we might call, a zero 
element: one which is not an f of anything. The first disjunct says 
that it is not always the case that if two individuals are equal under 
f, then they are equal. Thus, either there is a zero element, or two 
things identical under f are not then also always identical. 
Intuitively, for a set to be finite, the "ends" either have to just stop 
(as in a zero element) or end in a finite loop: -i(fx = fy —> x = y). The
proof is cribbed from Stewart Shapiro, Foundations Without 
Foundationalism. (Oxford Logic Guides: 17, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), p. 79.
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sentence is written in second-order because f is universally 
quantified; and it is this which guarantees that the sentence is only 
satisfied by finite sets.
We add G to an infinite set, M, of sentences asserting that the 
model contains at least two members, at least three members, at 
least four, and so on for every finite number:
{ ( 3 x j ) ( 3 x 2 ) ( x ^  Xg), ( 3 x J ( 3 x 2 ) ( 3 x g ) ( x ,  ^  a  a  ^  X3),  . . . )
For every proper subset of this set of sentences together with the 
sentence G, there is a model: one of finite size equal to, or greater 
than, the greatest nmnber of existential quantifiers listed in any 
member of the proper subset of sentences of M. However, no 
models will satisfy all the sentences M together with the sentence G! 
Thus, second-order logic is not compact. G can only be expressed in 
a language which allows quantification over higher-order 
variables.^^  ^However, some logics which allow quantification over 
second-order variables are compact. This will be the case, for 
example, when we have surreptitiously precluded conditions for 
non-compactness either by specifying a finite language (as opposed 
to a countable language), or by simply specifying that the language 
is only to be interpreted by finite models.
We direct our attention now to some philosophical 
considerations about compactness. The language of a logic, as we 
have defined it, confers upon the theories which use that language, 
the same limitative results as has the logic. To be more precise, what 
we mean by "using a language" is that given sentences are written in 
the language of the logic. What is important about this is that the 
limitative results of a theory are the same as those of its underlying 
logic.
Some of these results will only involve the language, and be 
syntactic; others will involve both semantics and syntax, and
l^^Stewart Shapiro, Foundations Without Foundationalism. (Oxford Logic 
Guides: 17, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), pp. 86 - 7.
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therefore, the whole logic or theory. Examples of syntactic limitative 
results are decidability and the Lowenheim-Skolem properties. 
Examples of limitative results involving both semantics and syntax 
are compactness and completeness. One reason why these results 
are called limitative is that they indicate limitations in the capacity 
of the logics to either express certain notions or to detect certain 
features. This can be turned into an advantage.
Compactness can seem like a good property for the language 
of a formal system to have. The compactness of a language opens up 
the possibility of studying non-standard models. This is because 
compactness allows for the existence of non-standard models which 
are not isomorphic to the standard model. That the standard model 
and the non-standard model are not isomorphic can only be shown 
in a second-order language. When we study non-standard models, 
we learn how imprecise (relative to a meta-linguistic 
characterisation) our object level language is. This has proved very 
fruitful. The most notable examples are studies of non-standard 
arithmetic and non-standard analysis. However, this advantage of 
compact languages over non-compact languages is a mathematical 
advantage: one leading to interesting mathematical theories, and so, 
is not strictly of interest to us here. On the other hand, under exactly 
the same mathematical considerations, we find a disadvantage.
The very fact that compactness can be used to construct 
unintended (non-standard) models implies that the language has 
limited expressive power. As we shall see, this arguably 
compromises the ability of the logic to reflect our intuitive notion of 
logical validity. That is, it will fail to pick out some arguments as 
valid which we (mathematicians, in particular) intuitively think of 
as logically valid. For example, the first-order theory of arithmetic 
together with elementary inessential extensions (by the addition of 
certain harmless constants to the language) under-determines its 
models. This is considered to be a fault in first-order arithmetic.
A non-standard model is one which we did not intend or 
expect. It looks different from the standard model, but still manages
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to satisfy the axioms of the theory. For example, in the theory of 
first-order arithmetic, we have an intended domain of study, 
namely: the natural numbers. We then develop a formal language to 
generate the valid formulas. We intend our syntax to describe the 
operations of addition, multiplication and so on. In the case of first- 
order arithmetic, the syntax succeeds in doing this, but it does not 
determine its model uniquely up to isomorphism. We do not have 
only isomorphic copies of the natural numbers modelling the theory 
of first-order arithmetic.
This is a direct consequence of the compactness of first-order 
logic. For, using compactness, we can generate a non-standard 
model of first-order arithmetic which has the same cardinality as the 
set of natural numbers, i.e. it has Ko members. However, it has a 
different structure from the natural numbers. This is the sense in 
which the non-standard models look different from the standard 
model of the natural numbers. Note that there are also non-standard 
models of first-order arithmetic which have a greater cardinality. 
This is a consequence of the upward Lowenheim-Skolem property 
and compactness.
The compactness of first-order logic also entails that the 
notions of finitude and Dedekind infinity are not expressible in first- 
order logic. This is why we say that finitude, or Dedekind infinity 
are second-order notions. It turns out that if the language of the 
theory of arithmetic is second-order, that is, if we allow second- 
order quantification: over predicates relations and functions; we 
then find that the second-order theory of arithmetic, together with 
inessential extensions, can determine its models uniquely up to 
isomorphism. Thus, any two models of second-order arithmetic are 
isomorphic. Because it has the expressive resources to pick out the 
natural numbers, as the model of the theory, second-order 
arithmetic is considered to be a better theory than first-order 
arithmetic. As we shall see in the next section, when we discuss 
Putnam's Skolemisation argument, this is not as straightforward as 
it might appear. This is because recognition that a theory determines
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its models uniquely up to isomorphism depends directly on features
of the meta-theory or meta-language.
Exploiting the rapprochement between a theory and its
underlying logic, lies an argument which is often summoned on the
side of those defending second-order logic over first-order. It is that
certain notions, such as finitude, can be expressed in second-order
logic but not in first. In first-order logic we can express particular
finite numbers. For example, if we want to say that there are exactly
three objects we write:
(3x)(3y)(3z)(x A y  ^ z a x ^ z a  
(Vx’)(x' = X V x' = y V  x' = z))
That is, there exist three things, they are distinct and any fourth
thing is not distinct from the three, i.e. there is no fourth. All finite
numbers are similarly expressible. However, we cannot even
express the more general thought that there are a finite number of
objects without naming a particular finite number. In first-order
logic, what we can do is write formulas which are only satisfied in
an infinite domain, for example:
(Vx)—iRxx A (Vx)(3y)Rxy a  (Vx)(Vy)(Vz)(Rxy a  Ryz Rxz)
For this sentence to be satisfied, it requires of R that R be anti­
reflexive, not have an end point and be transitive. Only an infinite 
domain will satisfy a relation, R, like this. Thus, there is a sense in 
which we can capture the notion of infinity in first-order logic. 
However, what we have not done is capture the notion of Dedekind 
infinity: that a set is infinite if it has a proper subset which can be 
placed into one-to-one correspondence with the original set. To do 
so, we need second-order quantification. We need to assert that 
there exists a proper subset which can be placed into one-to-one 
correspondence with the original set. Here is the definition of 
Dedekind infinite. A set U is Dedekind infinite iff:
(3U')((Vx)(U'x -> Ux) A (3y)(Uy a  -lU'y))
A (3f)(Vx)(Vy)(Ux A Uy a  (fx = fy —> x = y))
A (3x)(Ux U'fx).
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There are three major conjuncts each on a different line. The first 
major conjunct says that there is a proper subset of U, call it U*. This 
is, a set all of whose members are in U, but there is at least one 
member of U which is not in U'. The second conjunct says that there 
exists a one-to-one mapping between the members of U and those of 
U'. The third conjunct says that the mapping is to a subset of U. For 
example, consider the natural numbers, and a proper subset, such as 
the set of natural numbers without the number three. These can be 
placed into one-to-one correspondence. Just match one to one, two 
to two, three to four (in the proper subset) four to five, five to six 
and so on. Because these can be matched one-to-one and one set is a 
proper subset of the other, the set of natural numbers is Dedekind 
infinite. If we negate the definition of Dedekind infinity, we get the 
general notion of finitude of the set U fully defined:
-.((3U ’)((Vx)(U'x -> Ux) A  (3y)(Uy a  -lU ’y))
A  (3f)(Vx)(Vy)(Ux A  Uy a  (fx = fy —> x = y))
A (3x)(Ux U'fx)).
That is, finite is just the negation of Dedekind infinite which is that a 
set is finite if it has no proper subset which is of the same cardinality 
as the original set. The part which requires second-order 
quantification is the function whose value is the subset. The greater 
expressive power of second-order logic over first-order logic speaks 
in favour of second-order logic.
While this is a very nice consideration, it is not enough to 
show that second-order logic is logic, only that it has greater 
expressive power than first-order logic. In particular, we can 
express many mathematical notions using a second-order language. 
Thus, as it stands, the argument is of no use to us, since in our role 
of logicist, we want to show that some of mathematics is really logic. 
Given  ^this aim, we are not entitled to claim that the validity of 
arguments which rely on the capturing of certain mathematical 
notions is logical and intuitive. This would simply beg the question. 
The expressibility of Dedekind infinite or finitude is not prima facie 
an advantage we want to attribute to a logic. Prima facie, it is only a
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mathematical advantage. However, we might retort that 
nevertheless, finitude is expressible in the language of second-order 
logic and, therefore, employs only logical notation. That is also not 
enough to make finitude a logical notion. For, we first have to show  
that second-order logic is logic according to philosophical criteria. 
So, why is expressive power interesting to the philosopher? 
Before we answer this, we should first distinguish between a logical 
truth and a logical notion. The latter is a notion expressible in a 
logical language. For example, the capacity of a language to express 
finitude does not make the finitude of the universe into a truth of 
logic. For, there are infinite domains in which the sentence 
expressing the finitude of the universe is false. However, we should 
not be too quick in drawing conclusions. In a logical language we 
can write sentences which are true (in all domains, such as axioms), 
sentences which are always false, and sentences which are 
sometimes true and sometimes false. The latter are notions, the 
grasp of which, does not depend on intuition and sense experience. 
What would characterise such notions as logical is that they can be 
expressed in already approved logical vocabulary. We are then left 
with the task of arguing for the logicality of a vocabulary.
Similarly, the validity of arguments which make reference to 
non-logical notions, might be logically valid, provided their validity 
does not depend on the particular notions involved. For example, 
the notion of Dedekind infinity could figure in an argument whose 
validity depends on a logical manipulation of the expression rather 
than on a grasp of the notion of finitude. This will be realised, 
provided that the perceived validity is a matter of the form and not 
the content of the argument, and form is identified with structure 
and content is identified with particular domains. Consider the 
argument:
There is a set composed of three objects.
There is a Dedekind finite set.
If we accept that Dedekind finite is expressible using only logical 
vocabulary, then showing that the set composed of three objects is
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Dedekind finite is just a matter of giving a syntactical proof where 
we show that the set composed of three objects complies with the 
definition of Dedekind finite. Thus, the question as to whether or 
not the validity of the argument is logical validity, depends upon 
our accepting that the definition of Dedekind finite can be written 
using only logical vocabulary. The (logical) validity of the argument 
does not depend on our believing the universe to be finite, or that 
Dedekind-finite domains exist, or that even a three membered set 
exists. The distinction between a logical truth and a logical notion is 
that a logical truth is true under any interpretation. A logical notion 
is one which can be expressed using only logical vocabulary. A 
notion can be expressible in a logical language without being always 
true. A logically valid argument is one which relies on the form of 
the argument and not the content. That is, it relies on showing that 
whatever models the premises will also model the conclusion, 
without making any statement as to the existence of said models. 
The way in which we have drawn the form/ content distinction is 
enough to eliminate from competition for the title logic, any 
language with non-logical constants, or distinguished elements. It is 
not enough to favour, say, first-order logic over second.
Nevertheless, we do want a logical language to have the 
capacity to discuss the models with a certain accuracy. The inability 
of a compact language to characterise structures uniquely up to 
isomorphism reveals an expressive inadequacy. Insofar as this 
figures in our intuitive notion of logical validity, the compactness of 
a language is not a desirable property for the language of a logic to 
have.
Reason to think that the capacity of a language to characterise 
structures uniquely up to isomorphism, does accord with our 
intuitive understanding of where the boundary lies between form 
and content, is that this describes mathematical practice. "The logic 
of a mathematical theory", for a mathematician, just is the 
underlying language together with some logical rules of inference.
In practice, a logical language must be one which does not
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discriminate between members of the domain of objects of a theory. 
There are other conditions as well. What "discriminate" means in 
this context has to do with our other two criteria: universality and 
analyticity; and will receive further treatment in chapter four.
We can leave validity and compactness with the provisional 
conclusion that insofar as the language of second-order logic is a 
logical language, in the sense of not containing any non-logical 
constants, any argument expressed in this language will either be 
shown to be logically valid or logically invalid.
In contrast, the compactness of first-order languages plays 
against, at least the mathematician's, intuitive notion of logical 
validity, since they lack the capacity to characterise structures 
uniquely up to isomorphism. What we have yet to do is give a 
philosophical justification for the mathematician's intuitions and 
practice.
Compactness does not bear directly on the issues of 
analyticity or universality. The compactness of a logic does not 
restrict the domain we are allowed to consider, it just tells us 
something about domains relative to a language. Compactness also 
does not indicate of a language that it fails with regard to topic 
neutrality. The language of first-order logic does not include any 
vocabulary whose application is to particular objects or to particular 
domains. As for analyticity: the understanding of sentences written 
in the language of first-order logic does not require appeal to sense 
experience or to intuition. So in particular, the compactness of first- 
order logic does not indicate that sentences in first-order logic are 
synthetic. In chapter two we saw arguments for accepting some of 
the symbols of the language of first-order logic as symbols properly 
belonging to logic. The remaining symbols were left with a 
promissory note that arguments would be given in chapter four. If 
the arguments of chapter four are good, then as a corollary, we have 
that any notion expressed in the language of first-order logic is
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analytic. There may, of course be other notions which are analytic 
too, which are not expressible in the language of first-order logic.
§2: The Lowenheim-Skolem Properties
There are two theorems associated with the names 
Lowenheim and Skolem. One is the downward Lowenheim-Skolem 
theorem the other is the upward Lowenheim-Skolem theorem. The 
first was announced by Lowenheim in 1915, and was later given a 
more elegant proof by Skolem. The second theorem looks like an 
inverse of the first. That is why it is associated with the names of 
Lowenheim and Skolem. However, it was proved by Tarski.^^  ^Since 
neither result holds of all logics, and since it is a type of meta­
theorem, being formed in the meta-language of a theory, we shall 
refer to systems or logics as having, or not, the upward and 
downward Lowenheim-Skolem properties, respectively. We are 
using the term logic, here, just to denote a language with, prima facie, 
no non-logical constants. A logic has the downward Lowenheim- 
Skolem property or the upward Lowenheim-Skolem property, just 
in case the downward Lowenheim-Skolem theorem or the upward 
Lowenheim-Skolem theorem, respectively, are true of the logic.
^^^There are analytic notions which are not captured in logical language at all 
such as: bachelors are unmarried men, I am not concerned with these here, since 
the interest in analyticity is one of the interest in the analyticity of logic, in 
contrast to the synthetic aspect of mathematical theories which lie outside the 
scope of logic. These are mathematical theories such as Euclidean geometry, as it 
is traditionally presented. This is classed as synthetic because grasp of its truths 
seems to irreducibly require Kantian spatial intuition. If we were to show that 
there was another way of justifying Euclidean geometry: which did not rely on 
Kantian spatial intuition, (or empirical facts) then we would have shown that 
Euclidean geometry too is analytic.
Helena Raisowa, An Algebraic Approach to Non-classical Logics. 
(Amsterdam: North Holland, 1974), p.?
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The downward Lowenheim-Skolem theorem states: 
if L is a logic with a countable language, then for any 
theory T of L having a model, T has a countable 
modeld^^
A logic has a countable language if its language has less than or
equal to Kq symbols which are not logical constants. These include
individual variables and predicate or function letters. In other
words, if a logic has a countable language and the Lowenheim-
Skolem property, then we know that if it has a model, however big,
we also know that it will have a countable model. A logic L has the
upward Lowenheim-Skolem property iff:
If L is a logic with a countable language, then for any 
theory T of L, if T has an infinite model, then for any
cardinal k, k > countable, T has a model of cardinality
K.
The two properties are not co-extensional. That is, there are some 
logics which have the downward Lowenheim-Skolem property, but 
not the upward Lowenheim-Skolem property, and other logics 
which have the upward Lowenheim-Skolem property but not the 
downward Lowenheim-Skolem property. For example, weak 
second-order logic, is undecidable, is not compact, does not have 
the upward Lowenheim-Skolem property, but it does have the 
downward Lowenheim-Skolem p r o p e r t y W e a k  second-order 
logic is first-order logic augmented by a restricted list of relation 
and function variables which we can quantify over. The restriction 
is that these second-order variables should only have finite 
extensions. This is what distinguishes weak second-order logic from 
second-order logic. In second-order logic, all subsets of the powerset 
of the domain fall within the range of the predicate, relation and 
function variables.
What the downward and upward Lowenheim-Skolem 
properties show, of first-order logic is that, for example, the first-
Joseph R. Shoenfield, Mathematical Logic. (Addison-Wesley Series in Logic; 
Reading Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1967), p. 79.
j. Donald Monk. Mathematical Logic. (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1976), pp. 
488 - 9.
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order theory of arithmetic, has non-standard models of cardinality 
greater than Xo. That is, we can construct models with different 
cardinalities which all satisfy the same sets of sentences of the 
theory. By implication, these will then also have a different 
structure; think of the difference in structure between the natural 
numbers and the reals. This leads directly to the Skolem paradox, 
which reveals the inability of a logic, which has the Lowenheim- 
Skolem property, to characterise models for its theories uniquely up 
to isomorphism. Skolem took the paradox to be an argument for the 
relativity of set theory. I take this to be a rediictio: concluding that a 
logic with the Lowenheim-Skolem properties is deficient in its 
expressive power.
Skolem's paradox is traditionally run on the downward 
Lowenheim-Skolem theorem rather than the upward Lowenheim- 
Skolem theorem. However, it can also be run on the latter. Skolem 
ran the paradox on first-order Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, since 
this set theory was proposed by Skolem as a foundation to 
mathematics. The conclusion he drew was that the foundation of 
mathematics, i.e. set theory, is relative. For anyone harbouring 
foundational concerns, this was very dramatic.
The Skolem paradox runs as follows. The Lowenheim- 
Skolem theorem implies of first-order Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory 
(henceforth: ZFl) that if it is consistent, it has models of a size 
smaller than the size of sets which the theory claims exist. The 
puzzle is: how can a set of cardinality k fit into a model of 
cardinality X when k > À,?
More specifically, ZFl is essentially first-order logic plus the 
relation symbol €, which we read as membership. With this relation 
we introduce some axioms and rules of inference governing 
sentences where e figures as the major relation, i.e. rules and 
axioms concerning set construction. Since ZFl has the Lowenheim- 
Skolem property, if it is consistent, then it has a denumerable 
model. However, within ZFl we can prove the existence of 
cardinalities greater than Kq . In particular, we can carry out
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Cantor’s diagonal argument which proves that the size of the 
continuum is strictly greater than the size of the set of natural 
numbers. Since we can prove this as a theorem of ZFl, there is a 
consequence of the theory to the effect that the continuum exists 
and is strictly greater than Kq . But this is true in a denumerable 
model, i.e. a model of size Kq . The continuum has a cardinality 
greater than that of the natural numbers, but there are not enough 
elements available in the domain of the theory to instanciate this: 
hence the paradox.
In ZFl we can define or characterise the notion of a one-to- 
one and onto mapping, and it is this definition that gives us our 
notion of size, or cardinal equivalence in set theory. So, when we 
prove that the continuum is strictly greater in size than that of a 
denumerable set, we show that there is no mapping which is one-to- 
one and onto between the set we are calling the continuum and the 
natural numbers. Thus, according to our definition of size, the two 
sets are of different cardinality. Since the cardinality of the 
continuum is strictly greater than that of the natural numbers, the 
set satisfying the sentence asserting the existence of a set of 
cardinality the size of the continuum, must exist outside some 
models of ZFl.
However, we should look closely at the evidence for the 
existence a continuum large set. What testifies to this is the absence 
of our size comparison m a p p i n g ,  xhat is, a one-to-one and onto 
mapping provably cannot be constructed between (a) a supposed 
set satisfying the sentence which is only satisfied by the continuum, 
and (b) the smallest model which satisfies the theory (i.e. which 
models the theory). It is the absence of a mapping which indicates a 
discrepancy in cardinality between the two sets.
However, this is an artefact, and limitation in expressive 
power, of the first-order language of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. In
l^^Fora perspicuous discussion of this issue sec Michael Hallett, "Putnam and the 
Skolem Paradox," Reading Putnam, cds. Peter Clark and Bob Hale, (Oxford; Basil 
Blackwell Ltd., 1994), pp. 66 - 97.
143
C hapter III: Lim itative Results of First-O rder Logic
second-order Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, the paradox vanishes, 
since second-order logic does not have the Lowenheim-Skolem 
properties. Therefore, we are able to show that there is a one-to-one 
and onto mapping between the set satisfying the sentence 
expressing the existence of the continuum and a subset of the 
smallest model for the set of theorems of second-order Zermelo- 
Fraenkel set theory. Thus, the Skolem paradox can perfectly well be 
taken to indicate an expressive inadequacy in first-order set theory, 
rather than the relativity of set theory, and of the rest of 
mathematics.
We turn now to the expressive weakness of first-order logic, 
which is indicated by the Lowenheim-Skolem properties, and a very 
interesting twist to the notion of topic neutrality. With respect to our 
criterion of validity, we can again advance an argument about 
expressive power. Both the Lowenheim-Skolem properties limit the 
expressive power of a logic, such that, its theories cannot 
characterise models, such as the natural numbers, the reals, and so 
on, uniquely up to isomorphism. There are arguments which 
informally, we think of as valid, but which require greater resources 
in expressive power to reflect. We have seen many examples in the 
introduction and in chapter II. One example is the Mary and Betty 
example, where Mary has a sister, Betty has a sister, and conclude 
that Mary and Betty have a property in common. The obvious 
question to ask is why it is that uniqueness up to isomorphism is so 
important. The answer seems to be that if we want our logic to 
discuss structures at all, then it has to be able to identify these, and 
when we study structures in mathematics we seek to characterise 
them uniquely up to isomorphism. What constitutes a structure is a 
set of objects together with some relations which hold between them 
and some functions under which they are closed.
In mathematics, there is strong consensus over which objects, 
relations and functions are of interest. That is, some relations, such 
as, "is friends with" or "is sweeter than", are ignored in the 
determination of a mathematical structure. The mathematician is
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interested in mathematical properties, relations and functions, not in 
relations particular to social science, geography, history and so on.
However, from our perspective, the notion of structure is not 
determined beforehand, nor can we simply appeal to the practice of 
mathematicians. We cannot assume a grasp of what it is that 
distinguishes mathematics from other disciplines. Nor can we 
simply rely on mathematical practice to determine for us where the 
distinction lies. For, if we were to do so, we should end up with a 
mere description of mathematical practice. If we then were to 
attribute substance to the logicist claim about logic being the 
ultimate justification of certain parts of mathematics, we would beg 
the question. The logicist's claim (that some parts of mathematics 
are ultimately justified by logic) is merely descriptive. Any 
foundational pursuit which is not merely descriptive, takes with it a 
commitment to the possibility of some revision concerning practice. 
For this reason, we cannot simply rely on practice to tell us what 
constitute logical relations and functions.
Instead, what we wish to develop here is an intensional 
characterisation of structure which is relevant to the logicist project. 
To do this, we cannot just accept the practice of treating the 
standard logical constants as what remain invariant across 
structures. Instead, we have to assess the practice by appeal to more 
substantial considerations. The descriptive element of mathematical 
practice concerning what constitutes the logical properties of a 
structure, as opposed to the non-logical properties, is important. 
Indeed, it forms part of our criterion of validity. For, it sneaks in 
when we discuss the intuitive notion of logical validity. This is 
because the "intuition" part of the criterion is meant to elicit a 
description of practice. The other criteria are more prescriptive or 
substantive in this respect.
The programmatic nature of the present project is such that 
we can assume a certain modesty. In seeking to motivate what 
constitutes a structure, for the purposes of logic, or the distinction 
between form and content of an argument, we do not have to give a
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characterisation which determines all future cases. We only have to 
give a characterisation which gives a starting point for deciding 
which structures can be said to be logical, in as explicit a sense as 
possible while preserving our interests. The risk we run is of 
making our technical specifications of the philosophical criteria too 
precise to recover the philosophical significance of the criteria.
Let me suggest that the expressive adequacy of a logic is 
measured by its capacity to characterise (certain) structures 
uniquely up to isomorphism, as they are characterised in a second- 
order language. Of course, this will determine which symbols in the 
language remain invariant across structures. That is, a second-order 
language characterisation of structure will determine which 
constants are the logical constants.
The criterion of topic neutrality (an aspect of universality) is 
interesting in this case. The Lowenheim-Skolem properties both 
entail of a logic that has the properties, that it cannot show that its 
logical constants pass Tarski's criterion for l o g i c a l i t y . ^ ^ 3  The Tarski 
criterion is that a notion (or constant)^^^ is a logical notion (or 
constant) if it is invariant under any one-to-one permutation of the 
domain onto itself. A permutation is one-to-one and onto itself if it 
preserves the cardinality of the domain. Apart from that, the 
mapping function can shuffle around the objects in the domain. The 
logical constants: v, a ,  3, V, = and the cardinality of the
domain all remain invariant.
The reason second-order logic has the resources (according to 
Tarski) to express the logicality of the logical connectives, the
is due to Tarski, and is nicely explained in Peter Simons, Philosophy and 
Logic in Central Europe from Bolzano to Tarski, (Nijhoff International Philosophy 
Series, Vol. 45; Dordrecht, Holland: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992), pp. 21 - 
25. The reference to Tarski is to Alfred Tarski, "What are Logical Notions?" ed. 
John Corcoran, History and Philosophy of Logic, vol. 7. (1986), pp. 143 - 154 and 
A. Lindenbaum and Alfred Tarski, "On the Limitations of the Means of 
Expression of Deductive Tlieories," Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics, trans. J. 
H. Woodger, ed. J. Corcoran, (Second edition; Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983), pp.
384 - 392.
'^ '^^Notion includes logical constant. Alfred Tarski, "What are Logical Notions," 
History and Philosophy of Logic. Vol. 7 (1986), p. 150, n. 6.
146
C hapter III: Lim itative Results of First-O rder Logic
quantifiers and cardinality notions is that a second-order language 
has the capacity to express the relation of satisfaction formally. In a 
second-order language we can express the relationship between 
formulas and truth because we can quantify over formulas. The 
formulas we need are the atomic well-formed formulas which only 
contain one occurrence of a given connective or quantifier. Other 
cardinality notions are expressed in terms of a partitioning of the 
domain. The relationship between cardinality notions and the 
partitioning of the domain will be made explicit in chapter IV, § 2, 
However, we have to be careful. To show the logicality of the 
connectives, and so on, what we show is that the satisfaction 
conditions are met across all domains of interpretation, e.g. the truth 
table for P v Q is the same whatever propositions we substitute for 
P and Q. That is, we show that the satisfaction conditions for the 
connectives are invariant. We can show this just because we can 
represent satisfaction formally as a relation.
Of course, it is not quite accurate to say that second-order 
logic shows of its own connectives, and so on, that they are 
invariant. What we actually do is use a second-order language at 
both the object level and the meta-level. In contrast, if we want to 
show the logicality of the logical connectives in a first-order 
language, we have to do this in a second-order meta-language.
First-order logic cannot determine the cardinality of a 
domain unless it is finite, as was shown in the discussion of the 
Skolem paradox. Second-order logic can. Thus, second-order logic 
can show of its logical notions that they are invariant, whereas first- 
order logic cannot. Relations such as "less than" are prima facie 
filtered out by Tarski's criterion. Tarski calls what is left, the most 
general notions, and thereby, the logical notions. This is not to say 
that such relations ought not to be expressible in logic. On the 
contrary: if they can be expressed by appeal only to logical notions 
and constants, in Tarski's sense; then we reveal of them that they are 
topic neutral. The important idea is that what we accept first as a 
logical notion or constant is anything which passes the Tarski
147
C hapter III: Lim itative Results of First-O rder Logic
criterion. In this sense the Tarski criterion gives us our default list of
logical notions. Later we might define new notions or new constants
in terms of those in the default list. The new notions or constants
then earn a place in the list of logical notions. Thus, the list is under
constant revision.
What is interesting for us is that to show, of a notion, that it is
invariant under permutations, one needs to appeal either to set
theory or to a higher-order logic or type theory. First-order logic is
inadequate in this respect.
PLl [First-order logic] is too weak to show of many 
logical constants that they are logical constants. ...One 
may employ a method of Tarski, and show that these 
are all logical constants, instead of doing what is 
normally done, simply presupposing that certain 
constant symbols are logical constants and treating 
them specially (as in the standard semantics for PLl).
But to express some of the constants and to carry out 
all of the proofs of their logicality, it is essential that 
one employ higher-order bound variables.^^^
What this reveals is that knowledge of the logicality (according to 
Tarski's criterion) of the logical constants in first-order logic 
presupposes set theory or higher-order logic because to 
demonstrate their invariance under permutations of a given 
domain, one needs set theory or higher-order logic in the meta­
language. Both set theory and higher-order logic are very different 
from first-order logic, and it is their expressive power which 
provides for information about the object language. This is not the 
case with second-order logic. Used in the meta-language, second- 
order logic can demonstrate of logical constants in a second-order 
object language, that they are invariant under permutations of the 
domain. We might say that in this respect second-order logic is 
more autonomous than first-order logic. If logic is to count as an 
ultimate justification, then there ought to be some sense at least, in
'■^ ^Pcter Simons, "Who is Afraid of Second-order Logic?," Relativism and 
Contextualism, Essays in Honour of Henri Lauener, eds. Alex Burri and Jürg 
Freudigcr, {G razer Philosophische S tu d icn , IVIV, 1993), pp. 257, 258.
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which it can justify itself to itself. (Or, some argument to show that 
it is legitimate for the justification to end with logic). It is only in a 
limited sense that we can expect logic to justify itself to itself, 
because otherwise we run the risk of paradox or infinite regress. 
Nevertheless, it would be odd to think of first-order logic as an 
ultimate justification if we were then to have to appeal to set theory 
(which would then a fortiori lie outside logic) to show that the logical 
constants are invariant under permutations of the domain onto 
itself. By choosing a logic which has the expressive resources to 
show that the logical constants remain invariant under 
permutations of the domain, we add greater substance to our claim 
that logic acts as an "ultimate" justification. Incidentally, the Tarski 
criterion for logicality also passes cardinality notions. The 
significance of this will receive attention in chapter four. The 
importance of this depends upon the significance we attach to the 
invariance of logical constants and cardinality notions.
Grosso modo, one reason for accepting the claim that 
compactness and the Lowenheim-Skolem properties preclude our 
calling a formal system, which has these properties, a logic; depends 
on the following. (1) We consider that invariance under 
permutations of a domain is necessary for considering a symbol to 
be a logical constant or for a notion to be a logical notion. 
Furthermore, (2) we have to associate the capacity to show this with 
justificatory dependence. That is, we have to think that if we need to 
appeal to set theory to show that " in first-order logic is a logical 
constant, then we think that the assertion to the effect that it is a 
logical constant, depends on set theory. For a philosopher who 
endorses the above two claims, and who thinks that logic is 
significant and important in its differences from some of 
mathematics, along the lines of a logicist, the Lowenheim-Skolem 
properties and compactness indicate, of a formal system, that it does 
not deserve the honorific "logic". Such a philosopher will have to 
turn to an expressively richer formal system such as second-order 
logic.
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It turns out that this is good news for the logicist, since 
second-order logic is very expressively powerful, and ontologically 
non-committal. Second-order logic will be able to show, in 
accordance with the invariance criterion, that many notions are 
logical, and so re-capture a large part of mathematics!
However, before we merrily endorse second-order logic, we 
must consider some reservations traditionally harboured against 
second-order logic. These concern decidability and completeness.
§3: Decidability and Completeness
A set of sentences is decidable if the set of Godel numbers of
its members forms a recursive set.
'A theory is decidable iff the set 9 of Godel numbers of its
theorems is recursive, iff the characteristic function of 0 is 
recursive.
Decidability concerns only syntax. The completeness theorem
relates the syntax to the semantics of a theory in a language. It is: 
if an ennumerable set of sentences is unsatisfiable, there is a 
refutation of that set.^ "^ ^
That is, if there is no model of a set of sentences, then there is a
deductive proof procedure which will discover this. This result
concerns both syntax and semantics. In a sense, it guarantees that
there will be a match up between the two, so that whatever we can
do with the semantics we can also do with the syntax and vice-versa.
Sometimes we say that there are two aspects to this. One is
soundness: that all the theorems generated by the proof procedures
of the theory are truths. The other aspect is the reverse: that all the
truths can potentially be generated by the proof procedures.
I'^^Gcorge S. Boolos and Richard C. leffrcy. Computability and Logic. (Second 
edition; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 174.
•^^George S. Boolos and Richard C. Jeffrey, Computability and Logic, (Second 
edition; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 131.
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Decidability and completeness are results which carry 
epistemological significance. In both cases they tell us of a theory, 
that there will be certain obstacles to our knowing things in the 
theory. In this sense, a logic which is incomplete or undecidable is 
flawed. Often compactness, completeness and decidability are not 
properly distinguished in the literature, and this for the very good 
reasons that they are epistemologically significant and they are 
closely related. However, it would be a mistake to think that all 
undecidable theories are incomplete. For example, first-order logic 
is only semi-decidable, but it is complete. Decidability and 
completeness are neither extensionally nor intensionally equivalent. 
They are different results, about different aspects of a theory.
Many mathematicians restrict their study to at least semi- 
decidable logics. The restriction is imposed by epistemological 
concerns. If the logic is complete, and therefore compact, then it will 
have an effective method for discovering all the truths of a given 
theory. Constructivists, in particular, show concern for having finite 
proof procedures, and being in a position to know before trying to 
carry out a proof that in a finite number of steps we can 
mechanically generate a given theorem.
However, if we are interested in discovering what it is that 
logic consists in and its scope, we have no truck with complaints 
about incompleteness and undecidability. For, completeness and 
decidability results tell us of the extent to which logic can be applied 
to solving particular problems, or the extent to which it is practical 
to use it, or to what extent we can entrust machines with finding a 
solution to certain problems. That is, if we know that a formal 
system is complete and consistent, we know that if there is a model 
for a set of sentences, then we have a mechanical method of proving 
any further sentence which is a consequent of those sentences and 
which is written in the vocabulary of the other sentences. That is, 
there is a perfect match between the truths of the formal system and 
the theorems. A proof procedure is then effective if all the theorems 
can be mechanically generated in a finite number of steps.
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"Mechanically generated" just means that there is a finite stock of 
rules of inference and there is an unique one to use in the analysis of 
a given formula.
Of course, the machine analogy is not to be taken too 
seriously. For, if we really want a machine to solve a problem, we 
usually want it to solve it quickly, so we need a guarantee, not only 
that the proof procedure is effective, but also that it is short! Rather, 
the significance of the machine analogy lies with a matching of our 
intuitive concept of computability with a technical definition of 
Turing computability. Church’s Thesis is that all computable 
functions are Turing computable. Taken as a normative claim, this 
legislates the extension of the concept "computable function". Taken 
as a descriptive claim. Church's Thesis matches an extension: (all 
Turing computable functions), to an intuitive or pre-theoretic 
concept: (that of computable function). This is insufficient to 
legislate terms of acceptability of a logic. For, such terms of 
acceptability for a mathematical system, are pragmatically 
motivated, and this does not engage with our considerations.
It is exactly the same sorts of epistemological concern with 
completeness which motivate the constructivists. Their scruples 
concerning epistemology issue in an argument to the conclusion 
that the incompleteness of second-order logic shows the project of 
logicism to be untenable. The reason someone might think that the 
logicist project is undermined by Godel's incompleteness results 
rests on a confusion. The confusion is to think of logicism as the 
project of showing that we can reduce all arithmetic theorems to 
logic. Emphasis is placed on "showing". We read "showing" to mean 
mechanically demonstrate. That is, before we even discuss the logic, 
we have to show that there is a recursive procedure which will 
generate all the theorems of arithmetic. However, the Godel 
incompleteness results tell us that there will be some arithmetical 
truths which are not demonstrable, namely, a sentence saying of 
itself that it is true but not provable, Q. E. D.
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However, this is confused. For, the argument equivocates 
between "show", "prove", "demonstrate", and "mechanically prove". 
The logicist is not forced to identify "demonstrate" with 
"mechanically generate". It would certainly be nice for the logicist to 
have a mechanical proof deriving all the truths of second-order 
arithmetic from logical laws. However, we already know from the 
Godel incompleteness theorem, that arithmetic is incomplete. Thus, 
to have such a slew of mechanical proofs is not possible. However, 
it is not necessary to have a completable set of mechanical proofs of 
all the truths of arithmetic for a modified logicism to be vindicated. 
It is enough for logicism to trace the ultimate justification of 
arithmetic to logic; and justificatory dependence does not depend 
on the existence of a series of mechanical proofs.
Ultimate justification will take the form of a philosophical 
argument which develops a conception of the nature of the 
discipline in question, which in this case is arithmetic. The nature of 
a discipline may be shown to be logical if it can be shown to share 
salient philosophical properties with logic. The easiest way to show  
this is through a series of mechanical proofs, but this is not the only 
way. Already, Frege's project was to derive the Peano axioms from 
laws of logic, not to mechanically generate all the theorems of Peano 
arithmetic. Thus, Frege found it to be sufficient, for the purposes of 
meeting his criterion of analyticity that the axioms of arithmetic 
could be proven from logical laws.
However, to some extent even tracing the justification of 
arithmetic to logic through philosophical argument is moot, since 
even under this modification, we cannot show that arithmetic is 
universal, since the Peano axioms are false in finite domains. 
However, it remains open that the Peano axioms (and a foidiori 
arithmetic) share some philosophical properties with logic. For 
example, we might show that they are analytic, in the sense that we 
have developed here.
The resolution of the question, as to whether or not 
arithmetic is analytic, is beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, I
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am simply interested in showing which formal systems can
plausibly count as logic according to certain philosophical criteria.
Since the philosophical criteria are consistent with a modified sort of
logicism, it is hoped that the project indicates to some extent the
limitations and the viability of the project. This particular topic will
be addressed in the conclusion to the thesis.
Before we decide that completeness and decidability are
irrelevant, let us explore what it is we are letting ourselves in for, by
looking at what it is that an incomplete and undecidable logic is
like. A logic is incomplete iff there is no single mechanical method
that proves all and only the true or valid arguments. Turn this
around, and what we have is that recursive methods fall short of
generating all the logically true sentences of an incomplete logic.
Thus, the semantic notion of true sentence diverges from the
syntactic notion of theorem. At first glance, it looks as though an
incomplete logic is useless. Validity is a semantic notion: a formula
is valid if it is true under all interpretations. Theoremhood is a
syntactic notion. A formula is a theorem if it is an instance of one of
the axioms of a formal system or if it is derived from the axioms,
plus maybe some definitions, by the rules of inference of the formal
system. In an incomplete system, there are more true sentences than
theorems. The impression that such a logic is useless, comes from
dwelling on the fact that there is no guaranteed means of showing
that all the truths are theorems, and concluding from this that there
are no means at all of showing that a given truth is true. Insofar as
incompleteness shows that a logic is useless, it is ironic that
incompleteness and undecidability are features which hold of very
powerful systems. That is, they are features of systems which have
the power express quite subtle notions.
Some writers have suggested, that there is a clean trade-off
between expressive power (or definitional resources) and
completeness.
Completeness is very nice if you can get it, but if the 
price is expressive inadequacy, it seems to me we 
should be prepared to accept incompleteness. After all.
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the primary reasons for wanting higher-order logic are 
semantic ones, and the standard semantics for higher- 
order logic engenders completeness (sic!) not because 
of its own inherent problems but because we cannot 
recursively enumerate the sentences valid with respect 
to this semanticsd^®
However, the trade is not always a neat exchange. We might gain
definitional resources while retaining c o m p l e t e n e s s . ^^ 9 por example,
Keisler's system of first-order logic with the quantifier "there are
uncountably many" added on'^ o^ jg complete and compact but the
Lowenheim-Skolem property fails. This is an a-typical example. In
general, when we lose completeness we gain definitional
resourcesd^^
Incompleteness indicates a deficiency in the deductive 
system relative to the semantics of the formal system. We might 
think that this tells against such a theory's ability to track validity. In 
particular, we shall think this if we identify tracking validity with 
generating mechanical proofs, or with giving a mechanical proof
'^^^Peter Simons, "Who's Afraid of Higher-order Logic?" Relativism and 
Contextualism. Essays in Honour of Henri Lauener. eds. Alex Burri and Jürg 
Freudiger, (G razer P hilosoph isch e S tu d ien , IVlV, 1993) p. 256.
'^^^There will be more discussion of this throughout the thesis. However, for the 
moment note that while a system which is both finite and complete implies that it 
is also compact, the implication does not hold the other way around. For example, 
take weak second-order logic. See J. Donald Monk Mathematical Logic. (New  
York: Springer-Verlag, 1976), p. 488.
^^^H. Jerome Keisler, "Logic with the Quantifier "There are Uncountably Many"," 
Annals of Mathematical Logic. (1970), pp. 1 - 93. Also see M. Kaufmann, "The 
Quantifier "There Exists Uncountably Many" and some of its Relatives," Model- 
Theoretic Logics, eds. J. Barwise & S. Fcferman, (New York: Springer Verlag, 
1985), pp. 123-176.
^^^More specifically, consider extensions of first-order logic using generalised 
quantifiers. The study of these was first proposed in 1957 by Mostowski. These act 
syntactically just like the first-order quantifiers 3 and V . Examples are: "there are 
finitely many", "there is an even number", "there are more than Kq" and "most". 
Any extension of first-order logic by means of a generalised quantifier will be 
incomplete if the set of true sentences and the set of false sentences satisfying the 
new quantifier are denumerable. An example of a quantifier which, if added to 
first-order logic, makes the resulting system incomplete is the quantifier: "is 
even". We shall discuss generalised quantifiers in chapter four.
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procedure. A failure in tracking validity will then amount to a 
failure in mechanically generating all valid arguments.
However, recall that validity is a semantic notion. So, our 
concern with validity, is a concern with semantics. The fact that the 
syntactic proof procedure cannot keep up, is not a problem. It just 
shows that we have no algorithm which is guaranteed to generate 
all the truths of the formal system. What we demand from our 
criterion of validity is that it indicates to us a formal system which 
can show the semantic validity of an argument, in the sense of 
showing that all models which satisfy the premises also satisfy the 
conclusion of said argument.
Let us go back a little. A theory is sound, by definition, iff all 
its theorems are valid. Incompleteness shows that there will be some 
truths which are not theorems. They are not deducible by means of 
an effective method. One often comes across the remark that 
proving soundness is trivial. This is so, for a very good reason. A 
system which is unsound is of little use: "Soundness would seem to 
be an essential requirement of a proof procedure, since there is little 
point in proving formulas which may turn out false under some 
in terpretations.T herefore, we develop a syntax with either a 
particular semantic interpretation in mind or a completely general 
interpretation. There are trivial ways of doing this. For example 
there is the null p r o c e d u r e .  ^  53 This is when all valid formulas are 
awarded the status of an axiom. If there are an infinite number of 
valid sentences then there will be an infinite number of axioms. In 
this case, we say that the theory is not effective. The drawback to 
this procedure is that it is cumbersome and impractical. However, 
especially in mathematics, we tend to find "shortcuts" very rapidly. 
In other words, a sound proof procedure is one where, when we 
have a syntactic proof of a theorem, we can deduce (in the meta­
language) that the theorem is valid.
^^^Ecslic H. Tharp, "Which Logic is the Right Logic," Synthèse, XXXI (1975), p. 5. 
^53Lc5liQ H. Tharp, "Which Logic is the Right Logic," Synthèse. XXXI (1975), p. 5.
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The completeness of a formal system carries epistemological
interest. Indeed, Tharp argues that to be a logic a formal system
must at least be complete. He gives us two roles which a logic might
assume: "the first is as an instrument of demonstration, and the
second can perhaps be described as an instrument for the
characterisation of s t r u c t u r e s . "^ 54 former requires that the logic
be effective, i.e. decidable and complete. The latter requires that a
logic have enough expressive power to identify important
structures uniquely up to isomorphism. To fulfil this role, a logic
must not be compact or have the Lowenheim-Skolem properties. In
fact, it is this which Mostowski identifies as the role of logic.
In spite of this negative result [that the addition of 
most cardinality quantifiers results in a loss of 
completeness] we believe that some at least of the of 
the generalised quantifiers deserve a closer study and 
some deserve even to be included into systematic 
expositions of symbolic logic. This belief is based on the 
conviction that the construction of formal calculi is not the 
unique and even not the most important goal of symbolic 
logic. (Italics m in e ) 5^5
In contrast, Tharp argues for the role of logic as a tool of
demonstration. For this, a logic must be (at least s e m i - ) d e c i d a b l e ^ 5 6
and complete. Without completeness, we have no guarantee that we
shall always have the ability to show, or demonstrate mechanically,
the validity of an argument in any particular case. This is because
there is no single algorithm, or mechanical method, that generates
all the true formulas. Tharp writes:
If completeness fails there is no algorithm to list the 
valid formulas; so one can expect many of the 
principles of the logic to be unknowable, or 
determinable only by means of ad hoc or inconclusive
^54Leslie H. Tharp, "Which Logic is the Right Logic," Synthèse. XXXI (1975), p. 5. 
5^5 Andrzej Mostowki, "On a Generalization of Quantifiers," Fundamenta 
Matheinaticae. IVIV, (1957), p. 12.
156First-order logic is semi-decidable. That is, we have a mechanical procedure 
which will generate all the truths of the theory, but we have no mechanical 
procedure which will tell us in a finite number of steps if a sentence is a non- 
theorem. There are three types of proof: those which prove that a sentence is true, 
those that prove that a sentence is false, and those which are infinite.
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arguments. ...The negative evidence, together with the 
epistemological appeal of the completeness condition, 
make it seem reasonable to suppose that completeness 
is essential to an important sense of logic [namely, in 
its role as an instrument of demonstration],’57
In its role as instrument of demonstration, it is essential that "if
something follows, it can be known to f o l l o w . " ^ 5 8  However, at this
point we should be careful. Let us paraphrase the paragraph quoted
from Tharp, in such a way as to draw out the distinction between
knowledge acquired by means of syntax and knowledge acquired
by means of semantics. For, demonstrating validity in model-
theoretic semantics is no less rigorous than proving theorems using
the syntax of a system.
If completeness fails, there is no mechanical procedure 
to list the valid formulas; so one can expect many of 
the principles of the logic to be unknowable by a 
Turing machine. The negative evidence together with 
the epistemological appeal of the completeness 
condition, make it seem reasonable to suppose that 
completeness is essential to an important sense of 
logic, namely the ability of machines to reproduce it.
In other words, while completeness of a logic guarantees the
existence of a mechanical procedure for generating truths, this is not
the only means of gaining the truth. Furthermore, it is not the only
rigorous means of proving theorems. A proof can be rigorous, in
some sense, without being mechanical. The motivation for adding
greater rigor in proof is to make explicit, on what, certain theorems
depend. In particular, the logicist is interested in proofs which are
logical in the sense of not relying on intuition or sense experience.
We are not precluded from explicitness, in this sense, when
we give a non-mechanical proof. Absence of a guaranteed algorithm
for generating a conclusion to a proof is not synonymous with a
proof having to rely on intuition or sense experience. The sort of
proof which is not mechanical, but is rigorous, and does not rely on
^57]_,eslie H. Tharp, "Which Logic is the Right Logic," Synthèse. XXXI (1975), p. 7. 
’53Leslie H. Tharp, "Which Logic is the Right Logic," Synthèse. XXXI (1975), p. 7.
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sense experience or intuition is a proof which invokes semantic 
considerations. It is the semantic considerations for which we have 
no guarantee that there exists an algorithm, in an incomplete 
system. But this is in the nature of semantics.
This is not to deny that there are mathematical models, the 
grasp of which, requires intuition. Geometrical models, arguably at 
least according to Frege, do require spatial intuition, in order to be 
appreciated.
Thus, the lack of a mechanical procedure in a formal system  
is not as tragic as'it may at first seem, since we do not lose any 
truths we could establish in a weaker, but complete, system. Which 
mechanical procedures are available to us in a complete system are 
still available in an incomplete system. For example, in second-order 
logic, we are at liberty to avail ourselves of the mechanical 
procedures used in first-order logic. All the theorems of first-order 
logic, will also be theorems of second-order logic. Furthermore, it 
takes little to adapt the procedure to cope with sentences which 
include second-order quantification. Thus, not only can we generate 
all the truths of first-order logic, we can also generate some of the 
truths of second-order logic. The incompleteness and undecidability 
of second-order logic entails that there will be some truths which 
include second-order quantification, which will not be mechanically 
generated, and so will not show up as theorems. For example, "this 
sentence is true but not provable," or "if a sentence P is provable, 
then it is provable that it is p r o v a b l e " . '’ 5 9
In conclusion, the argument in favour of completeness in 
logic relies on a conception of logic whereby it functions as a tool of 
demonstration because, presumably, we want to be able to 
demonstrate to people correct reasoning. For this, completeness is 
crucial.
Completeness, after all, is not just another nice 
property of a system. When a deductive system of
^59Gcorgc Boolos, The Logic of Provability, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 150. Of course, any of these sentences can 
be added to the logic as axioms.
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whatever sort is presented, one of the most immediate 
questions is whether it is (in the relevant sense) 
complete. If all valid (or true) formulas can be proven 
by the rules, then apart from practical limitations such 
as length and complexity, they can be known to be 
valid (or true).^50
Thus, Tharp is associating "being in possession of a mechanical
method" with being able to know. Contrast this with the quotation
earlier from Simons where he says that he finds that it is worth
while to sacrifice completeness for the sake of expressive adequacy.
For, certainly, if there are notions which are not even expressible,
then we cannot know anything about them at all! If our system is
complete, then we enjoy two independent statements concerning
the validity of any given sentence. Truth and theoremhood will be
co-extensive.
This is the point stressed by Wolenski in his defence of the 
first-order thesis. In a complete system the valid sentences are the 
theorems and vice-versa. A  sentence is valid just in case it is true in 
any model. It is a theorem just in case it is generated by the 
formal/syntactic proof method. In first-order logic the two notions 
of validity and theoremhood coincide in extension. Wolenski states 
that "logic is universal because it is universally true."^ ^^  He then 
goes on to argue that we can tell that the set of universal truths are 
exhausted by first-order logic since it is complete. This is because he 
identifies universal truth with universal applicability, and this in 
turn, with the extensional coincidence of syntax and semantics. But 
this just begs the question, because he has built into his conception 
of logic the co-extension of theorems with truths.
In contrast, in an incomplete system, we have independent 
statements concerning truth and theoremhood. They do not 
coincide in extension. The notions of true sentence and theorem
Leslie H. Tharp, "Which Logic is the Right Logic," Synthèse, XXXI (1975), pp. 5 
- 6. Compare this to the quotation from Simons, quoted earlier in this section, 
which begins with the words: "Completeness is very nice if you can get it..."!
jan Wolenski, "In Defence of the First-order Thesis," Logica 93. Proceedings of 
the 7th International Symposium eds. P. Kola r, V. Svoboda (Praha, 1994), p. 4.
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diverge. The set of theorems is a subset of the true sentences. The 
logic can still function as a sort of justification, but it loses its status 
as a tool of mechanical demonstration.
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Chapter IV: Extending First-Order Logic
Introduction
In chapter three, we concluded that the motivation for 
adopting the first-order thesis viz: that the scope of logic is 
exhausted by first-order logic, is not sustained by the considerations 
we have brought into play to characterise logic. First-order logic 
was found to be inadequate in its expressive power: it could not 
recognise as valid, what intuitively look like valid arguments. Thus, 
we are curious to know what ways there are, of extending the 
language of first-order logic, to make a more powerful and more 
expressive language. In particular, we are interested in quantifiers. 
In this chapter I shall examine arguments for the inclusion of some, 
and the exclusion of others, from the list of logical constants.
In this chapter, we shall look at several extensions of the 
language of first-order logic. We shall develop them technically, 
insofar as this is helpful, and offer an assessment along the lines 
adopted in chapter three: with the difference that in chapter three 
we used the philosophical criteria of validity, analyticity and 
universality to assess the limitative results of first-order logic; in this 
chapter, we shall apply the criteria to languages and whole formal 
systems which include various types of quantifier. The reason I 
focus on quantifiers is that I have not really justified the inclusion of 
even the first-order quantifiers in a list of logical constants. I believe 
that the best justification for their inclusion also works as a 
justification for the inclusion of other quantifiers.
I shall not consider all quantifier based extensions of the 
language of first-order logic. In this sense, the thesis is 
programmatic: the considerations which are brought to bear on 
these systems can be brought to bear on others as well.
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The strategy I examine, for increasing the expressive power 
of first-order logic, is to generalise on the notion of quantifier. A  
new perspective is adopted where the quantifiers of first-order logic 
are thought of as instances of a more general notion of quantifier. 
Familiarity with the first-order universal and existential quantifiers 
is insufficient to give purchase on how to extend the (more general) 
notion of quantifier. Thus, there are divergent ways of generalising.
It might be conceptually useful to think of ourselves as 
asking questions about this general notion of quantifier, such as: are 
"all" and "at least one" the only quantities we are allowed to 
consider? What about other cardinal notions such as "eight",
"exactly three", " Kq ", "finitely many", or even more ambiguous 
quantities such as "most"? In the light of such questions, this chapter 
can be seen as a general polemic on why we should include some 
quantifiers and not others in the list of logical constants. Which ones 
we include will depend on our criteria. However, before we assess 
particular quantifiers, we have to decide to some extent, what the 
general notion of quantifier consists in. We may do so with an eye to 
capturing quantitative notions in natural language, or we may do so 
with an eye to mathematical arguments.
Neutral between the natural language perspective and the 
mathematical perspective, we can list two minimal criteria for 
quantifiers: (1) quantifiers play the syntactic role of binding 
variables. They turn well-formed formulas into sentences; we say 
that quantifiers are variable binding sentence operators. In binding 
all the variables in a well-formed formula, they make the formula 
apt for truth evaluation. Also very obviously, (2) quantifiers have to 
pick out a quantity. Consistent with these criteria, is the thought 
that quantifiers are higher-order predicates. That is, quantifiers are 
predicates of predicates; they attribute a quantity to a set picked out 
by a predicate.
Under these few constraints, we can develop quantifiers with 
an eye to our natural language use of quantified expressions to 
solve the problem of validity: to incorporate into a formal language
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the capacity to show that certain arguments are logically valid when 
they intuitively appear to be logically valid. Bearing these 
considerations in mind, a natural generalisation on the notion of 
quantifier is to include any predicate in which we can detect a 
quantitative notion, for example, "more", "the", "60%" and "finitely 
many". This generalisation on the notion of quantifier is developed 
by W e s te r s t a h p 5 2  and Barwise and C o o p e r . ’’ To avoid entering 
into unnecessary detail concerning presentation, I shall confine my 
comments to Barwise and Cooper's presentation of quantifiers.
At times it will be useful to distinguish a quantifier from a 
quantifier prefix as follows.^^^ A quantifier includes the variable 
over which it quantifies. A quantifier prefix is the quantifier without 
the variable. For example, (3x) and (Vx) are quantifiers. 3 and V 
are quantifier prefixes. Drawing on this distinction, we might also 
ask, of a general notion of quantifier prefix, if these are restricted to 
having only one individual variable following them. An example of 
a quantifier which is sometimes analysed as two-placed is "more", 
as in "there are more A's than B's".^ 5^ further question is whether
Westerstahl, "Quantifiers in Formal and Natural Languages," Handbook 
of Philosophical Logic. Eds. Dov Gabbay & F. Guenthner, (IV, Synthèse Library: 
Studies in Logic and Methodology and the Philosophy of Science; Dordrecht, 
Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1989), pp. 1 -132, and "Quantifiers in 
Natural Language: A Survey of some Recent Work," Quantifiers: Logics Models 
and Computation, eds. Michal Krynicki, Marcin Mostowski, Leslaw W. Szczerba, 
(I; Synthèse Library: Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology and 
Philosophy of Science; Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995), pp. 359 - 
408.
’^5jon Barwise and Robin Cooper, "Generalized Quantifiers and Natural 
Language," Linguistics and Philosophy. IV, (1981), pp. 159 - 219.
^54Michal Krynicki and Marcin Mostowski, "Henkin Quantifiers." Quantifiers: 
Logics, Models and Computation. Michal Krynicki, Marcin Mostowski, Leslaw 
W. Szczerba (eds.) (I; Synthèse Library: Studies in Epistemology, Logic, 
Methodology, and Philosophy of Science; Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1995), p. 194, n. 3.
165pQj. Lind Strom, "Prologue," Quantifiers: Logics. Models and Computation. 
Michal Krynicki, Marcin Mostowski, Leslaw W. Szczerba (eds.) (I; Synthèse 
Library: Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science; 
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995), pp. 21 - 24. We begin with a 
familiar example. Lindstrom analyses "All A’s are B" also as two place: ( Vx,y)(Ax; 
By) but notes that the traditional: ( Vx)(Ax Bx) is usually considered adequate. 
The judgement of adequacy here is relative to our use of quantified expressions in
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quantifiers have to quantify only over first-order variables, or can 
they also quantify over predicates, relations and functions? The 
latter possibility has lead to the more modern study of second and 
higher-order logic.
In section one, I shall examine the view, as it is developed by 
Barwise and Cooper, that quantifiers are a pair composed of a 
determiner and a set expression. This will solve the validity 
problem we were left with in chapter III: that first-order logic is 
inadequate in its expressive power. First-order logic will fail to 
identify arguments as valid which we intuitively think are logically 
valid. The theory of quantifier as it is developed by Barwise and 
Cooper will pick out a lot more arguments as valid. However, they 
are not logically valid since the Barwise and Cooper theory of 
quantifiers is not a theory of logical quantifiers. Thus, a first-order 
language augmented with the Barwise and Cooper quantifiers fails 
to meet our criteria of generality and analyticity: the inclusion of 
these quantifiers in sentences often renders them synthetic, and 
special (in Frege's sense).
In section two, I shall examine a more restrained view, that of 
"generalised quantifier" as it was first suggested by Mostowski, and 
later developed by Sher, Mostowski associates all quantifiers with a 
certain sort of cardinality function. Mostowski also draws 
distinctions among quantifiers using two (co-extensional) criteria. 
One distinction is between logical and non-logical quantifiers. The 
other is between general and non-general quantifiers. We shall find 
that with a little tinkering, Mostowski's criteria will pass muster 
under our criteria for logicality as well. However, his general and 
logical quantifiers do not pass without repercussion. Mostowski's 
criteria for quantifiers to be considered logical are necessary but not
natural language. "Most" cannot be analysed in the same way as we traditionally 
do the universal quantifier since the semantic interpretation for material 
implication is disloyal to our natural language understanding of "most". 
Lindstrom writes "most" as we first did the universal quantifier: (most x,y)( Ax; 
By).
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sufficient, relative to our criteria for a formal system to be 
considered to be a logic.
In section three, we find out that from the perspective of 
second-order logic, we can justify, by our criteria, the inclusion of 
the Mostowski quantifiers. We recover the Mostowski quantifiers by 
means of definitions. For this, we need powerful definitional 
resources. The addition of the second-order universal and 
existential quantifiers is sufficient to provide these resources. Thus, 
in this final section, we shall introduce second-order quantifiers. 
Once we do this, we find little difference between second-order 
logic and simple type theory. We shall then be able to define most of 
the Mostowski quantifiers in terms of higher-order functions! In this 
sense, all the quantifiers we have analysed here, are shown to be 
either non-logical or strictly redundant. But then, we are faced with 
the question as to whether or not we are prepared to accept second- 
order logic as logic, according to our criteria. That is, we ask if we 
are entitled to view second-order logic as logic according to our 
criteria of validity, analyticity and universality.
§ I: Quantifiers as Fairs Composed of a Determiner 
and a Set Expression
Barwise and Cooper, in their article: "Generalized Quantifiers 
and Natural L a n g u a g e " ^ 5 6  ^re interested in giving a formal account 
of quantified expressions as they are used in natural language. This 
is important for us insofar as we are trying to capture reasoning, to 
some extent both in natural language and in mathematics in our 
characterisation of an intuitive notion of logical validity. Recall that 
our measure of adequacy in reflecting the intuitive notion of logical 
validity corresponds to a language’s capacity to distinguish models 
uniquely up to isomorphism. This is something we have found to be
Barwise and Robin Cooper, "Generalized Quantifiers and Natural 
Language," Linguistics and Philosophy, IV, (1981), pp. 159 - 219.
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appropriate for reflecting mathematical practice. We are tacitly
viewing mathematicians as having more highly developed
intuitions, and this is due to their training. While we are accepting
the intensional characterisation of isomorphic structures, we do not
accept as definitive what the practice of mathematicians count as the
extension of the notion of isomorphism.^
As we have seen, first-order logic only uses the quantifiers
"all" and "there exists". In the language of first-order logic we can
construct particular finite numbers, and co-finite numbers such as
"all but 14"; but that is all. Barwise and Cooper complain that, in this
respect, first-order logic falls short of capturing many quantifiers
found in natural language.
The quantifiers of standard first-order logic... are 
inadequate to treat the quantified sentences of natural 
languages in at least two respects. First, there are 
sentences which simply cannot be symbolized in a 
logic which is restricted to the first order quantifiers 3 
and V. Second, the syntactic structure of the 
quantified, sentences in predicate calculus is 
completely different from the syntactic structure of 
quantified sentences in natural languages.
Examples of sentences whose quantified expressions cannot be
captured in a first-order language with only the standard first-order
quantifiers are: "there are only a finite number of stars", "more than
half of John's arrows hit the target",^^  ^"There is an even number of
letters in the English alphabet" and "More than one third of the
world's population suffers from h u n g er" .F o r  Barwise and
167For example, we have not yet determined that first-order quantifiers deserve to 
be logical constants. If they do not deserve to be logical constants, then they can 
be re-interpreted in eveiy new domain, and a fo rtio ri, will not be invariant across 
domains, as is the common practice among mathematicians. Certainly, we can 
envisage a case where first, but not second-order quantifiers were deemed to 
rightfully occupy a place among the logical constants.
”^”Jon Barwise and Robin Cooper, "Generalized Quantifiers and Natural 
Language," Linguistics and Philosophy, IV (1981), p. 159.
^^^Jon Barwise and Robin Cooper, "Generalized Quantifiers and Natural 
Language," Linguistics and Philosophv. IV (1981), pp. 160 -1 .
^^ (^ Cila Sher, The Bounds of Logic. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1991),
p. 18.
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Cooper, any natural language expression in which some quantity is 
referred to, counts as a quantified expression. The quantity need not 
be a precise number. Indeed, we often use quantified expressions in 
which no particular number is named. "Most", "the majority" and 
"few" all count as elements in quantified expressions.
The project Barwise and Cooper set themselves is to give a 
formal account of all quantifiers used in natural language. They 
include quantifiers such as "infinitely many", "there are finitely 
many", as well as fractions such as "one third" and more 
complicated functions such as "60%".
Barwise and Cooper observe that the actual underlying 
number in an expression such as "60%" will change from context to 
context. For this reason, they analyse quantifiers to be partly 
determined by a context. 60% is 6 out of 10,30 out of 50 and so on. 
For this reason, they include a set expression in their analysis of 
quantifier. This is what specifies the context. Their syntactic analysis 
of quantified sentences diverges from the standard analysis of the 
first-order universal and existential quantifiers.
For Barwise and Cooper, a quantifier is a pair composed of a 
determiner and a set expression. Quantifiers correspond to noun 
phrases in natural language. The set expression is a noun. The 
determiner is an operator which turns the noun into a noun phrase. 
For example, the noun "chicken" can be turned into a noun phrase 
by adding the determiner "four". The noun phrase is "four chickens". 
The quantifier is "four chickens", not "four" as we would 
traditionally have it.
The advantage of this analysis is that noun phrases such as 
"most of the people..." can now be captured formally. If we were to 
restrict ourselves to the traditional syntax which accompanies the 
first-order universal and existential quantifiers, then we would fail 
to represent many noun phrases accurately. For example, consider 
the sentence: Most people listen to Bach, If we represent this as: 
(most(x))(Px Bx), then this will not work as a formal 
representation because what it says is: for most things, if they are
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people, then they listen to Bach. The same faulty analysis occurs if 
we substitute other connectives in the place of the material 
conditional. We shall see more examples shortly. For this reason, 
Barwise and Cooper suggest that we analyse the sentence as (most 
people(x))(Bx). The quantifier is "most people". The set expression is 
"people", and the determiner is "most".
The upshot of the analysis is that, in general, a quantifier has 
no meaning independent of the domain of interpretation. In order to 
formalise the natural language use of quantified expressions, 
Barwise and Cooper end up with an enormous variety of 
quantifiers. Since quantifiers are a pair composed of a determiner 
and a set expression, we not only have a new quantifier whenever 
the determiner changes, but also whenever the set expression 
changes. Thus, "the chair", "three chairs", "Hilbert's chairs",^^  ^ ail 
count as separate quantifiers, as do "the horse", "the tartan", "the 
distance" and so on.
It looks as though we are allowing into a formal language 
non-logical quantifiers because non-logical set expressions are now  
finding themselves as part of the formal representation of 
quantifiers. We are then treating chairs, postcards, wave lengths and 
butterflies as forrhal entities. Such sets of entities cannot be admitted 
to the logical part of the theory because they are not analytic in the 
following sense. Determining the truth of sentences, whose truth is 
modified by some of the Barwise and Cooper (non-logical) 
quantifiers, requires the use of sense perception or of intuition.
However, we might be able to circumvent the objection by 
allowing the set expressions into the formal language as non-logical 
constants. This will not do for the very obvious reason that for a 
formal language to be the language of a logic, it must not include
^^^Even proper names count as separate quantifiers under this view! Jon Barwise 
and Robin Cooper, "Generalized Quantifiers and Natural Language," Linguistics 
and Philosophy, IV (1981), p. 164. For an excellent discussion and critique of their 
view, see Gila Sher, The Bounds of Logic, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 
1991), pp. 17-28.
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non-logical constants, as we have argued in chapter two, sections 
two and three.
Barwise and Cooper recognise that their view makes for a
very large number of quantifiers, not all of which would count as
logical quantifiers. To remedy this, they distinguish logical from
non-logical quantifiers. For them, a quantifier is logical just in case
its interpretation does not depend on a model. That is, logical
quantifiers are invariant across domains of interpretation.
...the interpretation of quantifiers, even those like 
"every man", will vary from model to model since the 
interpretation of "man" is determined by the model.
The difference between "every [x such that x is a] man" 
and "most men" is this. The interpretation of both 
"most" and "man" depend on the model whereas the 
interpretation of "every" is the same for every model.
"Every", unlike "open", "more than half" and "most", is
a logical q u a n t i f ie r ."^72
In other words, without loss of meaning, the logical quantifiers do 
not need to be analysed in terms of determiner and set expression, 
although they can be so analysed! That is, the traditional 
representation of the first-order universal and existential quantifiers 
is adequate for those quantifiers, but is inadequate for most 
quantifiers. The noun phrase "every person" is adequately captured 
by (Vx)(Fx —^ .... This anomaly indicates that the first-order 
universal quantifier is a logical quantifier. In contrast, the noun 
phrase "most polar bears", for example, cannot be captured in the 
format: (Most(x))(Px ... followed by a logical connective. If the 
logical connective were the material conditional, then the 
representation of the noun phrase would read: "most things, if they 
are polar bears then...". If the logical constant were a conjunction.
Barwise and Robin Cooper, "Generalized Quantifiers and Natural 
Language," Linguistics and Philosophy. IV (1981), p. 163.
The distinction between logical and non-logical quantifiers is not important for 
Barwise and Cooper, which is why they say so little about it. They prefer to 
analyse the noun phrase "every man", for example, as "every" being the 
determiner and "man" being the set expression. So, for the sake of uniformity with 
the other quantifiers, "every boat", "every brigand", and "every controversy" are 
all different quantifiers.
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then the noun phrase would read: "most things are polar bears 
and...". If the constant were a disjunction, then the noun phrase 
would read: "Most things are either polar bears or..." and so on. It 
turns out that, pending further investigation,^Barwise and Cooper 
believe that only the first-order universal and existential quantifiers, 
and any quantifier defined in terms of them, are logical quantifiers.
It is ironic that, while Frege disentangled the quantifier from 
other aspects of sentences, and gained great expressive resources in 
so doing; Barwise and Cooper restrict themselves to first-order 
quantifiers to gain expressive resources, and re-entangle quantifiers 
in noun phrases. This makes all quantifiers, prima facie, synthetic in 
the sense that determining whether or not a quantified expression is 
satisfied requires sense experience or Kantian spatial or temporal 
intuition over and above understanding of expression without 
quantifiers.
Recall Frege's positive characterisation of analyticity: that a 
sentence is analytic if it follows from logical axioms and definitions, 
where "follows from" means logically follows from in a gapless 
proof. We decided that this was too stringent a criterion, roughly 
because of undecidability. Compliance with the positive 
characterisation is sufficient, but unnecessary, to indicate 
analyticity.
Bearing this in mind, it turns out that one sharp way of 
distinguishing what Barwise and Cooper deem to be logical 
quantifiers from non-logical quantifiers is that the logical quantifiers 
have syntactic rules governing their use. For example, the natural 
deduction rule for elimination of the universal quantifier is:
(VxMx
(j)X.
That is, replace all x's in (j) with an arbitrary variable, or with a 
name, (depending on the system).
l^'^Strictly speaking, whether or not the universal and existential quantifiers are 
the only logical quantifiers, is an open question. Nevertheless, the point still 
remains that there are many quantifiers studied by Barwise and Cooper, which 
are not logical quantifiers in their sense.
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With a non-logical quantifier, such as "60% of widows". There 
is no syntactic rule. Any rule would have to be partly semantic. This 
distinction between quantifiers corresponds exactly to the 
distinction between quantifiers taken as logical constants and 
quantifiers taken as non-logical constants. Only the quantifiers 
which are logical constants will be "the same in every model". The 
rule governing the use of logical quantifiers is in this respect model 
independent. This implies analyticity in the sense that the syntactic 
rule governing the use of a logical quantifier is independent of 
domains or models.
This is not the case with the non-logical quantifiers as they 
are identified by Barwise and Cooper: i.e. those which do not have 
similar accompanying rules given independently of a domain. That 
is, the non-logical quantifiers, if they have a rule at all, have a 
semantic rule for every set expression/ domain. A new rule for 
quantifier introduction or elimination has to be devised for each 
determiner in each new domain.
If we think of Barwise and Cooper's suggestion, as one for 
including the logical quantifiers in the list of logical constants, and 
the non-logical quantifiers in the list of non-logical constants, then 
we shall find that we have not progressed very far.^ ^^  The reason is 
that only the first-order universal and existential quantifiers, and 
any we can define in terms of them, turn out to be logical. But as far 
as we know, that is all! In fact, this is their point. Barwise and 
Cooper believe that the analysis of quantifiers in terms of 
determiner and set expression is optimal for the analysis of 
quantified expression as they are used in natural language. As we 
have noted, they favour analysing the logical first-order universal 
and existential quantifiers in this way. They mention no other 
quantifiers as logical.^^  ^ Thus, in terms of capturing logical validity.
^^^Barwise and Cooper do not discuss quantifiers in terms of their status in the 
language of a formal system. Thus, this is very interpretative, in the sense of 
fitting their conceptions to the ones outlined in this thesis.
^^ J^on Barwise and Robin Cooper, "Generalized Quantifiers and Natural 
Language," Linguistics and Philosophy, Vol. IV (1981), pp. 162 - 3.
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and giving the ultimate (in the sense of logical and philosophical) 
justification for including notions such as "most" or "finite" in logic, 
we have not progressed at all. For, what we end up with is a formal 
system which is not logic in our sense.
Before we decide to exclude all but the first-order universal 
and existential quantifiers from our list of logical constants, let us 
examine an alternative analysis of quantifiers which might fare 
better, in responding to our intuitive notion of logical validity, and 
which will conform to the analyticity criterion.
§2: Extending First-Order Logic
Using Mostowski's Generalised Quantifiers
In 1957,^77 Mostowski suggested generalising the notion of 
quantifier, from the first-order universal and existential quantifiers, 
to other cardinals notions, such as: "finite", "infinite", "uncountably 
many" and "most". As we have seen in chapter three, section one, 
there is no point in symbolising small finite cardinals, such as 
"three", since these can be captured by a judicious use of the first- 
order and existential quantifiers. But, as we have also seen, in 
chapter three, the notions of "finite", "uncountably many", "most" 
and so on, cannot be captured in first-order logic, only in second- 
order logic. It is interesting to note that because "finite", 
"uncountably many" and so on, can be expressed in Frege's system, 
to add such quantifiers to his system would be redundant. Thus, it 
only makes sense to suggest extending first-order logic with 
generalised quantifiers, in the context of distrust of second-order 
quantifiers.
Mostowski's proposal is to view quantifiers, as operators 
which turn formulas with free variables into sentences. These 
operators are each associated with a function t The function takes as
Andrzej Mostowski, "On a Generalization of Quantifiers," Fundamenta 
Mathematicae, IVIV, (1957), pp. 12 - 36.
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arguments arbitrary assignments of individual variables. The values 
of the function are the truth values "true" and "false". Essentially, t is 
an interpretation function and a satisfaction function combined. The 
value of the t function allows the truth-value of a given sentence to 
be determined. Mostowski distinguishes two sorts of quantifier: the 
general and the non-general. A quantifier is general if its function is 
such that "the [truth] value assigned depends on the cardinalities of 
the set in question and its complement in the universe and on 
nothing else."^ ^^  A non-general quantifier is also a variable binding 
operator. However, the truth value assigned to its function depends 
on something other than the cardinality of a subset of the domain or 
its complement. Thus, its meaning will, in some sense, depend on 
the content of the domain, or particular features had by members of 
the domain. In this respect, the Mostowski non-general quantifiers 
resemble the Barwise and Cooper quantifiers. Where the Mostowski 
non-general quantifiers differ from the Barwise and Cooper 
quantifiers is in their formal analysis. As we have argued in section 
one of this chapter, the majority of the Barwise and Cooper 
quantifiers are synthetic because the truth of sentences in which 
they feature, depends on the content of the domain of 
quantification. Exactly in this respect, the Mostowski non-general 
quantifiers will also be synthetic. For this reason, we shall focus on 
Mostowski's general quantifiers since, prima facie, they better meet 
our criteria for logicality than do non-general quantifiers. 
Flenceforth, we shall simply refer to them as Mostowski quantifiers, 
since Mostowski himself was only interested in these and not in the 
non-general quantifiers.
In extension, the Mostowski quantifiers differ from the 
Barwise and Cooper logical quantifiers because there corresponds a 
Mostowski quantifier to any cardinal notion which can be 
interpreted in the standard semantics; even those not expressible in 
terms of the first-order universal and existential quantifiers.
Sher, The Bounds of Logic, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1991),
p. 10.
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Mostowski’s syntactical analysis of quantifiers is closer to that of 
Frege, than it is to that of Barwise and Cooper. The quantifiers are 
not analysed as a pair consisting in a determiner and a set 
expression, rather, they bind individual variables, making sentences 
from formulas, and are treated as separable entities from formulas.
Apart from these syntactical differences between the Barwise 
and Cooper quantifiers and Mostowski's quantifiers, there are other 
differences. There turn out to be fewer Mostowski generalised 
quantifiers than Barwise and Cooper quantifiers. Also, the similarity 
between "half of the people in China" and "half of Dwarf Dahlias" is 
preserved, trivially, since "Chinese people" and "Dwarf Dahlias" 
cannot figure as parts of quantifiers, only as predicates in quantified 
expressions. At least in this respect then, the refinement is more in 
keeping with Frege's analysis. This is because, prima facie at least, 
Mostowski's generalised quantifiers look as though they will pass 
the negative analyticity test: that detection of the truth of sentences 
whose truth they modify, does not require further appeal to sense 
perception or to intuition. That is, understanding a quantifier free 
formula may require sense experience or intuition. However, 
ascertaining the truth of a sentence, made from a formula by 
binding all the variables by means of a Mostowski generalised 
quantifier, does not require further recourse to sense experience or 
intuition. For example, "books on the shelf have green bindings" is a 
formula, the understanding of which requires, amongst other 
things, that we discriminate the colour green from other colours. 
"Nine books on the shelf have green bindings" is a sentence whose 
truth can be ascertained without recourse to any more sense 
experience or intuition than did the original formula. Tliis is because 
we can define nine in terms of the existential quantifier and non­
equality, which (for the sake of argument) are already accepted as 
logical constants. Mostowski's generalised quantifiers also, prima 
facie, increase the expressive power of first-order logic. They, 
thereby, stand a better chance at reflecting our informal notion of 
validity than does first-order logic.
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Mostowski draws a further distinction, that which lies 
between logical and non-logical quantifiers. Logical quantifiers do 
"not allow us to distinguish between different elements of the 
universe. "17^  Intuitively, the idea is that whether there are Chinese 
people in a given domain. Dwarf Dahlias, or bottles of Scotch 
Whisky, is irrelevant to logic. Mostowski's logicality criterion is 
reminiscent of the topic neutrality aspect of the generality criterion 
we have introduced. However, what little Mostowski says of it, is 
not enough to match our criterion precisely. As we saw in chapter 
III, §1, "distinguish between different elements" is ambiguous, and 
not sharp enough to meet our criteria for what counts as logical. 
Nevertheless, already on an intuitive level, the analysis rules out the 
offensive quantifiers included in the Barwise and Cooper analysis, 
such as, "the tank" or "most of the men in the room".
We shall give a general framework within which to analyse 
and define particular Mostowski generalised quantifiers, and then 
discuss the philosophical implications of Mostowski's two 
distinctions between different sorts of quantifier. Finally, we shall 
discuss a generalisation on Mostowski's framework: from one-place 
quantifiers to n-place quantifiers, where n g  c û . In the following 
section, we shall examine a further generalisation: to second-order 
quantifiers.
I assume familiarity with first-order logic. Let us begin with 
the syntax. Added to the language of first-order logic are one or 
several quantifiers Q. They are added to the list of logical constants. 
They will sometimes be distinguished from each other by 
superscripts explained as they are introduced. The universal and 
existential quantifiers may be rem oved .F orm u las are the same as 
for first-order logic, except that we generalise on the clause about 
formulas containing the universal and existential quantifiers, and
Andrzej Mostowski, "On a Generalization of Quantifiers," Fundamenta 
Mathematicae, IVIV, (1957), p. 13.
^^ ^^ There is no case I know of where this is done. However, because we are 
treating the first-order universal and existential quantifiers as instances of a 
broader notion, there is no reason to suppose that they have to be included.
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add a clause for the new quantifier(s): (Qx)(A) is a formula when A 
is. Sentences are well-formed formulas with no free variables.
The semantics of a logic whose language includes Mostowski 
quantifiers is the same as for first-order logic except for clauses 
involving the new quantifiers. Q is a quantifier, tQ is a (meta­
language) (truth) function associated with the quantifier Q which 
gives the cardinality conditions under which Q can be satisfied. This 
will be some cardinality statement. Often it is stated in terms 
relative to the size of the domain. In accordance with our 
universality criterion, the size of domains is not presumed to be 
absolute. We may quantify over any domain and in particular, any 
size of domain.
As a first step to meeting the validity criterion, the expressive 
power of the formal system is greater than that of first-order logic, 
because we have more quantifier prefixes than 3 and V. We can 
therefore express many more cardinality notions. Some of these 
require that we take into account the size of the domain (but not the 
content as in the Barwise and Cooper quantifiers). For example, we 
want to provide for flexibility in recognising proportional notions, 
such as "half", percentages, and so on.
To do this, the function t includes a pair (P, y) where p stands 
for the cardinal number which has to be met (i.e. be equal to, greater 
than or less than) to satisfy the quantifier, and y is the complement 
of P within the domain or universe, p + y = a, where a  is the 
cardinality of the domain.
Notationally, we write the scheme for the satisfaction clause, 
or truth function, for quantifiers thus:
Q /«  _  )T  if  P = whatever conditions are required by the quantifier,
F otherwise.
Q stands in the place of a name for the quantifier, a  is the size of the 
universe or domain, p and y partition the universe into two subsets
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in keeping with the meaning of the quantifier, y is the complement
of P in a. can be read "the satisfaction of Q in a domain of
size a  requires the partitioning of the domain into two: p and y such 
that..." Satisfaction, or truth, obtains when the truth conditions after 
the curly bracket are met. Falsity, obtains under all other 
circumstances.
Let us give some examples of t-functions which accompany 
various quantifiers. The existential quantifier is associated with the 
function t:
F otherwise.
The t function for the universal quantifier is written:
(P- = { f  l lr w is e .
In general, if we want an exact number 5, then the t function is 
defined:
F otherwise.
More specifically, if we substitute 3 for Ô, above, we have:
Ip ? ” -[ t  otherwise.
What about the quantifier "all but three"?
= {f  otherwise.
where -3 is the complement of 3. Thus, we can include in this 
framework, complements of cardinalities too. We can generalise 
further and allow no exact cardinal numbers to be mentioned at all. 
Consider the quantifier "most" as in "most of the members of the 
domain are A":
< f , « .  U ; ' " : ' 'F otherwise.
Sher, The Bounds of Logic, (Cambridge Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1991),
p. 12.
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To take another example, we have a function associated with 
the quantifier "is finite and even":
m „■> JT if P is finite and even.
[ F otherwise.
We may also want to consider "manifold" cardinality functions. 
These are ones which change their "p conditions" with the size of the 
universe; that is, with the cardinality of a. For example, say our 
manifold function is 2 out of 3,3 out of 6,19 out of 19... We then 
index a  for each new size, so is 3, is 6, ag is 19. Then p will be 2, 
3 and 19 respectively:
.matiifold / o  -.N I T i f P  -  2 ,
F otherwise;
(P, Y) = ^|.manifold / o  | T  i t  p  -  3 ,' Ip otherwise;
C “ ( P . Y )  =  19,[ F Otherwise;
and so on. "According to Mostowski, any formula-binding operator
defined by some cardinality function (simple or vacillating [what
we called manifold]) as described above is a generalized
quantifier."^®  ^Call this Mostowski's generality criterion. The set of
cardinality functions just is the set of two-partitions of the domain.
A two-partition is an exhaustive non-overlapping partitioning of the
domain into two (a set and its complement). Explicitly, Mostowski's
theorem to this effect says:
Let A be a set. Let T be the set of cardinality functions
on 2-partitions of a  = IA I. Let Q be the set of 
quantifiers on A. Then there exists a one-to-one 
function h from T onto Q defined as follows:
For any t e T, h{t) = the quantifier q on A such 
that for any B ç A, q(B) = t( I B I, IA - B ! ).i^3
Sher, The Bounds of Logic. (Cambridge Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1991),
p. 13.
^®^The theorem in this form is not to be found explicitly in Andrzej Mostowski, 
"On a Generalization of Quantifiers," Fundamenta Mathematicae, Vol. ILIV, 
(1957). It seems to be a combination of his theorem 1 on p. 13 and his lemma on p. 
21. The theorem as it stands is in Gila Sher, The Bounds of Logic, (Cambridge
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IAI is the cardinality of A. Q turns out to be the set of general 
quantifiers on A. The number of general quantifiers is equal to the 
powefset of A: it is all the ordered pairs composed of subsets of the 
domain together with their complements. So, any pair, consisting in 
a subset together with its complement will have a corresponding 
general quantifier on A, according to Mostowski.
Mostowski has a second criterion: that of a logical quantifier. 
Mostowski says of these: "that they should not allow us to 
distinguish between members of the u n i v e r s e . C a l l  this 
Mostowski's logicality criterion. One way of understanding this is in 
terms of characterising structures uniquely up to isomorphism. This 
would be in keeping with mathematical practice and would be 
consistent with what little Mostowski says about the criterion.^
It turns out that Mostowski thinks that his logicality criterion 
and his generality criterion are co-extensional. The co-extensionality 
of the two criteria depends upon a particular elaboration of the 
meaning of Mostowski's logical criterion. According to Sher, and it 
is fairly clear in Mostowski as well, if we assume standard 
conditions (semantics) for invariance under permutations of 
domains, then the two criteria are co-extensional. They also amount 
to Tarski's criterion for logicality. "Logical quantifiers are invariant 
under permutations of the universe in a given model for the 
language."^^^
We need one more assumption to show that Mostowski's two 
criteria are co-extensional: that the model theory we employ is the 
standard one. This is very important. The issue has been raised in 
this thesis in the form of the question as to what counts as a 
permutation: what are the invariant operators (logical constants)
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1991), p. 141. Her purported proof of the co- 
extensionality of the generality criterion and the logicality criterion is on pp. 141 - 
2.
Andrzej Mostowski, "On a Generalization of Quantifiers," Fundamenta 
Mathematicae, Vol. ILIV, (1957), p. 13.
^^^See also the discussion in chapter III, §1.
l^^Gila Sher, The Bounds of Logic. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1991), 
p. 14.
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and which are not (the non-logical constants)? Here we ask what is 
the background rule governing what counts as permutations of a set 
onto itself. In other words, we want to make explicit what can be 
changed and what cannot, and determine whether or not this is in 
keeping with our criteria. The problem is not that we do not know  
what a permutation of a set onto itself is. Rather, the problem is that 
it is so much taken for granted, and is so embedded and accepted in 
mathematical practice that it merits a re-appraisal. In particular, this 
is important for us because under the standard semantics, 
cardinality notions remain invariant, and are deemed logical 
because they are implicit in the formal languages we have been 
considering.
Contrast this with two cases of quantifiers which are logical 
according to Mostowsld's criterion, but are not general according to 
his criterion. The quantifiers are:
(1). "(Qx)<I)x says that the extension of Ox contains a non­
empty open set."^ ®^
(2). The quantifier "more than half" in some contexts of
infinite domains.
(1) requires a topological measure of distance to be imposed on the 
set. The second also sometimes requires a non-standard theory of 
cardinality. For, the standard theory cannot always make sense of 
"more than half" in infinite c o n t e x t s . T h e  examples stated in Sher 
are: "more than half the integers are not prime" and "more than half 
the real numbers between 0 and 1, expressed in decimal notation, do 
not begin with For us, the importance of these examples lies
^^?Gila Sher, The Bounds of Logic, (Cambridge Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1991), 
p. 15.
^^^The first quantifier was studied by J. Srgo, "Completeness theorems for 
Topological Models," Annals of Mathematical Logic, Vol. XI, (1977), pp. 173 -193. 
The second was studied by Jerome H. Keisler, "Hyper fini te Model Theory," Logic 
Colloquium 76. eds. Robin Candy and M. Hyland, (Amsterdam: North Holland, 
1977), pp. 5-110.
l^^Gila Sher, The Bounds of Logic. (Cambridge Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1991), 
p. 16. The reason the last example requires a non-standard interpretation is that in 
terms of the standard semantics, the two following sets equal: the real numbers 
between 0 and 1 not beginning with 7, and the real numbers between 0 and 1
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with the topic neutrality aspect of our generality criterion. A logic is 
topic neutral if the formal language lacks the resources to 
discriminate between members of the domain on the basis of 
particular features held by those members. A standard semantics for 
first-order logic where cardinality notions are "standardly" 
conceived underpins how it is that we identify and distinguish sets. 
By itself, this begs the question against the logicist. For, it makes 
appeal to a notion of what is standard which is ad hoc relative to our 
considerations. The examples suggest that we could just as easily 
have adopted a non-standard semantics for our background theory. 
For example, we might include topological notions in the 
background theory. Prima facie, we do not want this because 
topology seems to require intuition. Mostowski's criteria do not give 
us purchase on a justification for preferring the standard semantics 
over non-standard semantics.
Nevertheless, we can go some way to justifying 
philosophically, the co-extensionality of the two criteria. Co- 
extensionality of the two criteria is the product of our being allowed 
to strictly consider cardinality notions in our determination as to 
what counts as a (Mostowski) generalised quantifier. That is, we 
have to be able to ask of a sentence with a general quantifier: (Qx)0 
(where 0  only has x as a free variable) "For the sentence to be true, 
how many x's have to conform to 0 , and how many not?". A "how 
many?" question is a question about cardinality which is defined in 
terms of one-to-one correspondence. This does not require that we 
distinguish members of the domain in terms of their properties, in 
the very fundamental sense that such quantifiers are applicable to 
any domain because they do not infringe on the analyticity of a 
given sentence! More precisely: if a sentence is analytic, its truth will
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be justifiable without appeal to sense experience, or Kantian spatial 
or temporal intuition.^^^
This gives us a way of sharpening the form/ content 
distinction, as it was discussed in chapters two and three with 
respect to topic neutrality. If we identify content with the particular 
objects in a given domain, then we can say that any sentence which 
exploits the particularities displayed by the objects, will not count as 
logical on pain of loss of generality. Now we have to say what we 
mean by "particularity". Intuitively, this means something like: if, 
having examined an arbitrary member of the domain, we have a 
basis on which to include it or exclude it from a subset, then we 
have appealed to a particular feature.
This will not do, of course, since if we are told to pick 10 
things, and put the first 10 we chose into an appointed set, then we 
have a (cardinality) basis for excluding the eleventh object from that 
set.^ "^^  What we mean by "examining in order to find a basis for 
discrimination" requires further elaboration. Let us start with an 
example.
If someone says: "Pick out ten oranges from the bag of 
oranges," and say, the domain is a bag of more than ten oranges: we 
are given no way of choosing between oranges: accepting some and 
rejecting others. It is because we are given no means of 
discriminating between members of the domain, that we can claim 
to satisfy the sentence purely logically. If we were told "pick 10", we 
could do so arbitrarily: that is, by ignoring other features.
The arbitrariness is important. For, doing something 
arbitrarily, is just to ignore or suppress the content of what it is we
beginning with 7. This is because we can place the two sets into one-to-one 
correspondence. To say truly that more than half the real numbers between 0 and 
1 do not begin with 7 we have to take a notion of order into account. 
^^^^Recognising a one-to-one correspondence between sets is analytic in this sense. 
Also, since cardinality is universal according to Tarski’s criterion for logical 
notions, this gives us a hint on how to argue for the logicality of Hume's principle, 
for example.
The number 10 itself is not a particular object in this context for two reasons. 
One is that it is not an object in a domain. The second reason is that because we 
can define 10 using only logical vocabulary, it is a logical notion.
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do. When we pick out things arbitrarily, we do not discriminate, 
where discrimination involves intuition or sense perception. The 
word "pick" in the context of oranges evokes the image of handling, 
which involves tactile discrimination, if nothing else. However, this 
is not meant to be the salient image. We can pick abstract objects as 
well, such as numbers.
Consider a different sort of case where we partition a domain 
into a subset and its complement on considerations of cardinality 
alone. This is not done on the basis of what the particular features of 
the objects in the domain are, but on the cardinality of the domain.
If the domain were a bag consisting in more than ten oranges 
together with some apples, the quantifier "10 oranges" would not 
count as a logical quantifier. For, it makes us distinguish between 
apples and oranges.
These examples do not constitute an argument. Rather they 
help us sharpen the form/ content distinction. Let us give further 
precision to the distinction, and then examine the implications. In 
particular, we have to return to the issue of the non-standard 
semantics forming a possible background me ta-theory for the use of 
Mostowski's generalised quantifiers.
Returning to the syntax: in general, the constraint on tQ has 
to take into account that a, p, and y  are all partitionings of the 
domain according to cardinality only. Within the framework above, 
a first attempt at a rule for ensuring the topic neutrality of 
quantifiers is that:
Rule for topic neutrality (R. T. N .):
we are able to define a, p, and j  as equal to, greater than, less 
than, precise cardinal notions, or in terms of each other, with 
the understanding that a, p, and y  all range over cardinal 
numbers and nothing else.
The "nothing else" clause is meant to rule out any appeal to sense 
experience or Kantian intuition. The second disjunct allows for the 
case where we do not always give a precise cardinal number, as in 
the case of the t-function associated with the quantifier "most".
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However, what happens with the quantifier: "a lot"? Prima 
facie, this sounds like a cardinality notion. If we think that it can play 
a part in logically valid arguments, as was mentioned above with 
"most", we would have to make this artificially precise. In particular, 
we would have to develop a definition of "a lot" which conforms to 
the rule above. That is, we would have to define "a lot" in terms of 
the cardinality of the domain and some partitioning of it. Needless 
to say, we have little hope of both conforming to R. T. N. and of 
loyally capturing the use made in natural language arguments of "a 
lot". We interpreted "most A's" as: "there are more A's than non-A’s", 
and this ends up being a precise cardinal notion given the (precise) 
cardinality of a domain. Similarly, "a lot" could be interpreted as 
"more than half". Of course, this is artificial with respect to how we 
use the term "a lot" in natural language. For example, if we say "four 
votes (out of several thousand) were cast for the Communist party 
this year," and someone replies: "Gosh that was a lot!" we do not 
mean that more than half the votes cast, were for the Communist 
party, we mean that the number is unexpectedly high. The 
artificiality of our interpretation of a given quantifier is a price we 
have to pay, to conform to our gloss on Mostowski's generality 
constraint.
On the other hand, "a lot" is a notion which is relative to 
expectations. We could say that the non-conformity of notions such 
as "a lot" to R. T. N. indicates that it is not a logical notion. Whether 
or not it is, will depend on what it is the expectation is founded on, 
or rather, to what extent the expectation can be expressed in terms 
of cardinality. For example, if "a lot of numbers between 10 and 50 
are prime," can be loyally translated as "there are more than three 
numbers which lie between 10 and 50 and are prime", then "a lot" is 
a logical quantifier. If, on the other hand, no translation can be made 
which draws on (already accepted) cardinality properties, then the 
quantifier is not a logical one. If "a lot" can be loyally captured in 
conformity to R. T. N., then it is a logical notion; if not, then it is 
based on our epistemic situation, our psychology or whatever. In
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other words, we can take R. T. N. as normative of our criterion for 
topic neutrality. However, the extension of the application of the 
rule is not predetermined, as the case of "a lot" indicates. Thus, we 
can rule out "a lot" as a logical quantifier on the basis of its not being 
a precise cardinal notion. It changes from context to context, not in 
the sense of the manifold Mostowski generalised quantifiers, but the 
modification depends on considerations which are often sensitive to 
intuition and perception.
Can we generalise further? Mostowski did not consider the 
possibility of partitioning the domain into more than two subsets. A 
consequence of this is that his framework does not accommodate 
many-place quantifiers. However, we can accommodate this, in 
keeping with his generality and logicality constraints. Consider the 
quantifier "there are more x's than y's". In the notation above, we 
could represent the t-function as:
Here, the quantifier expression would be written more familiarly: 
"(more x, y)0", where 0  is a well-formed formula. The expression 
would be read: "there are more x’s than y's, such that 0". P, y and 6 
are a 3-partition of the domain; that is, p + y + Ô = a. The first 
variable after the quantifier prefix "more" is given the cardinality p, 
the second is given the cardinality y, and the quantifier is satisfied 
just in case p > y in a. Ô is the complement of p + y. In general, we 
can have n-place quantifiers for any n e co, and we can modify R. T. 
N. in the obvious way. The simplicity of the modification makes it 
surprising that Mostowski did not generalise from one place to two 
place quantifiers. More importantly, conceptually if not historically, 
it is surprising that Mostowski did not generalise from the first- 
order quantifiers to second-order quantifiers.
Taking stock: Mostowski's criteria conform to ours, modulo a 
better argument for cardinality notions remaining invariant under 
permutations of the domain onto itself. So far, the standard
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semantics assumes some cardinality measures implicitly, but not 
others.
Mostowski's quantifiers express measures of a 
particular kind, namely measures which have to do 
with the cardinality of sets, ...these are all the second- 
level 1-place measure predicates [first-order 
quantifiers] satisfying (LQ2) [Mostowski's logicality 
criterion] relative to standard model theory. But these 
are not the only second-level measures conforming to 
(LQ2). Other quantifier measures of first-level 
extensions have been developed involving more 
elaborate model structures. ...[For example, the]
quantifier Q, where "(Qx)0x" says that the extension of 
Ox contains a non-empty open set. This quantifier 
requires that models be enriched by some measure of 
distance (topology). The second [example] has to do 
with infinite sets [where the notion of half an infinite
set makes s e n s e ] .
As we have seen, using Mostowski's general framework, we can 
include quantifiers that Mostowski himself, did not consider, such 
as two-place quantifiers. These conform, in spirit, to his criteria for 
logicality and generality. They do not conform in letter, since 
Mostowski explicitly only considers two-partitions of the domain. 
Nevertheless, this gives us a marked improvement, over first-order 
logic, on expressive power. In turn, this allows first-order logic 
augmented with the Mostowski quantifiers to show a greater 
number of intuitively logically valid arguments as valid. For 
example:
an even number of people want to play football. 
therefore, two teams of equal number can play each other. 
This argument relies on the quantifiers "even number" because we 
have to understand that any even number can be divided by two 
whole numbers. Particular even numbers can be expressed in first- 
order logic, but not the more general notion of even number.
Sher, The Bounds of Logic, (Cambridge Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1991), 
pp. 15 -16.
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Earlier, we identified content with particular members of a 
domain, and form with cardinality properties of arbitrary subsets of 
the domain. The latter was expressed in terms of invariance under 
permutations of the domain. Insofar as we endorse this view, as a 
means of sharpening the criterion of universality in the context of 
generalised quantifiers, this will complement the criterion of 
validity. This is because logical validity is supposed, on an intuitive 
level, to be a matter of the formal properties of an argument, and 
should not rely on particular features of the subject matter, or 
content, of the argument.
However, including the Mostowski quantifiers in the list of 
logical constants presupposes purchase on a some fairly 
sophisticated notions concerning cardinality. For example, if we 
include, "there are K2" amongst our logical constants, then the 
interpretation of the quantifier remains invariant across domains; by 
the stipulated meaning of "logical constant". For this reason, we 
have to already be able to recognise cardinalities such as Ki and 
N*o; we need to know, for example, whether or not a given domain 
has this number of members as a subset or not, so, if it can satisfy a 
sentence in which the Mostowski generalised quantifier features.
The standard theory about cardinal numbers is fairly 
sophisticated and abstruse. For example, it includes theorems such 
as, prima facie, = ^2/ and that a set of infinite cardinality is
one which has a proper subset of the same cardinality as itself. 
Including these cardinality notions in the form of quantifiers in a list 
of logical constants, amounts to a stipulation that cardinality notions 
are logical notions. To make this stipulation almost begs the 
question against the logicist, who thought he had to do some 
technical work to prove that the axioms of arithmetic are part of 
logic. The stipulation does not fully beg the question, since 
including the Mostowski generalised quantifiers in the list of logical 
constants, will give us cardinality notions for free, but it is an open 
question whether they give us the resources to prove the Peano 
axioms. Frege wanted to prove, by means of a rigorous proof
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starting only from logical axioms and definitions, that arithmetic is 
part of logicd^^
Worse still, what the formal system, which results from 
adding Mostowski's generalised quantifiers to the language of first- 
order logic, lacks is an argument for preferring the standard theory 
of cardinality over the non-standard. The standard theory forms 
part of the standard semantics for first-order logic. But we have no 
basis upon which to justify our preference for the standard 
semantics. Thus, increasing the expressive power of first-order logic 
by adding Mostowski generalised quantifiers, in order to 
accommodate our validity criterion, proves a severe limitation on 
the logicist project as a whole. For, what we effectively do is sneak 
cardinality in by the back door. Moreover, we have no reason to 
exclude topological notions from the background theory, or 
alternative cardinality theories to accommodate ordinal notions, for 
example. These theories sometimes contradict the standard 
semantics. But we have no basis yet, upon which to select one 
semantics over another.
For now, then, let us register that the method of vindicating 
logicism, by adding Mostowski generalised quantifiers to the logical 
constants, to some extent, begs the question against the logicist. 
Mostowski's criteria comply with our criteria of analyticity and 
validity. However, they make a farce of generality by offering a 
circular justification for topic neutrality. This is because on an 
intuitive level we were associating cardinality notions, prima facie, 
with mathematical notions. We did this on the grounds that theories 
about cardinal numbers seem to be about particular objects, or 
particular domains of objects. Thus, we need to do some work to 
show that they belong to logic, if they do. The Mostowski 
quantifiers already include such notions in the language, so that we 
just point to the vocabulary and say look: "we have a quantifier:
Underlying the satisfaction conditions for arithemtical notions included among 
the Mostowski quantifiers, (such as 0, Dedekind finite, greater than) will be some 
theory of arithmetic, thus, it may be possible to distill the Peano axioms out of the 
satisfaction conditions for an appropriate set of Mostowski quantifiers.
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Dedekind infinite in the list of logical constants, and therefore, it is a 
logical notion. While Mostowski's demarcation of invariance and 
logicality may conform to present practice among mathematicians 
and logicians, it is not good enough for the logicist. Let us look to an 
alternative method of vindicating logicism: through the 
introduction of the second-order universal and existential 
quantifiers.
§3: Second-Order Quantifiers
In the same vein as in the previous sections of this chapter, 
we might ask the question: "is there any reason to restrict ourselves 
to first-order quantifiers?" That is, is there an a priori logical or 
philosophical reason why we cannot quantify over second-order 
variables and consider the formal system (of second-order logic) to 
be a logic? To answer this question, we propose to generalise on the 
notion of quantifier from our examples of the first-order universal 
and existential quantifiers to second-order universal and existential 
quantifiers.
This is not new. As was made clear in the first chapter, this is 
an a-historical question. Frege, used not only first, but also second- 
order quantifiers. Frege's formal system is commonly agreed to be 
equivalent to what we think of today as second-order logic. The 
structure of the system is a little more elaborate than that of first- 
order logic.
Frege analysed first-order quantifiers as (one-place) second 
order concepts, and second-order quantifiers as (one place) third- 
order concepts. In this construal of Frege's system we have a 
domain of individuals, then above those, there are first-order 
concepts, then the second-order concepts. First-order quantifiers 
quantify over members of the domain of individuals.
Distinguish orders from levels as follows. Levels are 
absolute. Orders are typed, in the sense that in the type "concept" 
there are first-order concepts, second-order concepts, and so on. In
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the type "quantifier", there are first-order quantifiers, second-order 
quantifiers and so on. The only other type we discuss is the type of 
individuals. There are no orders of individuals. Different type/ 
order combinations are located at different levels as shown in the 
figure below. The first level comprises the first-order individual 
objects. Tliere are no second-order objects or individuals. The next 
level up is that of the first-order concepts. These apply to the 
individuals. The third level comprises the second-order concepts, 
that is, concepts of concepts. On the third level we find the first- 
order quantifiers. On the fourth level, we find the second-order 
quantifiers. These quantify over concepts at the second level (that of 
first-order concepts).
Figure
4th level: second-order quantifiers, third-order concepts*, i.e.
concepts of concepts of concepts, these range over the 
powerset of concepts at level 3.
3rd level: first-order quantifiers, second-order concepts, i.e.,
concepts of concepts, these range over the powerset of 
concepts at level 2.
2nd level: first-order concepts, i.e. concepts which pertain
directly to objects, these range over the powerset of the 
objects which are found at level 1.
1st level: individuals or objects. First-order variables: x, y, z...
range over these.
* "Concepts" is generic for predicates, relations and functions.^^^
is not how Frege used the word "concept".
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First-order quantifiers are cardinality predicates which relate 
individuals to first-order concepts. For example, if we write: (Vx)Px, 
we assert that all the individuals in the domain fall under P, or have 
the feature P. Similarly, a second-order quantifier, makes a 
cardinality judgement about the first-order concepts, for example, 
that a concept, P, exists. This is written: (3P)P, where P is a first- 
order predicate.
From the first chapter, we learned that the notion of second- 
order quantifier in logic, as a part of logic, was abandoned early this 
century. However, we could still find it in second-order set theory 
and in most meta-languages. We also know from the first chapter, 
that the abandonment was too swift, since the formal system of the 
Begriffsschrift is consistent. The only offending part of Frege's formal 
system is axiom V of Gnindgesetze. Interestingly, the infamous 
axiom V of Grundgesetze was shown to be dispensable in deriving all 
the theorems of Grundgesetze, save Hume's principle and any 
theorems of a n a ly sis .H u m e's  principle is consistent with the 
formal system of the Begriffsschrift, in which there is no mention of 
axiom V in Grundgesetze. We can promote Hume's principle from its 
status as theorem in Grundgesetze, to the status of axiom and add it 
to the formal system of the Begriffsschrift. This makes a formal 
system which is equiconsistent with second-order arithmetic and is 
commonly accepted to be equivalent to second order logic together 
with Hume's principle added as an axiom. This system is powerful 
enough to derive the Peano axioms as theorems.
The logicist cannot rest content with this. He has to develop a 
case for saying the Hume's principle is a logical principle, in some 
sense. The problem is philosophical. There is little agreement in the 
literature over what the philosophical status of Hume's principle is: 
whether it is analytic, whether it is an abstraction principle, or a 
contextual definition: that is, to what extent it is logical.
l^^Richard Heck, "The Development of Arithmetic in Frege's G ru n d g ese tze  der  
A rith m etik ,"  The Tournai of Symbolic Logic. LVIII.2 (1993), pp. 579 - 601.
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I do not propose to discuss this issue here. I am Just flagging 
a motivation and a limitation concerning the present thesis. The 
limitation is that even if I do show that second-order logic is logic, 
this is not enough to vindicate logicism. Hume’s principle must also 
be shown to be logical, at least to some degree. Furthermore, exactly 
in which respects Hume's principle is logical had better accord with 
why the logicist thinks that second-order logic is logical. Thus, apart 
from arguing for the logical status of Hume's principle, it is crucial 
for the logicist that second-order logic be shown to be a logic. If 
second-order logic is a piece of mathematics, then the logicist 
project, of showing that arithmetic is in some sense part of logic, is 
of technical interest, but loses its philosophical interest. The 
philosophical interest can only be made clear if we have reasons to 
think that second-order logic can be regarded as logic. That same 
philosophical interest will also make explicit wherein lies the 
interest in the logicist project in its modern guise.
In the previous section, we discussed Mostowski's criterion 
for a quantifier tq be regarded as a logical quantifier: that it not 
distinguish between different members of the domain. We 
registered dissatisfaction with what he considered to be the 
outcome of conformity to the criterion because it presupposes a 
background theory of cardinality, which, for all we can tell, requires 
intuition to recognise its true sentences. This led to the problem that 
we cannot justify the standard semantics over the non-standard 
semantics. The problem with endorsing both non-standard and 
standard semantics is that some of the non-standard theories 
contradict the standard theory, and at least prima facie, the rival 
cardinality theories or theories of topology, look more like 
mathematical theories than logic, because choosing between them 
(for all we know) requires intuition. This makes cardinality notions, 
in full generality (standard theories and non-standard theories) 
seem, prima facie, synthetic. We have no logical basis upon which to 
make a choice, which we are forced to make on pain of 
contradiction. While this is the case prima facie, we shall see that
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many of the Mostowski logical quantifiers can be expressed using 
higher-order predicates. This allows us to define the notions in 
second-order logic. If we can define a notion in second-order logic, 
and we consider second-order logic to count as logic according to 
our criteria, then the definitions turn out to be analytic. We shall see 
this at work shortly. First, let us introduce second-order logic.
When we introduce second-order quantification, the syntactic 
difference with first-order logic is that we introduce an infinite set of 
first-order predicate, relation and function symbols as variables.
That is, a formula is well formed, if it is of the form (Qx)((j)); where x 
stands for individuals, first-order predicates, first-order relations or 
first-order functions, Q is either the existential or the universal 
quantifier prefix, and (j) is a formula. A sentence is a formula with no 
free variables. In particular, it cannot contain unbounded 
individual, predicate, relation or function variables! For example, 
"(Vx)Px" is not a sentence in the language of second-order logic 
because P is free.
The remarkable thing is that we gain the expressive 
advantages of higher-order languages immediately if we allow 
variables and quantifiers at any level above levels three and four, 
respectively. We now find ourselves in the realm of higher-order 
logic which is a sort of simple type theory. Moreover, we gain the 
advantages at little cost. The jump from first to second-order logic is 
far more dramatic than the jump from second to third order or any 
finite order thereafter. This is so, in two senses. One is that 
predicates, relations and functions of higher-orders are definable in 
terms of non-logical constants at lower levels. Thus, there is a sense 
in which higher-order logic can be made to "collapse" into second- 
order logic, by successively making definitions which lengthen the 
number of places in a relation, say, but each time bring it one level 
down. The details are not important for us and they are well 
documented.^^^
Stewart Shapiro, Foundations Without Foiindationalism, (Oxford Logic
Guides: 17; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991 ), pp. 137 -140.
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The second sense in which higher-order logic is similar to 
second-order logic is that second-order logic and higher-order logics 
have many of the same limitative results. First-order logic is 
complete, semi-decidable, has the upward and downward 
Lowenheim-Skolem properties and is compact. In contrast, second- 
order logic is incomplete, undecidable, has neither Lowenheim- 
Skolem property and is not compact. This is also the case with third- 
order logic, fourth order logic, and indeed, higher-order logic.^^  ^As 
we saw in chapter three, a formal theory's having this combination 
of limitative results, is, by and large, an advantage, if our purpose is 
to pick out logic in the philosophically interesting sense I have 
suggested.
As a separate point, if we are willing to extend the notion of 
quantifier in first-order logic, to that of second-order quantifier, it is 
not at all clear that we should stop at second-order. Just as a point of 
fact, quantifiers of order higher than two, are seldom needed to 
express mathematical notions. Still, there are some notions whose 
full definition requires third order quantifiers, and some which 
require even higher-order quantifiers. For example: "is a two-place 
relation". Thus, while in practice, we rarely go very high in a higher- 
order language, our considerations give us no way of stopping 
ourselves at second-order logic. However, here, we shall simply 
consider second-order logic, and leave the question open as to the 
conformity of higher-order logics and other systems.
We should now evaluate philosophically whether or not the 
second-order quantifiers belong to a list of logical constants, 
whether this makes for a logical language, and if this language 
applied to any domain, makes a logic. Let us begin with 
universality. That is, we ask if the language, resulting from adding 
second-order quantifiers to the list of logical constants to the 
language of first-order logic, can really be applied to any domain. 
The semantics for second-order logic are more complicated than the
^^^Stewart Shapiro, Foundations Without Foundationalism. (Oxford Logic
Guides: 17; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), pp. 137 -140.
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semantics for first-order logic. We could see some of this from the 
figure above. Nevertheless, the domain of individuals is still 
arbitrary. Thus, the individual variables range over any domain we 
like. This was also the case with first-order logic. Unlike in first- 
order logic, we also have concept variables (where "concept" is 
generic for predicates relations and functions). The one-place 
predicates are variables which range over the powerset of the set of 
individuals, that is, over all subsets of the domain. Thus, we have 
maximal arbitrariness. We shall discuss topic neutrality shortly.
As far as validity is concerned, second-order logic is more 
satisfying than first-order logic. This is because arguments such as: 
the first sculpture in the exhibition is large, 
the last sculpture in the exhibition is large, 
the first and last sculpture are distinct, 
therefore, there are at least two sculptures which have 
some property in common; 
turns out valid in second-order logic. Similarly, the following 
argument can also be shown to be valid in second-order logic, but 
not in first order.'^ ®^
Most trees are tall.
Most trees have green foliage.
Therefore, there are some tall green trees.
Second-order logic has much more expressive power than first- 
order logic. This is because in second-order logic, we can generalise 
(in the sense of universally quantify) over predicates, relations and 
functions. More levels of generality are allowed, unlike in first-order 
logic, where we are restricted to generalising over individuals.
Thus, there is a sense in which second-order logic is more general 
than first-order logic: we may not only consider and quantify over 
any domain of individuals, we may also quantify over their 
properties, relations and functions.
many more examples see: George Boolos, "Nonfirstordcrizability Again", 
Linguistic Enquiry. XV, 2,1984 pp. 343-4, or George Boolos, "To Be is to Be a 
Value of a Variable (or to Be Some Values of Some Variables)", lournal of 
Philosophy, Vol. LXXXI1984, pp. 430 - 449.
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From the perspective of second-order logic, first-order logic 
seems artificial in allowing quantification over individual variables, 
but not over predicates, relations and functions. As logicists, we 
want logic to be general: we want to be able to quantify over any 
domain. Quantification over first-order predicates is quantification 
over subsets of the domain of individuals. Quantification over n- 
place relations, is quantification over ordered n-tuples of the 
domain of individuals raised to the power n. Similarly for functions. 
Quantification over n-place first-order functions is quantification 
over (n + l)-tuples of the domain raised to the power of (n + 1). By 
allowing in second-order quantifiers we have allowed ourselves, not 
only quantifications over the domain of individuals, but also over 
subsets of the powerset of that set. Because we can quantify over 
first-order concepts, when we say that we may quantify over any 
domain, we are being more general than in the first-order case.
Thus, even this aspect of universality is better exemplified by 
second-order logic than first-order logic.
The other aspect of universality is topic neutrality. Second- 
order logic is categorical. That is, it can pick out models for its 
theories uniquely up to isomorphism. In particular, second-order 
logic has the expressive power to express and recognise any finite 
cardinality. Furthermore, in the language of second-order logic, we 
can express Dedekind finiteness: that a set is finite if it has no 
proper subset which can be placed into one-to-one correspondence 
with it. We can express Dedekind infinity, and the notion of 
powerset, and therefore, many infinite cardinalities.^^^ We decided 
earlier, in chapter two, section one, that the capacity of a logic to 
pick out sets uniquely up to isomorphism was to be treated as a 
standard of adequacy for the ability of the logic to reflect an 
informal notion of logical validity.
However, we seem to run into trouble. For, if we allow 
quantification over individuals, properties, relations and functions.
*9^Stewart Shapiro, Foundations Without Foundationalism, (Oxford Logic
Guides: 17; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), pp. 141 -157.
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then we presuppose that we can distinguish the different sorts of 
variable. This does not require sense experience, but it may seem to 
require intuition. For, we are asked to identify different types or 
sorts. However, note that quantification over a property and 
quantification over a relation is a matter of number of places. A 
property is a one-place relation. The distinction between functions 
and relations is greater. However, it is worth noting, that in higher- 
order logic or in simple type theory, a first-order n-place function 
can be defined as a second-order n + 1-place relation. The function 
is described as a relation such that it relates series of arguments to a 
value. As we noted earlier, technically, there is not much difference 
between allowing higher-order quantification or second-order 
quantification. Insofar as we accept this, the salient difference 
between sorts of variable: individual, predicate, relation or function 
variable, can be reduced to one between the number of places of 
variables and whether they are individual or concept variables. As 
for the number of places, this is perfectly in keeping with our 
conception of logic since all we want to argue for here are relations 
and functions of finite numbers of places, and finite numbers are 
already expressible in terms of logical vocabulary. As for the 
appreciation of the distinction between a concept variable and an 
individual variable, this looks as though it might require intuition of 
some sort. Furthermore, the intuition might be of a kind offensive to 
our criteria.
The price we would have to pay in rejecting a formal system 
which distinguishes concepts from objects is high. For, the 
distinction is embedded in first-order logic in the syntax, and 
therefore, if we were to reject a formal system as a logic on the 
grounds that it distinguishes concepts from objects, we should have 
to give up first-order logic as well. This is just a warning. However, 
we do not have to give up both first and second-order logic. For, we 
can argue for the distinction, between concept (in the generic sense) 
and object, being worthy of consideration as a logical distinction.
Let us apply our criteria.
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We might think that in making a distinction between concept 
and object in this way in a formal system, that we have strayed from 
generality, since we have started to delineate different categories.
We might think that appreciation of the difference requires sense 
perception or intuition. However, so far, we have left open the 
possibility that abstract objects can feature as individuals just as 
much as physical objects. Thus, apprehension of a set of objects does 
not require sense perception particularly, although it may do, such 
as when our domain is composed of the red objects in the room. We 
are, after all, allowed to consider any domain we like. Picking out a 
domain as such is not the business of logic. Logic features only 
when we want to make arguments concerning objects in a domain.
Furthermore, we do not require Kantian spatial or temporal 
intuition to appreciate the difference between objects and concepts. 
Nevertheless, we might still require intuition in an offensive sense. 
Under the view of second-order logic being developed here, once 
we are given a domain of objects, all subsets of those objects have a 
concept. Thus, for an arbitrary subset, there is a concept 
corresponding to it. For this reason, we do not seem to violate topic 
neutrality. That is, there are no particular subsets of individuals 
which are singled out.
Moreover, a distinction between individual and concept 
under this very broad understanding is nothing more than what we 
find when we distinguish a token from a type or a genus from a 
species. For example, when we say "all whales are mammals" or 
"Socrates is a man". This distinction is crucial in appreciating the 
validity of an argument, and is therefore, a crucial component of a 
logic according to our criterion of validity.
Moreover, with respect to topic neutrality, second-order logic 
fares better than the extension of first-order logic with the 
Mostowski generalised quantifiers.
The complaint about the Mostowski generalised quantifiers 
was that in the case of named cardinals, such as "most" or Ko, we 
had to presuppose a sophisticated (and not obviously logical)
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theory about cardinal number s. In the case of ambiguous cardinal 
properties such as "most", "few", "half", these depended on the size 
of the domain. Furthermore, we may need to tinker with the 
standard theory of cardinality, in order to accommodate, say, the 
notion of "half" in some contexts involving infinite sets. Prima facie, 
this suggests that we require intuition, in some sense, to determine 
the truth of sentences whose truth depends upon particular non­
standard theories of cardinality or some theory of topology or 
whatever. Of course, we have run into the analyticity criterion. The 
relationship between topic neutrality and analyticity is this. Topic 
neutrality is a generality requirement. Deciding whether or not 
some aspect of a logic conforms to the criterion requires that 
attention be paid as to the analyticity of sentences which use that 
aspect of the logic.
In contrast, 3 and V do not require a sophisticated 
background theory about cardinality. As Frege put it: "affirmation 
of existence is in fact nothing but denial of the number n o u g h t .  
Similarly, the universal quantifier does not depend on the size of the 
domain to know its satisfaction conditions. We just take all of the 
domain.
Thus, according to the considerations here, where 
Mostowski's quantifiers fail, the second-order universal and 
existential quantifiers pass. It turns out that accepting the second- 
order universal and existential quantifiers allows us to recover at 
least the standard theory of cardinality, in the sense that we can 
define finite numbers, the notion of Dedekind finite. Dedekind 
infinite, Kq , and so on. We can also recover many of the 
Mostowski generalised quantifiers such as "Most", "half", and so 
on. 202 This allows us to show, through the definitional resources of
2^ 0^^ ]sq  ^ this will beg the question against the logicist, since he is not allowed to 
presuppose a sophisticated theory about cardinality if he is trying to prove, in any 
respectable sense, that the natural numbers are a part of logic.
2^  ^Gottlob Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic, Trans. J, L. Austin. (Second 
revised edition; Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1980), § 53.
202s te wart Shapiro, Foundations Without Foundationalism. (Oxford Logic 
Guides: 17; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), pp. 96 - 109.
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second-order logic, that these cardinality notions are analytic! They 
then earn their place amongst the logical notions. Recall that Frege's 
positive characterisation of analyticity was that a sentence is 
analytic if it follows from logical laws together with definitions.
Grosso modo, the addition, to the language of first-order logic, 
of the second-order universal and existential quantifiers to the list of 
logical constants, is consistent with our criteria for a language to be 
logical. Furthermore, the formal system resulting from stipulating 
that the language can be applied to any domain of individuals is 
consistent with our criteria for being a logic. Therefore, second- 
order logic is logic.
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Conclusion
The thesis provides a meeting ground for three broad lines of 
thought. One is to partially contribute towards the revival of a 
philosophical idea which, for various historical reasons, we too hastily 
abandoned. The idea is that of logicism. It was championed by Frege at 
the turn of the century.
The second line of thought is that logic enjoys a certain 
philosophical privilege. We want to make this more explicit: account 
for it and explain what the privilege consists in.
The third line of thought is somewhat negative. It is that if we 
consult the technical books on the subject of logic, mathematical logic, 
meta-mathematics, model theory and so on, we are faced with some 
formal systems which are called mathematical, and others which are 
called logic. For any formal system with more expressive power than 
first-order logic, the distinction seems somewhat arbitrary; or at least, 
does not seem to be motivated by an unique set of considerations. 
Faced with this situation, we want to give clear reasons for drawing a 
distinction between logic and mathematics.
The reasons can be clear, without being determinate in all cases. 
That our reasons should not always determine, for a given formal 
system, whether it constitutes logic or mathematics, is somewhat 
inevitable since we have chosen to draw on philosophical 
considerations rather than on technical ones, and the match is not 
guaranteed beforehand to be perfect!
This choice is in keeping with the second line of thought: that 
logic enjoys a certain philosophical privilege over (the rest of) 
mathematics. Thus, fitting the second and third lines of thought 
together, we have the task of facing philosophical considerations with 
formal systems and looking for a match. Fitting in the first line of 
thought, we chose our philosophical considerations from those which 
motivated Frege when he proposed to prove that numbers are logical 
objects.
2 0 2
Conclusion
Both logic and mathematics have developed considerably this 
century. In the light of certain developments it has turned out that we 
cannot entirely keep intact the philosophical considerations which 
motivated Frege. On the one hand, they have to be made more precise. 
On the other hand, they have to be modified. Nevertheless, the 
technical discovery that the formal system of the Begriffsschrift. together 
with Hume's principle added as an axiom, is both consistent and 
sufficiently powerful to derive the Peano axioms, encourages us to look 
again at Frege's logicist project.
The technical discovery, in conjunction with some interesting 
philosophical arguments to the effect that the resulting formal system  
goes some way towards vindicating Frege's logicism, has renewed 
interest in the logicist project. Two debates ensued.203 One was centred 
on the status of Hume's principle. The other focused on particular 
arguments which were meant to show that second-order logic is really 
set theory. In the thesis, we have largely left these debates aside: the 
first, because it lies out with the scope of the thesis; the second, because 
it is too narrow.
The sought after conclusion of logicist arguments is that the 
natural numbers are logical objects. Showing this can be thought of as 
having two parts. One is to show that Hume's principle is a logical 
principle. The other is to show that the formal system, to which we are 
adding Hume's principle as an axiom, deserves to be called a logic. The 
aim of the thesis, has been to argue that second-order logic does 
deserve tliis title.
I have endeavoured to defend this claim in two respects. One 
defence is against specific arguments to show that anything stronger
203por example, see: George Boolos, "Saving Frege from Contradiction," 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. LXXXVII (1986 - 7), pp. 137 -151, 
Goege Boolos, "The Standard of Equality of Numbers," Meaning and Method: 
Essays in Honor of Hilary Putnam, cd. George Boolos, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), pp. 261 - 278, Michael Dummett, Frege Philosophy of 
Mathematics. (London: Duckworth, 1991), Crispin Wright. Frege's Conception of 
Numbers as Objects. (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1983), Richard Heck 
Jnr., "On the Consistency of Second-Order Definitions," Nous, vol. XXVI.4 (1992), 
pp. 491 - 494, Bob Hale, "Frege's Platonism," The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 
XXXIV (special issue: Frege, 1984).
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than first-order logic does not deserve to be called logic. The other 
respect in which I have tried to defend the claim is in terms of 
philosophical criteria which indicate the significance of the logicist 
project.
There is a conjunction of criteria which are intimately related. 
They are: an informal notion of logical validity, universality and 
analyticity. Their interrelation is as follows. We have an intuitive notion 
as to what counts as a logically valid argument. Mathematicians in 
particular, have cultivated these intuitions. As it turns out, to reflect 
this intuitive notion, we need an expressively powerful formal 
language. What the intuition consists in is a sense of universality. A 
logically valid argument is one which can be brought to bear in any 
situation. Universality has two aspects. One, is that a logical language 
should be applicable to any domain of objects. The other, is that a logic 
has to be topic neutral. That is, logic ignores particular features which 
objects in a domain possess.
The first aspect ruled out any non-logical constants being 
allowed in a logical language on the grounds that these effect a 
selection of domains, because they are accompanied by intended 
interpretations. Furthermore, recognition that the intended domain is 
manifest comes from outside logic. It has to be expressed in a meta­
language. The second aspect was expressed in terms of being able to 
pick out structures uniquely up to isomorphism. This proved to be a 
good measure of the adequacy of a language to reflect our informal 
notion of logical validity. What shows us that isomorphism is a salient 
measure is that the truths of logic must be analytic.
This criterion also has into two aspects. This time we have 
positive and negative characterisations. The negative aspect is that a 
sentence is analytically true if recognition of its truth does not rely on 
sense experience or on intuition. That is, we have to be able to justify an 
analytic assertion by appeal to very basic truths. The positive aspect is 
meant to flesh out what "recognition" amounts to. One does not have to 
look very far in Frege to think that what he had in mind was an 
effective proof procedure, expressed in terms of his famous gapless
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proofs. We rejected this positive construal of analyticity on the grounds 
that Godel's incompleteness results show us that requiring all truths of 
a formal system to be justified by means of an effective proof procedure 
makes for a very limited formal system. In particular, said formal 
systems have very low expressive power, and therefore, compromise 
our validity criterion too much.
The formal system of second-order logic passes muster under 
these criteria. The significance of second-order logic's conforming to 
these criteria is that it shows wherein the feasibility of the logicist 
project lies in the modern context. It is also, therefore, in the light of 
these criteria that arguments for and against the logicist project should 
be conducted.
"...et j'aurai vu encore une belle journée s'éiriietter on ne sait 
comment, inutile, raccourcie, gâchée..."
-Collette, L'entrave
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